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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse directors' incentives in large companies 
in Japan and the UK, with particular emphasis on the relationship between corporate 
governance and executive compensation. This thesis seeks to contrast the effect of 
corporate governance on the determinants of executive pay, by comparing the UK and 
Japan. 
Firstly, this research estimates the determinants of executive compensation in 
Japan. We find a positive relationship between an employee's wage and a director's 
salary, which is consistent with our hypothesis that both directors and employees are 
paid in similar ways. In contrast, this research can not find any relationship between 
shareholders' return and directors' pay in Japan, suggesting that directors have little 
incentive to pursue shareholders' interest. 
In contrast, this research finds that top pay in the UK is positively correlated 
with most company performance variables, including profit, stock market capitalisation 
and sales, which is consistent with our hypothesis that shareholders in large UK 
companies have relatively strong powers to control top managers and their 
compensation through remuneration committees. 
This research also analyses the effects of company's pay policy on corporate 
performance. Our analysis on data from the UK shows that there is a positive 
relationship between `company's pay policy' and firm performance. The company with 
an annual bonus scheme is more likely to improve company profit and earnings per 
-2- 
share, for example. 
In contrast, there is no relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and 
firm performance in Japan, showing that the performance-pay sensitivity does not affect 
company performance in Japan's large companies, or the directors in those companies 
are not motivated by the change in performance-pay sensitivity. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose and Background of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse directors' incentives in large 
companies in Japan and the UK, with particular emphasis on the relationship 
between corporate governance and executive compensation. 
It is widely believed that large Japanese companies work differently from 
their British counterparts. Some studies suggest that Japanese firms are more 
concerned with the welfare of their core employees than with the interests of their 
shareholders (Komiya, 1988, Iwai, 1988, Kuwahara, 1988, Itami, 1993,1994, 
Dore, 1987), whereas British firms strive to satisfy their shareholders, who wield 
considerable power. In our opinion, it is important to examine whether the 
behaviour of large Japanese firms is indeed different from those in the UK, since 
some authors have argued that the performance of the Japanese economy can be 
attributed to precisely such a difference. Weitzman (1984) has argued that this 
difference is behind Japan's low unemployment rate. Theoretically, `profit 
maximising firms' gain profit by reducing the number of employees, while 
`labour managed firms' protect employment by reducing their profits. 
Some suggested that directors of large Japanese firms believe that the 
goal of companies includes protecting the job security and welfare of their 
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employees, in addition to improving their financial position' (Tachibanaki, 1995, 
Noda, 1995, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 1995, Kagono et al 1983). Over ninety 
percent of directors choose `employees' job security' and `employees' welfare' as 
very important objectives (Tachibanaki, 1995, Noda, 1995)2. 
Although standard economics textbooks assume that the objective of a 
firm is to maximise its profit, it is often argued that companies are not really run 
in accordance with this. It has been argued that managers work in their own 
interests, rather than that of the shareholders (Baumal, 1959, Marris, 1964, 
Williamson, 1986). Some studies focus on the financial incentive of top managers 
in order to test this self-serving hypothesis. They estimate the determinants of 
executive compensation, though the results are not clear (Cosh, 1975, Iwasaki, 
1977, Williamson, 1986, Benston, 1985)3. 
' These works are based on questionnaire surveys and interviews. 
Z According to Kagono et al (1983), one of the most important objectives of Japanese firms is to 
maximise their market share. One reason why a company pursues growth may be to protect its 
employees' jobs. 
3 Cosh (1975), Iwasaki (1977), Ciscel and Carol (1980) find a positive correlation between 
executive pay and company size. It is argued that this correlation suggests that managers are 
maximising the size of the company, rather than the profit. But as Simon (1957), and Lydall (1968) 
show, this correlation may reflect the internal structure of the firm. Benston (1985) shows that 
there is a strong correlation between the financial return of directors in major conglomerates and 
the shareholder's return. He argues that this result is inconsistent with the self-serving managerial 
hypothesis. 
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1.2. Economic Theory of Executive Compensation 
1.2.1. Principal-Agent Theory 
There have been many studies on executive compensation in both the US 
and the UK (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, Gibbons and Murphy, 1990, Cosh and 
Hugh, 1997, Conyon, 1995,1997, Conyon, Gregg, and Machin, 1995, Conyon 
and Leech, 1994, Conyon and Nicolitsas, 1998, Gregg, Machin and Szymanski, 
1993, McKnight, 1996, Wolfram, 1998). Most of these studies investigated 
whether there was a significant relationship between top pay and company 
performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, Gibbons and Murphy, 1990), and were 
trying to test whether directors in large companies have an incentive to increase a 
shareholder's value. According to principal-agent theory, executive pay may 
depend on shareholders' return, so directors may have an incentive to pursue this. 
1.2.2. Rank Order Tournament 
It is often argued that executive compensation not only motivates the 
directors, but also the employees of companies (Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Lazear, 
1991,1995). According to rank order tournament theory, employees may work 
hard to be promoted to executive positions'. Some scholars have used this model 
I According to Lazear (1995), there are certain characteristics of rank order tournament. Firstly, the 
compensation is attached to the rank of the employee, rather than his performance. Secondly, 
newly recruited employees start their career from the bottom layer of the company hierarchy, and 
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to explain the incentive structure of typical Japanese firms (Aoki, 1990,1994, Ito, 
1994). 
According to rank order tournament theory, directors' pay may be larger 
than their productivity. This `overpayment to the directors' may be efficient under 
some circumstances, because other employees may work harder to be promoted. 
1.3. Previous Empirical Researchs 
1.3.1. The Determinants of Executive Pay 
As described above, there are many studies that estimated the 
determinants of executive compensation in the US and in the UK, analysing 
whether CEOs in large companies have incentives to improve shareholders' 
values (Coughlan, A., and Schmidt, R., 1985, Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1990, Cosh and Hugh, 1997, Conyon, 1995,1997, Conyon, 
Gregg, and Machin, 1995, Conyon and Leech, 1994, Conyon and Nicolitsas, 1998, 
Gregg, Machin and Szymanski, 1993, McKnight, 1996, Wolfram, 1998). 
Many studies suggest that in large UK companies the relationship 
between directors' salaries and a firm's performance was weak (Gregg et al., 1993, 
Conyon, 1995), while McKnight (1996) finds a positive relationship. 
Although relatively few attempts have made to analyse directors' 
incentives in Japan, it has sometimes been argued that there is little difference 
between Japan and the US in this respect. Some previous studies on executive pay 
compete with each other for promotion. Thirdly, promotion is based on relative performance. 
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and turnover state that there is a significant similarity between the two, in terms of 
the financial incentives of directors (Kaplan, 1994, Xu, 1992,1993,1996,1997, 
Abe, 1997). According to Kato and Rockel (1991), however, there is little 
relationship between a shareholders' return and executive pay. 
1.3.2. The Effect of Executive Pay on Firm Performance 
Although there are many studies on the determinants of executive 
compensation, there are relatively few studies on the effect of pay policy on 
company performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b, Abowd, 1990, Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno, 1990). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990b) find that the performances of companies 
with high pay-performance sensitivity are much better than those with low 
sensitivity. Abowd (1990) also analysed the effect of performance-based 
executive compensation on company performance, finding that companies with 
higher pay-performance sensitivity are more likely to achieve better economic 
returns in the following year. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) tested whether 
tournament acts as incentive device, suggesting that rank order tournament is 
indeed an effective incentive device. 
I We will show the details of these empirical studies in chapters 2 and 3. 
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1.4. Corporate Governance and Executive Pay 
1.4.1. Why Compare? 
Much of the literature on the determinants of executive compensation in 
the US and the UK tend to focus on the relationship between directors' pay and 
the shareholders' return. Many of these studies often take for granted the `Anglo- 
American style of corporate governance'. This thesis seeks to contrast the effect 
of corporate governance on the determinants of executive pay, by comparing the 
UK and Japan. 
As will be discussed in chapter 2, there is a considerable difference 
between Japan and the UK in terms of corporate governance. Shareholders and 
the financial market have considerable power over directors in large UK 
companies. There are more hostile take-overs in the UK than in Japan (Odagiri, 
1994, Prowse, 1994). In contrast, because of the long-term employment 
relationship, employees in large Japanese firms have strong incentive to monitor 
top managers (Itami, 1994). 
1.4.2. The Determinants of Executive Compensation 
As seen above, shareholders in large UK companies have relatively 
strong powers to control top managers and their compensation through 
remuneration committees. Principal-agent theory predicts that a directors' salary 
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depend on a firm's performance, particularly its stock market performance, in 
order to motivate top managers to work towards increasing shareholders' interest. 
Then, we hypothesise that there is a positive relationship between directors' salary 
and a firm's performance in the UK. 
Similarly, this research will estimate the determinants of executive 
compensation in Japan. As will be discussed in chapter 5, a director's salary has 
many similarities with an employee's wage in large Japanese companies: Both 
directors and employees are paid a monthly wage and bonuses. Both a director's 
salary and an employee's wage are reflected in the firm's performance, such as its 
sales and profit. In addition, an employee's wage is, in practice, one of the most 
important determinants of a director's salary (Abe et al., 1997, Okushima eds., 
1996). Thus, we can hypothesise that there is a positive relationship between a 
director's salary and an employee's wage in Japan. 
1.4.3. The Effect of Pay Policy on Firm Performance 
Various incentive schemes for directors are used in large UK companies, 
with the aim of strengthening the link between director's incentive and 
shareholders' interest. Many listed companies in the UK have stock options and 
annual incentives. Many of them are disclosing the details of their executive pay, 
remuneration policy and performance criteria, in response to the Cadbury and 
Greenbury report (Cadbury Committee, 1992, Greenbury Committee, 1995) 
In addition, in the UK, many large companies seem to be strengthening 
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the link between firm performance and executive pay, with more of them 
introducing an annual incentive scheme (Conyon, Gregg, and Machin, 1995, 
Monks partnership, 1994), often with the intention of motivating directors to work 
hard and set clear performance targets (Williams, 1994). 
This brings us to the next important question. Namely, are these 
remuneration policies really effective? For example, do companies with annual 
incentives perform better than those without? Is there any relationship between 
pay-performance sensitivity and company performance? Though more and more 
companies seem to be trying to introduce new compensation schemes for directors 
(Conyon, Gregg, and Machin, 1995, Monks partnership, 1994), little attempt has 
been made to test whether pay policy affects company performance. 
As will be discussed in chapter 7, principal-agent theory predicts that 
CEOs are more motivated with higher pay-performance sensitivity, leading to a 
firm's higher performance. If large UK companies strengthen the link between a 
firm's performance and CEOs pay, the firm's performance may improve. This 
research hypothesises that there is a positive relationship in large UK companies 
between director's compensation and the performance of the firm, including how 
it fares in the stock market. 
This research will analyse the effects of company pay policy on corporate 
performance. The main hypotheses are as follows. 1) Companies with high pay- 
performance sensitivity will perform better than those without. 2) Companies with 
annual incentive schemes will perform better than those without them. In 
particular, we estimated logistic regression, investigating the possibility of the 
company improving its performance. Similar equations are estimated using data 
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from Japan. 
It is believed to be important to compare the results for Japan with those 
for the UK since the two countries have a different corporate governance style. In 
the UK, the financial market plays a more active role in monitoring top directors 
(Prowse, 1994, Odagiri, 1994). In addition, many companies are trying to 
strengthen the relationship between company performance and top pay, in 
response to the recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury committees. By 
contrast, few large Japanese firms show an interest in this. As a result, it may be 
that directors in the UK understand their goals better than their counterparts in 
Japan. As suggested in Marsden and French (1998), appropriate goal setting may 
help managers to concentrate on specific targets, leading to higher performance. 
Thus, it may be of interest to compare the effect of `pay policy `on firm 
performance in Japan and the UK. 
1.4.4. Rank Order Tournament 
According to Aoki (1990), and Ito (1994), rank order tournament theory 
can explain how these internal promotion systems in large Japanese firms 
motivate their employees. 
Although relatively few empirical studies have been done on the internal 
promotion systems in large Japanese firms, recent works show that the internal 
structure of Japanese firms have many similarities with the rank order tournament 
system. Pay in large Japanese firms depends on the rank of the employee (Koike, 
1994, Tachibanaki, 1987). Promotion is based mainly on tenure and relative 
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performance (Koike, 1994, Hanada, 1994, Tomita, 1992). 
Thus we can hypothesise that the rank order tournament is used as an 
incentive device for employees, and that directors are motivated by performance- 
related compensation in large companies in Japan. This research analyses the 
effect of the promotion probability on the pay gap between directors and 
employees. Tournament theory implies that there is a negative relationship 
between promotion probability and this pay gap. 
1.4.5. Data 
The Japanese companies are taken from the 210, which are included in 
the NIKKEI STOCK MARKET INDEX, excluding firms in the finance sector. 
The time period covered is 1995 and 1996. Most variables, including directors' 
pay and their bonuses, are taken from the NIKKEI NEEDS DATABASE. Other 
variables are taken from Toyo Keizai Yakuin Shikihou (Directory of directors), 
and Kabushiki Toshi Shuekiritsu (Rate of Return on Stocks in Japan). This 
research focuses on the director's average pay, calculated on the basis of these 
data. For the analysis of UK companies, data from almost 1500 listed companies 
are used as a sample. The time period covered is 1994 and 1995. The data 
analysed here are taken from Monks partnership's "United Kingdom board 
earnings", which is based on companies' annual reports. This research focuses on 
the highest paid director's pay, which is disclosed in these data. 
Using these data, this research estimates the determinants of executive 
remuneration in both countries. The main hypotheses are as follows. 1) In Japan, 
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there is a positive correlation between director's salary and employees' average 
wage, rather than shareholders' return. 2) In the UK, the director's pay depends on 
corporate performance, particularly in the stock market. 
1.5. Structure of this Thesis 
This dissertation consists of 9 chapters. In chapter 2, an account is 
provided of the corporate governance systems of Japan and the UK, showing that 
there are important differences between the two. 
We begin by comparing the institutional difference in corporate 
governance, with particular emphasis on the power of shareholders over directors. 
We examine various mechanisms that monitor the managers, such as annual 
shareholders' meetings, outside directors, and the financial market. In addition to 
these monitoring devices, it is suggested that the employer-employee relationship 
may be a further constraint on how directors manage the firm. 
It is shown that there is a difference in the role of these mechanisms in 
Japan and the UK. In particular, shareholders in Japan have very limited control 
over the managers of large companies. In most large companies in Japan, both 
annual shareholders meetings and board of directors are controlled by the current 
management team. Thus, it is suggested that the directors have little incentive to 
pursue shareholders' return, as the shareholders have very limited power to punish 
the current management team. In addition, it is suggested that the financial market 
may fail to motivate directors to work in the shareholders' interests in Japan, 
compared with in the UK. For example, there are fewer hostile take-overs in 
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Japan than in the UK (Odagiri, 1994, Prowse, 1994). 
We also analyse the employee-management relationship in both countries. 
It is suggested that top directors in large Japanese firms are more restricted by this 
relationship. It may not be easy for directors in large Japanese firms to lay-off 
their employees. In addition, employees in such firms have strong incentives to 
monitor top management, as they are implicitly investing through deferred 
compensation. 
How then, can the stakeholders motivate directors to work in their 
interests? Executive compensation can be such an incentive mechanism, as it is 
possible to link the manager's financial incentive to those of other stakeholders. 
In chapter 3, we review relevant existing theories, and examine the 
institutional characteristics of executive compensation in both countries. Firstly, 
we examine principal-agency theory, most widely cited in explanations of the 
executive compensation, as well as other theories. Agency theory suggests that 
managerial compensation is tied to performance measures. For example, if, the 
directors are managing the company on behalf of the shareholders, or in other 
words, if they are agents of principals (shareholders), then, their compensation 
will depend on the shareholders' return. If, on the contrary, employees have 
considerable power over managers, then a positive relationship will be observed 
between directors' salary and employees' wage6. Other theories of executive pay 
are reviewed, including the `hierarchical structure' theory (Simon, 1957, Lydall, 
6 The employees may be more concerned about their job security than their average wage. 
However, this research focuses on the relationship between director's compensation and 
employees' wage. One reason is that it is very difficult to measure job security. 
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1968). Chapter 3 also outlines previous research on executive compensation. 
There have been many empirical studies done on the determinants of executive 
compensation, particularly in the US (Rosen, 1990, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
In addition to this, we explain the internal incentive structure of large 
companies. After providing a review of rank order tournament theory, (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981, Lazear, 1991,1995), we explain the results of empirical studies into 
the career paths of directors in the UK and in Japan (Korn/Ferry, 1981, Yamamoto 
and Takase, 1987). This research also uses Labour Force Survey and Census to 
compare the characteristics of directors in both countries. 
Chapter 3 also describes the characteristics of employment structure in 
large Japanese companies, often described as ranking hierarchy (Aoki, 1988). This 
research suggests that rank order tournament type incentive structure is used for 
managerial positions in large Japanese firms, while for non-managerial positions, 
ranking hierarchy is used. 
Chapter 4 examines the data set and their source. Firstly, we examine and 
compare some of the available data sources. Particular attention is paid to the 
executive compensation data, as individual executive compensation data are not 
disclosed in Japan. It is suggested that executive compensation data based on a 
company's annual report are more reliable and accurate than data from other 
sources, for example, data based on income tax in Japan. The sources of data on 
UK companies are also examined. Some basic characteristics of the data are also 
reported in this chapter in order to compare our data set with those used in 
previous studies. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the determinants of executive compensation 
in Japan and the UK. In chapter 5, it is shown how our hypotheses are drawn from 
theories, and how these hypotheses can be examined using micro-data from 
companies. We explain the model and methodology used to analyse the 
determinants of executive compensation in Japan and in the UK. 
The discussion in chapter 3 suggests that shareholders have considerable 
power over top directors in the UK, while in Japan, employees may have some 
power to monitor top directors. In other words, top directors of large UK 
companies may be seen as agents of shareholders. In large companies in the UK, 
directors' salaries are often determined by remuneration committees, which are 
composed of non-executive directors. The number of companies that have 
remuneration committees are increasing (Conyon et al. 1995). 
In contrast, in Japan, directors and employees are paid in similar ways. 
Both of them are paid monthly wages and bonuses, which usually make up 15- 
30% of the annual salary. A firm's performance, such as profit and sales are 
important determinants of salaries. Why are directors and employees paid in 
similar ways? One of the most important reasons is that both of them can be seen 
as implicit investors in the company. 
Thus, we obtain our main hypothesis: The effect of employees' wage on 
directors' compensation is positive, whereas the effect of shareholders' interests is 
not, in Japan. It is also hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between 
top pay and company performance, particularly stock market performance, in the 
UK. 
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We explain the basic model for estimating executive compensation in 
Japan and the UK. As in previous studies, this research estimates the executive 
compensation function for both countries. The dependent variable is executive 
compensation; The independent variables include company performance, in 
addition to employees' wage. 
For the Japanese data, the average pay and average bonus of directors are 
used as dependent variables. Independent variables are employees' average wage, 
profit, return on capital, shareholders' return, sales, number of employees, and 
directors' characteristics such as average age and tenure. For the UK data, the 
highest paid director's total pay, their fixed pay, and their annual incentive are 
used as dependent variables. The independent variables include company profit, 
earnings per share, the stock market value of the company, and sales. We give the 
definition and explain the expected effect of these independent variables. 
In chapter 6, the results of these estimations for both countries are shown. 
By estimating the determinants of executive compensation, we test the hypotheses 
which are put forward in previous chapters. 
Firstly, the result of the analysis of the data from Japan is given. The 
main hypothesis here is that there is a positive relationship between a director's 
salary and an employee's wage. Thus, particular emphasis is put on the 
relationship between director's compensation and employees' wage. The effect on 
director's bonus, particularly by company profit, is also assessed. 
The result of the analysis of the UK data is then given. The main 
hypothesis here is that the director's pay in large UK companies depends on 
company performance, and particularly on the stock market valuation of the firm. 
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Thus, particular emphasis is put on the correlation between director's 
remuneration and the stock market evaluation of the company. The effect of other 
independent variables, such as earnings per share and profit before tax, is also 
estimated. The effect of earnings per share and profit before tax is of particular 
interest because these two indicators are the most frequently used performance 
indicator in large UK companies (Williams, 1994). 
The main findings of this research with respect to the Japanese data can 
be summarised as follows. There is a positive relationship between directors' 
compensation and employees' wage in Japan, but we cannot find any positive 
relationship between shareholders' return and top salaries. This research also finds 
a positive relationship between the director's bonus and the profit of the company. 
These findings suggest that a director's compensation is jointly determined with 
an employee's wage in large Japanese companies. By contrast, this research finds 
that top pay in the UK is positively correlated with most company performance 
variables, including profit, stock market capitalisation, and sales. 
Chapter 6 also examines the pay gap between director and employee in 
large companies in Japan. The main hypothesis explored here is that there is a 
negative relationship between pay gap and the possibility of employees becoming 
directors. This hypothesis is implied by rank order tournament theory (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981, Lazear, 1991,1995), which suggests that if the probability for 
promotion for each employee is small, the pay gap may become larger in order to 
motivate employees. Thus, it is considered that there exists a negative correlation 
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if the company uses a tournament type pay structure7. 
The pay gap is calculated as the ratio of compensations between directors 
and employees. Promotion probability is approximated by the ratio of numbers 
between directors and employees'. Thus, we estimate the determinants of the pay 
gap in Japan. The independent variables include promotion probability and the 
size of the company in question. 
We estimate that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
pay gap and promotion probability. The pay gap between directors and employees 
is larger when employees see less change of promotion. This suggests that rank 
order tournament is used in large Japanese companies as an incentive device. 
Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the effect of pay policy on company 
performance in the UK and in Japan. Chapter 7 outlines our hypotheses and 
explains the model and methodology used to test these. The definition of pay- 
performance sensitivity is also discussed, as it is not easy to observe this for 
individual companies. 
As we will see in chapter 3, many attempts have been made to estimate 
the determinants of executive compensation. Many of these empirical studies on 
executive pay implicitly assume that directors are more motivated if their salary is 
more performance sensitive. However, relatively little attempt has been made to 
' Tournament theory implies that the compensation of top directors may exceed their real 
productivity, as this compensation includes a premium for winning the competition. It is of interest 
to see if this holds in large companies in Japan, as the pay gap between directors and employees is 
considered to be smaller than in other industrial countries. 
8 This promotion possibility is calculated by dividing the number of directors by the number of 
employees. This calculation does not show the real possibility of promotion for each employee, as 
it may be the case that `outsiders' are appointed as directors. However, we use this ratio as the 
proxy for the promotion, as most directors in large companies in Japan are former or current 
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analyse the effect of pay policy on company performance' (Abowd, 1990, Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990b). This research hypothesises that the performance of 
companies with high performance-pay sensitivity is superior to that of companies 
with low sensitivity. It is also hypothesised that companies which intensify their 
performance-pay sensitivity perform better than others. 
It is not easy to assess the degree of pay-performance sensitivity for 
individual companies. However, this is necessary in order to examine whether 
companies with high sensitivity perform better. This research defines pay- 
performance sensitivity as the `% change of pay when performance improves by 
1%10'. In this chapter, we also examine alternative ways of measuring of pay- 
performance sensitivity, suggesting that our definition is more appropriate for the 
research objectives at hand". 
This sensitivity variable is calculated for each company, each year. Thus, 
it is possible to examine the effect of `change of sensitivity' on company 
performance. Using this sensitivity definition, we test whether a company that 
intensifies its pay-performance sensitivity will achieve better results. 
Next, we specify the model to be estimated for both countries. Firstly the 
basic model is explained. In our basic model, the dependent variable is a dummy 
employees of the company, and are promoted from the bottom layer of the company hierarchy. 
9 Gibbons (1997) gives a summary of the research in this field. 
1° This pay-performance sensitivity is calculated by dividing the % change of pay by the % change 
of performance. % Change of pay is calculated by dividing the change of pay by the amount of 
pay. 
" Jensen and Murphy (1990b) calculate pay-performance sensitivity by estimating the 
determinants of directors' pay for each company. They compare the performance of companies 
with high coefficient and those with low coefficient, showing that there is a difference in 
performance between these two groups. Though it is possible to distinguish `companies with 
sensitive pay' from `companies with insensitive pay', they assume implicitly that a company's 
pay-performance sensitivity holds constant across time. The advantage of our definition of pay- 
performance sensitivity is that our sensitivity index can capture the change in companies' pay 
policy each year, for each company. 
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variable that shows whether or not the company improves its performance. As 
company performance depends on so many factors, we focus on a dichotomous 
variable that only shows whether the company improved its performance or not. If 
the company improves its performance, this variable is set to 1; If not, it is set to 
012. The independent variables indicate the companies' pay policy, including pay- 
performance sensitivity, and annual bonus dummy. The particular equation is 
specified for the data from each country. For the Japanese data, the dependent 
variables include profit, return on capital, and wage13, while the independent 
variables include pay-performance sensitivity. For the UK data, independent 
variables include the profit and earnings per share14, while the dependent variables 
include not only pay-performance sensitivity, but also dummy variables that show 
whether the company has particular incentives, such as annual incentives. In 
addition, we include a dummy variable that shows whether a company increases 
its pay-performance sensitivity, and a dummy variable that shows whether a 
company introduces an annual incentive scheme for a particular year. 
Chapter 8 gives the results of these estimations. The main hypothesis is 
that companies with high pay-performance sensitivity perform better than the rest. 
We also test the hypothesis that companies with annual incentive schemes perform 
better. This research estimates the performance function, using the same micro 
data used in chapter 6. As the dependent variable is a dummy variable, logistic 
12 We can interpret this dependent variable as the probability that the company will improve its 
performance. 
13 Wage is included as a dependent variable because our analysis in chapter 6 shows that there is a 
significant relationship between wage and director's compensation. 
`a We could not include stock market performance as a dependent variable because our data set 
does not have enough time coverage. We need at least 3 years' data to calculate pay-performance 
sensitivity, and our data on stock market performance covers only 2 years. 
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and probit regressions are employed to estimate these equations. 
In this chapter, we begin by giving the results of the estimation using the 
Japanese data, then moving on to the UK data. The results show whether there is a 
difference between the two countries regarding the effect of pay policy on 
company performance. Particular emphasis is given to the UK results, because 
British companies seem to make more of an effort to tie directors' pay to company 
performance than their Japanese counterparts. If a positive correlation can be 
found between pay-performance sensitivity and corporate performance, these pay 
policies may be considered to be effective. 
The main results of this chapter can be summarised as follows. In general, 
there is a positive correlation between incentive plans and company performance 
in the UK, but not in Japan. For one thing, in the UK, companies which have an 
annual bonus are more likely to improve their profit and earnings per share. 
Similarly, companies with high pay-performance sensitivity perform better than 
those with low sensitivity. In addition, companies that intensify their pay- 
performance sensitivity are more likely to achieve better results. 
In contrast, there is virtually no relationship between performance pay 
sensitivity and company performance in Japan. In addition, companies that 
intensify their pay-performance sensitivity are unlikely to achieve better results 
there. This all suggests that there are substantial differences between two 
countries with respect to the effect of incentive schemes on company performance. 
It is shown that companies' pay policy, or "way to pay" is a very important factor 
in company directors' incentives in the UK. In contrast, performance-pay 
sensitivity does not affect company performance in the large companies of Japan. 
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This difference may reflect the fact that British companies have much better 
designed pay plans for their directors. 
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the main findings of this thesis. After 
doing this, the contribution of this research to the literature on corporate 
governance and executive compensation in Japan and the UK is explained. In the 
first place, this research represents the first attempt to compare the financial 
incentives of directors in these two countries15. There are a number of reasons 
why the UK and Japan were chosen, firstly, the fact that companies in these 
countries have different styles of corporate governance, and secondly and 
relatedly, because this research hypothesises that differences in corporate 
governance will lead to differences in the financial incentive of directors. 
This research compares the effects of employees' wage and shareholders' 
return on directors' compensation in Japan16. A positive and significant 
relationship is found between director's remuneration and employees' wage in the 
large companies. 
In addition, this research is the first to compare the effect of companies' 
`way to pay' on corporate performance in the UK and Japan. The comparison is 
made between these two countries because many British companies have more 
detailed pay plans. 
'S Kato and Rockel (1992), and Kaplan (1994) compare the determinants of directors' 
compensation in Japan with those in the US, though their results are quite different. Kaplan argues 
that the financial incentive of director's in Japan is similar to that of their American counterparts, 
finding a significant relationship between corporate performance and top pay. In contrast, Kato et 
al show that there is no significant relationship between director's compensation and shareholders' 
return. 
16 Xu (1993) compares the effect of employees' wage on director's compensation with that of 
company profit, but fails to obtain a positive relationship between wage and top pay. 
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Chapter 9 also discusses some possible limitations of this research and 
suggests some further projects for further investigation. Some policy implications 
of this thesis are also discussed". 
" In this thesis, we will use `he' and `his', rather than `she' and `her'. This is because most 
directors in Japan and the UK are male, although there are a significant number of female directors, 
particularly in the UK. 
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Chapter 2. Corporate Governance in Japan and 
the UK 
2-1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine corporate governance in both Japan and the 
UK, with particular emphasis on the effectiveness of mechanisms for monitoring 
top management. The main question to be addressed is this: How are top 
managers controlled by shareholders and other stakeholders? And are these 
mechanisms effective? 
Section 2.2 discusses economic theories of corporate governance. It is 
shown that both financial markets and shareholders may fail to monitor senior 
managers because of the moral hazard problem. Section 2.2 also argues that 
employees may have an incentive to monitor top managers. 
We then go on to examine the effectiveness of these monitoring devices 
for managers in Japan and the UK. In section 2.3, the legal structure of corporate 
governance in the two countries is discussed, as well as the effectiveness of 
monitoring by shareholders. In a similar vein, section 2.4 examines the 
effectiveness of the monitoring of directors by the financial market. It is suggested 
that both the financial market and shareholders have a very limited ability to 
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monitor top managers of large companies in Japan. 
Next, we examine the employee-management relationship. It is 
suggested that top managers in Japan may be more constrained by the employee- 
management relationship there. Lastly, we summarise the discussion. 
2-2. The Economic Theory of Corporate Governance 
This section examines economic theories of corporate governance. The 
principal-agent problem is discussed, as well as the effectiveness of various 
monitoring mechanisms for directors from the perspective of economic theory. We 
then explore the possibility that managers may be restricted by the management- 
employee relationship. 
2-2-1. The Principal-Agent Problem 
Many economists have examined the relationship between shareholders 
and directors (Fama, 1980, Gibbons, 1997, Holmstrom, 1979, Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992, Mirrlees, 1976). One of the basic challenges is to design an 
incentive system which encourages directors to manage the company on behalf of 
its shareholders. Although shareholders want directors to pursue their interests, 
managers may have goals of their own in mind. This conflict of interests is often 
known as the principal-agent problem. It is not easy for individual shareholders to 
monitor the top director, because they do not usually have sufficient knowledge; 
This would include knowledge of the product market, and of the company's day- 
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to-day operations. As a result, it may not be easy for shareholders to know 
whether the directors are really pursuing their interest. 
Although shareholders have limited power to keep an eye on the top 
management, there are various mechanisms and institutions which motivate 
directors to work in the interest of shareholders. For example, the stock market 
may punish directors who fail to achieve certain share price, as outside investors 
may be able to gain profit by taking over the firm, resulting in the management 
being replaced. For this reason, directors may be encouraged to keep stock price 
at a certain level. 
In addition, there are certain institutions and groups which act as a good 
monitors of top managers. For example, outside directors are considered to be 
relatively independent, and may therefore be able to monitor the top directors. We 
examine the efficiency of these mechanisms and institutions in the following 
subsection. 
2-2-2. Efficiency of Monitoring Mechanism for Directors 
In this subsection, I will examine the efficiency of monitoring 
mechanisms and institutions for directors based on Stiglitz (1985) and Hart (1995). 
In the first place, we look at monitoring and control by the financial market, 
including hostile take-over and banks. Then, we will examine whether various 
stakeholders can monitor the top directors. Outside directors, large shareholders, 
annual shareholder's meetings and proxy fights are discussed. 
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Hostile take-overs 
The financial market may have a mechanism that forces managers to 
pursue their shareholders' interests. For example, if the actual stock price is lower 
than the potential stock price for that company, investors can gain profit by taking 
over the company and then replace the senior managers. Hence managers must 
keep their stock prices high in order to prevent a hostile take-over and in so doing, 
keep their jobs. However, Hart (1995) suggests that this mechanism suffers from 
the problem of moral hazard. 
According to Hart (1995), hostile take-overs are a very strong device for 
disciplining managers, because they allow whoever takes over the company to 
receive large amounts of gains from it. Once a person can identify an 
underperforming company and take it over, he will receive a large proportion of 
gains by improving the company's efficiency. Thus, many potential investors will 
have an incentive to check whether the company is well managed, in distinct 
contrast to other mechanisms of corporate control. But Hart argues that even 
hostile take-overs have problems. Small shareholders may not co-operate with the 
raider, so that they make a profit after the completion of the take-over. The raider 
will compete with other raiders because they will be aware that the targeted 
company is undervalued, and also fight with the current management team. Hart 
suggested that this problem would make hostile take-overs less profitable than 
expected. 
Stiglitz (1985) also points out that hostile take-overs may not be efficient 
because the assets of the company may be smaller than they appear. The potential 
buyer of the company has less information about it than the current management 
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team, which means that they may misjudge the potential profitability of the 
company. Since the chief executive has much more information about the 
company, if he sells his shares to raiders, he may have a rational reason to do so. 
This means that outside investors can take over the company only when they 
overevaluate it. Since there are a lot of measures that current managers can take to 
prevent hostile take-overs, known as the "golden parachute" and "poison pill", 
take-over may not be a good incentive device. 
The Capital Market 
If the current managers of a company fail to run it well, they may have 
difficulty in raising funds from the capital market. This mechanism can serve as 
an incentive device for managers. The directors may be encouraged to make the 
company attractive to potential investors. However, if managers are able to raise 
capital from banks, or if managers do not have any plans that require additional 
capital, this mechanism will not be effective as a mechanism for corporate control. 
Banks 
Stiglitz (1985) argues that banks and lenders can be a better monitor for 
managers than shareholders. He also argues that banks and large shareholders can 
be a better incentive device for managers than other classical mechanisms such as 
annual general meetings of the shareholders, or hostile take-overs. 
Banks can be the most important monitoring agent, according to Stiglitz 
(1985). By their nature, banks know the profitability of companies. They also 
have a strong incentive to monitor their clients in order to protect their credit. 
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However, banks can not replace the role of shareholders, because their interest is 
different. As banks are usually concerned with their credit, they will be satisfied 
when companies gain a sufficient amount of money for them. In addition, banks 
may want managers to take smaller risks, while shareholders are likely to want 
managers to take risks to achieve higher returns. 
Outside directors 
Outside directors are considered to be an effective way to monitor CEO. 
The Cadbury and Greenbury committees recommended that companies should 
have more outside directors. However, Hart (1995) argues that outside directors 
may not be a good monitor since they may not have sufficient financial incentive 
to check the top management. Outside directors may receive good compensation 
and be happy to remain where they are. Since outside directors are usually 
nominated by CEO (Prowse, 1994), they may want to keep a good relationship 
with managing directors. This means that they will have little incentive to monitor 
managing directors. 
Large shareholders and proxy fights 
Large shareholders have strong incentives and power to monitor the 
management of the company, as their financial wealth depends on this. They can 
use their vote to replace current managers if they think this is necessary. However, 
there are some limits on large shareholders as a mechanism for controlling top 
management. The biggest problem is that large shareholders must share the 
benefit of monitoring with other small shareholders whilst having to bear all the 
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cost of it. Instead, they may choose to exercise their power in another way, by 
colluding with top managers. If a large shareholder is a supplier or client of the 
company, they can use this to make better deals, for example. 
Similarly, proxy fights may not be a good monitoring mechanism. The 
person who initiated them must share their gains with other shareholders, whilst 
shouldering all the costs themselves. 
Annual general meetings of shareholders 
For small shareholders, the cost of obtaining information about the 
management and evaluating managers appropriately is very large. They receive 
little benefit from this monitoring, because the result of meetings will not be 
influenced by their vote. In addition, they may not have enough knowledge of the 
company to monitor it effectively; For example, knowledge of the product market 
may be lacking. Thus, many small individual shareholders do not try to monitor 
the company by themselves. 
2-2-3. The Management-Employee Relationship from the Viewpoint of 
Corporate Governance 
In addition to the financial market and shareholders, employees may also 
act as monitors of the top management. In this subsection, we will explore the 
possibility that the employer-employee relationship restricts the behaviour of top 
managers. In particular we will examine to what extent managers are constrained 
by the employee-management relationship in managing their firms. As seen in 
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previous subsections, managers may be controlled and monitored by the financial 
market, by shareholders and by other monitoring mechanisms. Managers may be 
able to pursue their own interests, on the condition that they satisfy these 
monitoring agents. 
In addition to these constraints imposed by the financial market and 
shareholders, directors may be restricted by the employer-employee relationship 
in how far they manage the company in their own individual interests. For 
example, if it is difficult for managers to fire employees because of legal 
regulations, they will hardly be able to reduce labour costs in order to improve 
company performance. In addition, employees may have some power over 
management; For example, they may not co-operate with managers when they 
think that current policy is not favourable to them. 
According to Itami (1993), employees may be involved in the 
governance of the company, by investing their monetary and non-monetary assets, 
and by sharing in the risk that the company takes. In the first place, employees 
may contribute to the company through deferred compensation. 
For example, a certain proportion of employees' wage depends on their 
age in large Japanese companies. When wages increase according to the 
employee's age, it may be the case that someone's salary is less than his 
contribution to the company when he is young. His salary increases as he gets 
older, because of the seniority based pay system, and at a later age, his salary may 
be more than his contribution to the company. In other words, an employee may 
deposit his salary to the company in the earlier stage of his career, then gets it 
back when he is older. That is, he is implicitly investing his money in the 
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company. If the company fails, he may not able to receive any return on his 
investment. On the other hand, if the company succeeds and grows, he may 
receive a good salary in later life. 
In addition to these monetary investments, employees may have firm- 
specific skills, which may be of use only in their own particular company. As 
these firm-specific skills are essential managerial resources for the company, 
employees may be investing in the company by acquiring them. As employees are 
implicitly investing in the company, they will have a strong incentive to monitor 
the top management. They may also have incentives to use their power if their 
interest is threatened. 
Secondly, employees may take more risks than shareholders. When a 
company is in financial distress, shareholders can get out by simply selling their 
stocks. However, it may not be so easy for employees to escape from the company, 
owing to their firm-specific skills or implicit investment. This being so, 
employees may have a strong incentive to monitor the directors, to protect their 
own interests. 
2-3. The Shareholders-Managers Relationship in Japan and the UK 
In this section, we explain how directors are monitored and controlled by 
shareholders in Japan and the UK, looking in particular at the difference in the 
structure of corporate governance between the two countries. The effectiveness of 
monitoring by shareholders is also discussed. We begin by reviewing the legal 
structure of corporate governance. Table (2-1) summarises the discussion to come. 
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Table 2-1 Corporate governance in Japan and the UK (1) : Monitoring by 
shareholders 
JAPAN UK 
Nomination of directors Legally, annual general Legally, annual general 
meeting of shareholders meeting of shareholders 
nominates directors. nominates directors. 
But AGM is usually In practice, shareholders 
controlled by the current just confirm the list of 
management team directors presented by 
current board. 
Non executive directors Very few About 40% of board of 
(NED) Some directors come from directors are NED. 
group companies, Recommended by 
particularly from banks Cadbury/Greenbury, 
and government. 
Remuneration /nomination No Recommended by 
committee Cadbury/Greenbury, 
Many large companies 
already introduced. 
Auditors All the listed companies Cadbury committee 
must have full-time recommends companies to 
auditors within the establish auditing 
company. In practice, they committees 
have very limited power 
and incentives to monitor 
top managers. 
BIBL 
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2-3-1. Legal Structure of Japanese Firm' 
In Japan, members of the board of directors are nominated by 
shareholders at their general meeting. They form a board of directors. The term of 
director is two years in most companies. The board nominates representative 
directors, who represent the company. Representative directors are chosen from 
among the board members. It is often the case that there are a number of 
representative directors in a company. Among representative directors, one is 
nominated to be the president of the company, who is usually the top manager2. It 
is noted that both representative directors and other directors carry out the day-to- 
day business of the company. The board of directors is a decision-making body, 
and also supervises representative directors. 
Auditors are also appointed by the annual general meeting of 
shareholders. The number of auditors must be two or more. In a company whose 
capital exceeds 500 million-yen, or whose debt exceeds 20 billion yen, auditors 
check the accounts of the company and the legality of the management. Although 
they check the legality, they are not entrusted to check the appropriateness of the 
conduct of directors. Auditors are entitled to participate in the board meeting but 
they do not have a vote. Employees do not have power to control the company 
legally. In addition to be audited by the auditors, these large companies are also 
required to be audited by a chartered accountant or by an accounting firm. 
' See Oda (1992,1997) and Fukao (1995) for detailed discussion. 
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2-3-2. The Structure of Top Management Teams in Japan 
In many of Japan's large companies, the directors are classified into 
chairman, president, senior executives, and non-title directors. All of these are 
members of the board. In addition to these directors, there are auditors who are 
supposed to monitor them. 
Usually, non-title directors have responsibility for a section of the 
company, rather than for the company as a whole. It is noted that these non-title 
directors are different from non-executive directors in the UK. Non-title directors 
are usually full-time directors of the company. `Non-title' means that they do not 
have a specific title, such as Shacho, Senmu, or Jyomu. 
One of the characteristics of the board of directors in large Japanese 
companies is that there is a hierarchy. All directors are classified as Kaicho 
(chairman), Fuku-Kaicho (vice chairman), Shacho (President), Fuku-Shacho, 
Senmu, Jyomu, or other Non-title directors (Torishimariyaku). This hierarchy is 
not based on company law3. 
It is often the case that companies form higher senior executive boards. 
One reason for this is that number of directors on the board is too large for 
decisions to be made quickly'. This higher board is sometimes called JOMUKAI5. 
Although this higher board is not based on company law, it acts as the "real" top 
2 It may be the case that the chairman has more power than the president. 
3 According to company law, companies have representative directors and non-representative 
directors. Representative directors can represent the company. 
4 In our sample, the average number of directors is 29, while the maximum is 60. 
5 In some companies, this higher board is called Keiei Kaigi (Management committee). 
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management team in day-to-day business. The board of directors, on the other 
hand, tends merely to approve what the senior executive board has decided. 
Board of directors 
It is often argued that boards of directors fail to monitor senior 
management in Japan (Kubori, 1996, Fukao et al. 1997). There are two main 
reasons for this. The first is that directors regard the president as their boss. In 
many companies, it is the president who makes decisions on the promotion and 
dismissal of directors. Although company law states that the shareholders' annual 
general meeting (AGM) determines the board members, in practice the AGM just 
approves what the current management team has already decided. The AGM 
approves the list of candidates, which is submitted by the current board. In 
addition, the board meetings also approve the list of candidates for new board 
members. It is often the case that the president chooses the candidates from 
among his employees in many large companies in Japan. 
The second reason is that the board may not have full information on the 
company. The board tends to be too large to discuss and decide company policy 
quickly. Many companies have JOUMUKAI, or senior executive boards that work 
as the real senior management team. Once a policy is determined by the senior 
executive board, then the board of directors approve it. In my sample of 210 large 
companies in Japan, the average number of directors is 29, and the maximum, 60. 
The survey by the TOKYO BENGOSHI KAI (The Tokyo Bar Association)', which 
collected answers from both listed and unlisted companies, shows how often the 
6 Cited in Fukao, et al (1997). This survey is based on 576 companies in 1993. 
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board is called and how long it lasts. In more than 95% of the companies, a board 
meeting is called only once a month or less'. In almost 80% of them, the board 
meeting lasts less than two hours'. In contrast, the same survey reveals that in 
61.7% of the companies, senior executive board meetings are called more than 
twice a month. In 32.3% of the companies, a senior executive board meeting is 
called more than once a week. For these reasons, some scholars maintain that the 
boards of directors in large Japanese companies are not effective enough to 
monitor the senior management teams9. 
Auditors 
Many studies (Kubori, 1996, Fukao, et al., 1997) argue that auditors are 
also failing to monitor presidents or senior management teams. First of all, in 
practice, auditors are nominated by boards, or in many cases, by the president. 
According to a survey carried out by the University of Kobe1°, almost 90% of 
candidates for auditors are chosen by the president or chairman. It is often the 
case that presidents or chairmen have the power to replace them. Thus, auditors 
may not feel that they are independent from the senior management teams, but 
rather subordinate to them" 
' In 3.2% of the 576 companies, board meetings are called only 4 times a year, which is the 
minimum requirement under company law. In 13.7% of the companies, the board is called 5 to 7 
times a year, while in 14.1 % of the companies, it is called 8 to 11 times. In 65.1 % of the 
companies, boards are called once a month. 
8 In 22.4% of the companies, the board meetings last more than two hours. 
Fukao (1999) gives some examples of presidents being dismissed by board of directors in Japan. 
This survey was conducted by the University of Kobe, department of management, committee 
for studying the environment for auditors. This survey was published in 1991, based on 437 
companies. (96.9% of them with 500 million yen of capital or more. These results are cited by 
Fukao et al. (1997). 
" According to company law, at least one of the auditors in some large joint stock companies must 
be an 'outside' auditor. This regulation applied to those joint stock companies whose capital is 
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Secondly, auditors simply do not have access to enough information to 
monitor senior management (Kubori, 1996, Fukao et al., 1997). They can attend 
board meetings and gather information about management in this way. But in 
many companies, important company policy is not actually determined by the 
board of directors, but by the senior executive board. It is often the case that 
auditors do not attend senior executive boards. The survey by TOKYO 
BENGOSHI KAI (The Tokyo Bar Association) shows that in 52.9% of the 
companies investigated, auditors do not attend senior executive board meetings". 
Thus many auditors fail to gather important company information relevant to 
monitoring the senior management team, because this information is often 
reported only at the senior executive board. 
Thirdly, auditors do not usually have their own staff to collect 
information on company management. According to the survey in KEIZAI DOYU 
KAI (Japan Association of Corporate Executives)", 60% of auditors do not have 
their own staff. Among those auditors who do, the average number of staff is only 
2.1 per company. It is not easy for them to collect information about senior 
management teams by themselves. 
For the above reasons, it is considered that both boards of directors and 
auditors are inadequate to monitor the presidents of Japan's large companies. 
more than 500 million yen, or whose sales exceed 20 billion yen. `Outside' means that the person 
has not been an employee or the director of the company within the last 5 years. But in many 
companies, these auditors come from the same company groups (Fukao et al., 1997). 
12 Cited in Fukao et al. (1997). The sample is of 576 listed and unlisted companies. 
13 This survey is based on the presidents and chairmen of listed and unlisted companies, conducted 
in 1995. This result is cited in Fukao et al. (1997). 
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2-3-3. Annual General Meetings of Shareholders 
Many studies suggest that the annual general meeting of shareholders 
also fails to control the board of presidents of the company (Matsumoto, 1991, 
Kubori, 1996). 
First of all, the annual general meeting of shareholders is usually 
controlled by the current management team. The directors ask shareholders to 
send a blank proxy to support an agenda submitted by the current management. In 
57% of companies, more than 50% of the vote at the meeting was sent by mail, 
and most of these were blank proxy, supporting the current management team. 
Among listed companies, 76% finished their meetings within 30 minutes. At 90% 
of the meetings, there were no questions from shareholders at all. 
Secondly, it is the board of directors and auditors who are supposed to 
monitor senior management teams on behalf of the shareholders. But, as stated 
above, both fail to do this. Therefore, shareholders in Japan have very limited 
influence over the company. As a result, the current management team has no 
incentive to pursue the shareholders' interests because the shareholders are 
powerless to punish them if they fail to do so14 
2-3-4. The Legal Framework of Corporate Governance in the UK 
In the UK, members of the board of directors of public companies are 
14 Because of cross-shareholdings between large companies in Japan, large shareholders may not 
withdraw their capital even if the performance of the firm is not satisfactory. Instead, these large 
shareholders try to intervene with the management team by sending directors, for example (Aoki, 
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nominated by the shareholders. In practice, the shareholders just confirm the list 
of directors presented by the current board. The board of directors is composed of 
inside directors and outside directors, both of whom have responsibility for the 
shareholders. It is often the case that there are a number of non-executive directors 
on the board in large British companies, as though there is no legal obligation for 
this (Sheridan and Kendall, 1992). In big British companies, the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board of directors is about 40% on average 
(Conyon, Gregg, and Machin, 1995). In addition, 9% of the UK's largest 
companies have no outside director (Monks and Minow, 1995). 
In response to public concern about directors' salaries in the UK, The 
Cadbury and Greenbury committees issued a number of recommendations, the 
main points of which are as follows. Directors' salaries should be determined by a 
remuneration committee, which is composed mainly of non-executive directors. 
This committee will report their remuneration policy and each director's pay 
packages, including a detailed disclosure of remuneration. Greater transparency 
and accountability on the determination of executive compensation is required. In 
addition, it is recommended that there should be sufficient non-executive directors 
for it not to be dominated by CEO and the current management team. 
2-3-5. Remuneration Committees 
In many big British companies, executive pay is set by a remuneration 
committee. Although remuneration committees have not been popular, more and 
1990, Kaplan and Minton, 1993). 
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more large companies in the UK are adopting them, in response to the 
recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury committees. As suggested in 
their recommendations, remuneration committees are expected to strengthen 
accountability to the shareholders. In addition, it is also expected that the link 
between firm performance and top compensation will be made clear. 
About 94% of big companies had a remuneration committee in 1992, 
whereas only 54% had one in 1988 (Conyon et al., 1995). Main and Johnston 
report that 30% among 220 Britain's large companies mentions that they have 
remuneration committee in their 1990 annual report (Main and Johnston, 1993). 
2-4. The Financial Markets in Japan and the UK 
In this section, we examine the monitoring of top managers by the 
financial markets in Japan and the UK, and attempt to compare the effectiveness 
of monitoring. Table (2-2) summarises the coming discussions. 
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Table 2-2 Corporate governance in Japan and the UK (2): Monitoring by 
financial market 
Japan UK 
Majority of shares are Group companies, Individual and 
owned by institutional shareholders institutional shareholders 
Only 0.7% of total stocks 
are owned by financial 
institutions on their own 
behalf. 
Are banks large Yes No 
shareholders in other Banks can own other 
companies? companies stocks only 
after approval by Bank of 
England 
Hostile take-overs and Rare Common 
M&A 
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2-4-1. Share Ownership of Listed Companies in Japan 
In Japan, the majority of shares in large companies are owned by other 
companies and financial institutions, rather than individual investors. Banks and 
insurance companies may own shares in other companies, up to a certain limit. 
Banks are allowed to own other companies' stocks up to 5%. Insurance 
companies are allowed to have up to 10% of the total stocks of other companies. 
In 1990,25% of the total shares on the stock market were owned by non-financial 
institutions, while 48% were owned by financial institutions such as banks and 
insurance companies (Fukao, 1995). These financial institutions own most of their 
shares on their own account, as opposed to on behalf of other investors. 
Many large companies belong to company groups, such as Sumitomo and 
Mitsubishi. There are six big company groups in Japan: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-Ichi Kangin, and Sanwa. Within these groups, it is often the 
case that each company owns stocks of the others. In 1987,25% of the total 
stocks of companies belonging to the Mitsui group, were owned by companies 
within that group. This practice of cross-shareholding has been developed mainly 
to prevent take-over by foreign companies and other potential hostile investors 
(Ito, 1993, Hsu, 1994, Morikawa, 1992). 
Among the large shareholders of a company, most non-financial 
institutions and banks belong to the same company group as the focal company. 
Since each company owns shares of their shareholders, they will act as `silent 
shareholders'. Banks will not intervene in the management of a company unless it 
-59- 
is in financial crisis15. Although insurance companies have a significant proportion 
of stocks in Japan, they do not try to intervene in the management of other 
companies. Because of cross-shareholding among companies, few hostile take- 
overs are observed in Japan in comparison to the US and the UK16 (Odagiri, 1994). 
Thus, managers of large companies in Japan face less threat of being taken over 
by outside investors, even if their stock market performance is not very good. In 
other words, the financial market and mergers and acquisitions do not have the 
power to discipline managers who are failing to achieve high stock market 
returns". 
Above description of corporate governance in Japan suggests that both 
the financial market and shareholders have limited power over the executives of 
large firms. In other words, directors can avoid sanction even if they fail to take 
their shareholders' interests in account. 
2-4-2. Share Ownership and the Financial Market in the UK 
Most shares in listed companies are owned by institutional shareholders 
and companies in the UK. However, most institutional shareholders are agents of 
small shareholders. 57.8% of shares are owned by financial institutions who are 
just agents, while only 0.7% are owned by financial institutions in their own right. 
"s In the case of financial crisis, banks try to push their own personnel into the company as 
directors to monitor the management properly (Kaplan and Minton, 1993). 
16 Companies are relatively protected from the pressure of the stock market because of these cross 
shareholdings. 
" It should be noted that large companies in Japan are monitored by banks as well as by other 
companies in the same company group, as they are also large shareholders of the company (Aoki, 
1990, Kaplan and Minton, 1993). 
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Banks can own other companies' stocks only with the approval of the Bank of 
England (Prowse, 1994). 
Hostile take-over may be an important mechanism for disciplining 
managers in the UK. Mergers and acquisitions are often observed, and significant 
numbers of these are hostile take-overs. According to Prowse (1994), 37.1% of 
attempted mergers and acquisitions in the UK were hostile take-overs, in the 
period1985-1989. It is suggested that executives in the UK are under more 
pressure from the financial market. 
2-5. The Employee-Employer Relationship in Japan and the UK 
As described in previous sections, managers face various constraints in 
managing their company, including monitoring by shareholders and the financial 
market. In this section, we will focus on the constraints imposed by the employer- 
employee relationship. Table (2-3) summarises the discussion to come. 
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Table 2-3 Corporate Governance in Japan and the UK (3) : Employment 
relationship 
Japan UK 
Output-employment Rigid Less rigid 
flexibility 
Deferred compensation? Yes Less so than in Japan 
(Do employees have 
implicit investment in the 
company? ) 
Is job security an Yes Less so than in Japan 
important managerial 
goal? 
Does employees' salary Employees' annual bonus Less so than in Japan 
reflect firm performance? usually consists of about 
30% of their total salary, 
and reflects firm 
performance. 
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2-5-1. Output-Employment Flexibility in Japan and the UK 
In 1989, the OECD published a report on the output-employment 
flexibility in OECD countries. The output-employment relationship was estimated 
for each country using long-term macroeconomic data. One of their main focuses 
was on employment flexibility in response to change in output. Their results show 
that in Japan, employment is more rigid with respect to the change in output than 
it is in the UK. The number of employees is less likely to be reduced in Japan 
when firm output declines. 
This may suggest that managers in Japan have little scope to make people 
redundant in order to improve performance. In contrast, employment is more 
likely to be adjusted to output in the UK, implying that managers in the UK are 
less compelled to keep their employees on. 
2-5-2. Employees in Large Companies in Japan are Implicitly Investing in the 
Company. 
As seen in previous sections, employees may implicitly invest their 
assets in the company. Firstly, deferred compensation can be interpreted as a kind 
of implicit investment since employees' money is deposited in the company for 
the long term. If the company does well, employees may eventually receive a 
good return, or alternatively lose their money if the company fails. As it is often 
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argued that pay in large Japanese companies depend more on age and tenure than 
is the case in other countries, employees in these companies can be seen as 
implicit investors in them (Itami 1993). Thus, employees in these companies may 
have strong incentives for monitoring the management, to ensure that their 
implicit investment is protected. 
2-5-3. Top Managers in Large Japanese Firms Protect Their Employees' Job 
Security. 
It is often argued that job security for employees has been one of the 
most important management objectives. Japanese firms are less likely to reduce 
labour costs when their business declines (Fukao, 1995), even when they do this, 
they try to avoid laying people off (Fukao, 1995, Muramatsu, 1995). 
According to a survey of the difference in company behaviour between 
the US and Japan's, managers of large Japanese firms are more likely to reduce 
non-labour costs when company performance declines, while their American 
counterparts are more likely to reduce labour costs. Only 4.5% of Japanese 
companies try to reduce their labour costs as a first response to a deterioration in 
business, as compared with 17.9% of American companies. 
In addition, American companies are more likely to lay-off their 
employees to reduce their labour costs while Japanese companies are more likely 
to reduce working hours. 29.1 % of American companies say that they will lay 
18 The following results are based on the survey by Kigyo Kodo ni Kansuru Chosa Kenkyu Iinkai 
(Research committee on firm behaviour), cited in Fukao (1995). These results are based on 
questionnaires sent to large manufacturing companies in the United States and in Japan. 
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people off when they want to reduce their labour costs, compared with only 1.8% 
of Japanese firms (Fukao, 1995). 
Muramatsu (1995) shows how the typical Japanese company tries to 
avoid laying off employees even when in financial distress. It is often said that the 
senior management should make every effort to avoid redundancies. According to 
Muramatsu, Japanese firms typically try to reduce their labour costs while 
protecting their employees' job security. Faced with setbacks in their product 
market and the need to reduce their labour costs, they try firstly to reduce the 
amount of overtime work done and therefore the amount of overtime pay they 
have to pay. The firm may discontinue contracts with part-time and seasonal 
workers, and stop taking on new employees. Lay-off is considered only when 
management has tried these measures and found that they are not enough to 
reduce labour costs. Even if the management decides to lay-off staff, it is often the 
case that `voluntary redundancy' is suggested so as to avoid explicitly nominating 
people. 
2-5-4. In Japan, Employees Exercise Their Power When Their Interest is 
Threatened. 
In some cases, employees exercise their power in order to protect their 
interests. They may say no to senior managers when their interests are threatened. 
For example, the agreement by their senior management to merge the Dai-Ichi and 
Mitsubishi banks failed to be realised, because the employees of these banks 
refused to co-operate. Similarly, when the Sumitomo bank tried to acquire the 
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Kansai Sogo bank, the employees contested the agreement by the senior managers 
(Komiya, 1988). 
In some cases, employees co-operate with the senior management when 
their company is about to be taken over. In 1981, for example, Daiei, a large 
supermarket company, tried to take over the Takashimaya department store, but 
failed. In this case, both the senior management and the employees of 
Takashimaya, as well as the main bank, were said to have co-operated to prevent 
the take-over going ahead (Komiya, 1988). 
2-5-5. A Significant Proportion of Company Profit is Distributed to 
Employees in Japan. 
Some empirical studies suggest that wages in Japan are more flexible 
than in other countries because of bonuses and the wage bargaining system. The 
bonus usually makes up 20-30% of the total salary, while the monthly wage 
makes up the rest. The amount of bonus changes every year, reflecting the 
company's performance: Freeman and Weitzman (1987) find a positive 
relationship between bonus and company profit. In addition, the amount of the 
monthly wage is determined through bargaining between the company and 
company union. As company performance is an important factor in determining 
the monthly wage in this bargaining, the monthly wage may reflect a change in 
this respect (Mizuno, 1987). Thus, it is suggested that employees are sharing risk 
with other investors in large companies in Japan. If the company performs well, 
they will receive a larger return; But if the company fails, their bonus will be 
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smaller. Thus, as seen in previous sections, employees may have a strong 
incentive to monitor the company, so that they can receive larger bonuses. 
2-6. Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, the structure of corporate governance in Japan and the 
UK has discussed. We have paid particular attention to the following question: To 
what extent are managers autonomous in running companies? Top directors may 
have their own interests, which do not necessarily coincide with those of their 
shareholders. The shareholders may then want to monitor the senior directors so 
that they manage the company with their interests in mind. Thus these directors in 
large companies are monitored and controlled by a variety of devices, such as the 
financial market or the board of directors. In addition, senior managers are 
constrained by the employer-employee relationship. 
We began by examining some theories of corporate governance and 
control. Though there are various mechanisms and institutions which monitor 
senior directors, these devices may not be that effective due to the moral hazard 
problem (Hart, 1995, Stiglitz, 1985). For example, outside directors may collude 
with current CEOs, instead of pursuing the shareholders' interests by monitoring 
them. In addition to monitoring by the financial market and shareholders, it is also 
suggested that the employer-employee relationship constraints the way in which 
directors behave. 
We then looked at the pattern of corporate governance in Japan and the 
UK, examining its legal structure and monitoring by shareholders. It was noted 
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that there are few non-executive directors in Japan. Most members of board of 
directors in large Japanese companies are full time directors who regard the 
president as their boss, rather than someone they should be monitoring. It was 
suggested that both boards of directors and auditors are ineffective as monitors of 
senior managers in Japan. In the UK, on the other hands, almost 40% of members 
of boards of directors in large companies are non-executive directors (Conyon, 
Gregg, and Machin, 1995). Many companies have remuneration committees to 
discuss executive pay. Although non-executive directors and remuneration 
committees have their limitations as monitoring devices for senior directors, they 
may be more effective than the Japanese system. In other words, shareholders 
may have more power over current management teams than they do in Japan. 
As there are few hostile take-overs in Japan, the financial market may 
also fail to punish those directors who do not pursue the improvement of share 
prices. In contrast, hostile take-overs and M&A are observed relatively often in 
the UK, showing stronger monitoring of directors than exists in Japan. 
Lastly, we examined the employer-employee relationship. It was shown 
that directors in Japan are more constrained by this. For example, OECD (1989) 
suggests that managers in Japan are less likely to reduce employees than their UK 
counterparts. In addition, it was shown that employees in large companies in 
Japan may have a strong incentive to monitor the senior management, since they 
are implicitly investing their assets in the company. Some examples were also 
given which suggest that employees have significant power over the management. 
The above arguments suggest that British managers face more pressure 
from shareholders and the financial market, while their counterparts in Japan are 
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constrained by the employment relationship rather than by the financial market 
and shareholders. As managers in both countries face different types of 
monitoring and restrictions on the way in which they work, their compensation 
scheme may reflect these differences. For example, if shareholders have very 
limited power, there may be little relationship between shareholder's return and 
the top director's salary. The next chapter examines executive compensation in 
both countries, as well as the relationship between this and the internal 
employment structure of the firm. 
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Chapter 3. The Managerial Labour Market and 
Executive Compensation in Japan and the UK 
3.1. Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, shareholders and the financial 
market have only limited power to monitor directors. They may fail to punish 
directors who pursue their own interests instead of those of their shareholders. In 
Japan in particular, the financial market and large shareholders have very limited 
power. By contrast, it has been suggested that executives in the UK may are 
facing more pressure from the financial market. 
Certain questions arise at this point. If, as we have seen, the financial 
market and other governance mechanisms are not effective monitoring devices, 
then what kind of incentive do managers have? How do stakeholders try to control 
executive compensation? In an attempt to address these questions, this chapter 
focuses on the determinants of executive compensation in both countries. The 
internal structure of large firms is also discussed. 
Section 3.2 reviews previous studies on the determinants of executive 
compensation. Particular emphasis is given to the relationship between 
remuneration and company performance, leading to some research hypotheses. 
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Section 3.3 explains rank order tournament theory, which we will employ 
in analysing the internal structure of large firms. Career paths and promotion 
systems are discussed in section 3.4. 
Lastly, section 3.5 examines the internal employment structure of large 
Japanese firms, which is described as a `ranking hierarchy' by Aoki (1988). It is 
shown that there are some similarities between ranking hierarchy and rank order 
tournament, leading to a further research hypothesis about the pay structure in 
Japanese firms. 
3.2. The Determinants of Executive Compensation 
In this section, we survey previous studies on the determinants of 
executive compensation in Japan and the UK. Firstly, the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm performance is discussed as well as the size 
effect. We then summarise the results of previous empirical studies. 
3.2.1. The Relationship between Executive Pay and Firm Performance 
There have been many studies that analyse the determinants of executive 
pay, particularly in the US' and in the UK (Coughlan, A., and Schmidt, R., 1985, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, Gibbons and Murphy, 1990, Ciscel and Carroll, 1980, 
Dunlevy, 1985. Cosh, 1975, Cosh and Hugh, 1997, Conyon, 1995,1997, Conyon, 
Gregg, and Machin, 1995, Conyon and Leech, 1994, Conyon and Nicolitsas, 1998. 
' Rosen (1990) reviews much of the literature on this topic. 
-71 - 
Gregg, Machin and Szymanski, 1993, McKnight, 1996, Wolfram, 1998)2. 
Many of these set out to investigate whether there is any significant 
relationship between top pay and company performance (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990a, Gibbons and Murphy, 1990), in response to advances in agency theory 
(Fama, 1980, Holmstrom, 1979, Mirrlees, 1976)3. Some scholars have focused on 
econometric issues surrounding this topic (Ciscel and Carroll, 1980, Dunlevy, 
1985), while earlier studies dwelt on the relationship between executive 
compensation and company size (Roberts, 1956, Cosh, 1975). 
These authors examine whether the coefficients for firm performances 
are significant, or whether they are large enough to motivate directors. If the 
coefficient of firm performance is large, the executives will have a strong 
incentive to work towards these performance measures, but if the coefficient is 
small, they may have little motivation to pursue the interest of the shareholders. If 
the latter is the case, managers may want to invest in a project that will increase 
their own utility'. 
These same studies suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
executive compensation and both accounting return and stock performance 
(Rosen, 1990), though some argue that the coefficients are too small to motivate 
them (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a) 
In many studies, it is assumed that executives are the agents of 
shareholders. Although shareholders will want top managers to run the company 
2 The results of these empirical studies that analysed UK data are discussed in following sections. 
Rosen (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1992) give a survey of this topic. 
Stiglitz and Edlin (1992) prove that the possibility exists that managers will invest in 
idiosyncratic projects so that nobody else can understand what is happening in the company, thus 
making them irreplaceable. Managers may use company money to increase their own utilities 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
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in such a way as to achieve a better stock market performance, they do not have 
enough information to monitor them. Thus, the shareholders will set the directors' 
pay based on company performance, because the directors will have a strong 
incentive to work in the shareholders' interests. 
Both the Cadbury and Greenbury committees recommended that there 
should be more responsibility, accountability and transparency in the 
determination of executive pay. It was also recommended that remuneration 
committees should be set up in which non-executive directors play a major role. 
In response to these recommendations, many large UK companies have tried to 
change their executive pay policy. For example, some studies report that more 
companies are establishing remuneration committees in recent years (Conyon, 
Gregg, and Machin, 1995, Main and Johnson, 1993). In 1988,54% of large 
companies in the UK had remuneration committees, compared with 94% in 1992 
(Conyon, Gregg, and Machin, 1995). In addition, many large UK companies have 
annual incentive schemes for their top directors. The Monks partnership reports 
that 71% of FT-SE 350 companies have such schemes (Monks partnership, 1994). 
Many companies introduce annual incentive schemes in order to motivate 
the directors. As many annual incentives set a performance target, managers 
should have a clear idea of their goals (Williams, 1994). For this reason, many 
large companies in the UK are trying to motivate managers to work harder toward 
achieving shareholders' goals by strengthening the link between directors' pay 
and firm performance. 
These arguments raise a question. Does executive pay in large UK 
companies really reflect the interest of shareholders? In order to address this 
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question, we will make following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3-1: There is a positive relationship between directors' pay 
and company performance, and particularly stock market performance, in 
the UK'. 
Principal-agent theory predicts a positive relationship between directors' 
pay and firm performance. As shown in the previous chapter, although 
shareholders naturally want top directors to manage the company in their interests, 
they have little information and power to monitor the situation. Thus, according to 
this theory, the top director's compensation will be tied to firm performance to 
give him some incentive. Principal-agent theory suggests that the incentive of 
directors depends on pay-performance sensitivity'. If this is larger, then directors 
may have more incentives, suggesting that the company's performance may 
improve. 
With this in mind, it may be of interest to examine whether the pay- 
performance sensitivity does improve firm performance. There are relatively few 
studies examining the effect of the pay system on company performance (Abowd, 
1990, Jensen and Murphy 1990a, 1990b)'. Here, we will test the effect of pay- 
performance sensitivity on firm performance. The main hypothesis will be as 
follows. 
These hypotheses are discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 7. 
6 Principal-agent theory also argues that there is a trade-off between incentive and insurance in this 
contract. If pay-performance sensitivity increases, the director's salary may be affected by various 
factors, such as market conditions. 
Gibbons (1997) reviews some studies of the relationship between pay systems and performance. 
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Hypothesis 3-2: Companies with high pay-performance sensitivity will 
perform better than those without. 
As mentioned above, many companies in the UK have annual incentive 
schemes (Monks partnership, 1994), and many of these schemes in the large 
companies are designed to encourage the top managers to work hard to improve 
performance'. In a typical annual incentive program, there are a number of 
performance targets, profit and Earnings Per Share (EPS) being most widely used. 
(Income Data Services 1996, Williams, 1994). Directors are paid an annual bonus 
in accordance with the firms' performance. It is often the case that some extra 
money is added to their bonus if they can achieve a certain performance target. 
According to Williams (1994), many companies believe that an annual incentive 
scheme will motivate managers to work towards the target9. In particular, annual 
incentive schemes are introduced to motivate managers to focus on performance 
targets that can be measured within a year. However, there have been few 
investigations into whether these pay policies are really effective. Thus, we will 
test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3-3: Companies with annual incentive schemes will perform 
better than those without. 
We will test the first hypothesis using both British and Japanese data, and 
8 Details of annual incentive schemes in large UK companies are discussed in chapter 5. 
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the second hypothesis using just British data. These hypotheses are analysed in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
There are various pay policies for directors, such as long-term incentives 
and stock options. However, we will focus here on the effect of annual incentive 
schemes. The first reason for this is that it may be easier to assess the effects of 
annual incentive schemes than those of long-term incentives. As long-term 
incentives are designed to motivate managers to pursue long-term goals, we 
would need a larger data set and more detailed information. Secondly, as most 
large UK companies have stock option plans, it is not easy to compare the 
performance of those with them to those without. 
3.2.2. The Relationship between Top Pay and Company Size 
Simon (1957) and Lydall (1968) explain why directors' salary is linked to 
company size on the basis of certain assumptions about company structure. Rosen 
(1990) explains the relationship between top pay and company size from the 
viewpoint of marginal productivity theory. 
Simon (1957) explains why top pay relates to the size of the company. 
He derives this relationship from the following assumptions. 1) The wages of 
workers in the bottom layers of the firm will be determined by the labour market 
and thus will be almost same across firms. 2) The pay of middle managers is 
higher than that of the workers they supervise and this difference will be within a 
' Some companies state that goal setting help managers to understand their managerial goal. 
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small range across firms1°. And 3) the number of workers that one manager can 
supervise is within a small range across firms. If these three conditions hold, then, 
the salary of one manager will be determined by number of total employees whom 
he supervises directly or indirectly". The pay of senior and middle managers can 
be written as a function of the number of employees who are supervised by him. 
For example, the compensation of a top executive depends on the number of total 
employees in the company that he manages. Simon also shows that the 
relationship between the number of employees and executive compensation is log- 
linear. 
Lydall obtains similar results in explaining the size distribution of income 
within companies, which he argues follows Pareto's Law. According to this law, 
the number of people who receive more than income level X can be written as 
follows. 
N=A-X-' 
(Equation 3 -1) 
Where N is the number of people, and A and a are constants. This function is 
considered to be able to explain the upper tail of a distribution (Lydall, 1968). 
Lydall derived this relationship from the same assumptions used in Simon's 
model. From this model, the salary of a top executive can be calculated as a 
function of the number of employees; The pay of senior and middle managers 
10 However, this assumption is inconsistent with recent empirical findings, as the pay gap will be 
larger as one climbs up the corporate hierarchy. Main et al. (1993) and O'Reilly et al (1988) found 
that the wage difference would be largest between the CEO and the vice president, and smallest at 
the bottom layer of the directors' hierarchy. 
" Simon argues that there is a certain limit to one's rationale (Simon, 1951). 
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depends on the number of people who belong to the sub-hierarchy of the company 
that the manager supervises. 
Rosen (1990) also shows theoretically why pay relates to the size of the 
company. He assumes that the ability of a top manager affects the productivity of 
the whole company. The marginal productivity of a manager in a big company is 
larger than that of a top manager in a small company with the same ability, 
because the ability of a CEO in a large company will influence more people than 
that of his counterpart in a small company. Thus, an efficient market will allocate 
highly able managers to large companies. They will get higher wages because of 
their high productivity. 
All these theories aim to explain the relationship between top pay and 
firm size. It should be noted that they do not analyse motivational aspects of 
director's compensation. Simon (1957) and Lydall (1968) approach the question 
of why top directors of large companies receive higher pay from the viewpoint of 
the hierarchical structure of the firm, and Rosen (1990) examines this relationship 
based on the productivity of the CEO. 
Most empirical work on the determinants of top director's compensation 
reports a strong relationship between firm size and directors' compensation 
(Rosen, 1990, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This suggests that top directors' pay 
may be explained to a certain extent by these theories. 
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3.2.3. Executive Compensation in the UK 
A number of scholars have analysed the determinants of executive 
compensation in the UK (Cosh, 1975, Cosh and Hugh, 1997, Conyon, 1995,1997, 
Conyon, Gregg, and Machin, 1995, Conyon and Leech, 1994, Conyon and 
Nicolitsas, 1998, Gregg, Machin and Szymanski, 1993, McKnight, 1996, Wolfram, 
1998). Table (3-1) summarises their results. 
Much attention has been paid to the relationship between directors' pay 
and firm performance. Some empirical studies have suggested that the 
relationship is very weak, or does not exist (Gregg et al., 1993, Conyon, 1995), 
others, that there is a positive relationship (McKnight, 1996) 
According to Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993), the link between 
directors' remuneration and company performance is disappearing. They estimate 
the determinants of the remuneration of the highest paid directors in 500 largest 
companies in the UK, between the years of 1981 and 1991. The coefficient of 
change in shareholders return to growth in directors remuneration is 0.027 
(statistically significant) according to the data from 1983-1988 and -0.024 
(insignificant) according to the data from 1989 to 1991, suggesting that the link 
between stock performance and remuneration was disappearing by the late 1980's. 
They also found that rapid growth in the highest paid directors' pay (about 20 per 
cent a year), and that the growth of pay is correlated with the growth of the 
company. 
Conyon (1995) took as a sample 28 privatised utilities between 1990 and 
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1994. He found that there was little relationship between top pay and corporate 
performance in these companies. Coefficients of company performance to top pay 
were not statistically significant. Conyon and Leech (1994) found a positive 
relationship albeit a very weak one. 
In contrast, some studies have suggested that there is a positive 
relationship between company performance and directors' remuneration 
(McKnight, 1996, Conyon, 1997, Ingham and Thompson, 1995). For example, 
McKnight (1996) finds a positive correlation between change in top pay and 
firms' earnings per share. 
Some authors look at the relationship between directors' remuneration 
and firm performance for the previous year, while other focus on the relationship 
with current performance (Conyon, 1997, Ingham and Thompson, 1995). It 
appears that current performance has stronger explanatory power than does the 
performance of the previous term. By analysing 213 large UK companies between 
1988-1993, Conyon (1997) finds that directors' compensation in large UK 
companies is positively related to current shareholders' return but much less so to 
previous year's shareholders' return. Ingham and Thompson's results similarly 
show that top pay is positively correlated with current profit, but there is no 
relationship between top pay and previous year's profit. 
These results may be consistent with current practice in top director's pay 
in large UK companies. As will be discussed in chapter 7, top director's pay is 
typically determined in the following way (Williams, 1994): Firstly, the 
remuneration committee set a performance target at the beginning of the year. 
They also set some kind of `formula' to calculate the directors' annual bonus. 
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Directors are given this information at the beginning of the year. Thus, it is clear 
that their bonuses will probably be dependent on current performance, rather than 
the performance of the previous year. 
As pointed out by Rosen (1990), most previous studies on executive 
compensation show a strong correlation between top pay and company size. In the 
UK, most relevant research shows that size is indeed a very important factor. This 
relationship is observed in most papers12. 
'Z Ingham and Thompson reports negative relationship between size and performance using 
building society data. They suggest that this negative relationship can be attributed to the 
deregulation in the industry. 
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Table 3-1 Previous studies on executive pay in the UK 
Conyon Cosh and Hughes Conyon McKnight 
(1995) (1997) (1997) (1996) 
Dependent variable In ( Salary + Bonus) In (CEO pay) In (CEO pay) % change in top pay 
Coefficient -0.0018774 -0.005 0.13 5028 ** 
Profitability Earnings per share profit / net assets Change in EPS 
Coefficient -0.0001025 -0.0006 0.060602** 
Stock return Shareholders' return relative shareholders' shareholders' return 
return 
Coefficient 0.475157** 0.27 ** 0.220227** 0.2759** 
Size In (Capital employed) In (Net assets) In (Sales) In (Sales)to In (top pay) 
Year 1990-94 1989-94 1988-1993 1992-1994 
Sample 28 privatised utilities 64 electrical firms 213 quoted firms 90 listed firms 
Conyon and Nicolitsas Gregg, Machin, Conyon and Leech Ingham and Thompson 
(1998) Szymanski (1993) (1994) (1995) 
Dependent variable In (CEO pay) Change in In (HPD's Change in In (salary Change in top pay 
pay) + bonus) 
Coefficient 0.00276 0.121 0.021 * 
Profitability change in EPS (change in profit) 
Coefficient 0.01 0.094416** 
Stock return change in shareholders' change in In 
return (shareholders' wealth) 
Coefficient 0.146 0.005 0.066219 -0.119** 
Size change in In (Asset) In (Sales) change in In (Sales) In (Asset) 
Year 1987-1992 1982-1991 1983-1986 1986-1990 
Sample 39 small firms 288 large listed firms 294 listed firms 117 building societies 
HPD: Highest Paid Director EPS: Earnings Per Share 
Note that the coefficients in this table are those reported in the papers in question. 
It is not possible to compare these directly, as different equations were used. 
Goodness of fit is not reported, as these coefficients are not always taken from one 
equation. 
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Table 3-2 Previous studies on executive pay in Japan 
Iwasaki Xu Xu Kaplan Kato, Rockel Kato 
(1977) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1992a) (1997) 
Dependent Average pay per In (Presidents' Director's Change in In ( In (president' In 
variable director salary) average salary Average salary income) (presidents' 
per director) income) 
Coefficient 1.312** 1.1142** 0.000054** 1.618** 0.1319E-03 3.068** 
Profitability profit per asset profit / capital profit change in ROE ROA 
income/assets 
Coefficient 0.095** -0.4274E-03 0.061 
Stock return Stock return Stock return Stock return 
Coefficient. 12.01** 0.24113** 0.0000071** 0.247** 0.1803** 
Size In (Asset) In (sales) Sales Sales growth In(Employees) 
Coefficient. 0.24595 
Wage In (wage) 
Year 1973 1984-1987 1970-1990 1981-1984 1985 1985 
Sample 349 firms in 37 firms 31 firms in 121 largest 599 firms 154 
manufacturing 104 samples manufacturing listed firms 
** Significant at the 1% level 
* Significant at the 5% level 
ROA: return on asset 
ROE: return on equity 
Note that the coefficients in this table are those reported in the papers in question. 
It is not possible to compare these directly, as different equations were used. 
Goodness of fit is not reported, as these coefficients are not always taken from one 
equation. 
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3.2.4. Executive Compensation in Japan 
There has been relatively little work analysing the determinants of 
executive compensation in Japan. Recently, however, some studies have been 
published in response to the increasing attention to this topic in the US and the 
UK (Iwasaki, 1977, Kato, 1997, Kato and Rockel, 1992a, Kaplan, 1994, Xu, 
1992,1993,1996,1997). Table 3-2 summarises the results of these studies. It 
should be noted that there are two types of data set on executive compensation in 
Japan13 
A strong relationship between firm size and directors' pay is observed in 
most studies and this cuts across time and industries. For example, Iwasaki (1977) 
showed that there is a strong relationship between sales and directors' average pay, 
as did Xu (1992,1993). According to Xu (1992), the elasticity of sales to 
presidents' pay is 0.24113. It is also reported that both sales growth and number of 
employees are important factors (Kaplan 1994, Kato and Rockel, 1992). 
Many studies have suggested that there is a positive relationship between 
firm performance and directors' pay (Kaplan 1994, Xu, 1992,1993). Kaplan finds 
a positive and significant relationship with stock return, suggesting that directors 
in large Japanese firms have an incentive to work towards shareholders' return. In 
addition, Xu (1992,1993) and Kato (1997) show a positive relationship between 
profit and directors' pay. Xu (1993) shows that the coefficient of profit is 
As listed companies in Japan are not required to disclose the pay packages of individual 
directors, we cannot observe president's pay directly. Instead, some research uses `president's 
income' estimated from income tax, or `directors' average salary', calculated from a company's 
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significant while the coefficient of wage is not. 
In contrast, Kato and Rockel (1992a) find no relationship between 
shareholders' return and presidents' pay. They also fail to obtain any significant 
relationship between profit and presidents' pay. They compare the determinants of 
executive salaries in Japan and in the US, finding that performance variables 
(return on equity and shareholders' return) are significant in the US, but not in 
Japan. 
3.2.5. The Theory of Executive Compensation: Other Factors 
There are a number of other theories about executive compensation. 
These are the pay compression hypothesis, social comparison theory, and rank 
order tournament theory. After a belief description of the pay compression 
hypothesis and social comparison theory, we will examine rank order tournament 
theory extensively in section 3.3. 
The Pay Compression Hypothesis 
According to Lazear (1989,1991), the pay difference between managers 
may be smaller than the productivity difference, because pay compression will 
lead to high performance. He argues that pay compression makes them more 
team-oriented. 
The idea is that if someone's compensation is based on his relative 
performance within the team, he can benefit from his rivals' failure. Thus he will 
annual report. The strengths and weaknesses of these data sets are discussed in chapter 4. 
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have an incentive to sabotage his colleagues, and will not share important 
information with his colleagues since this may be to his own detriment. 
If success depends on co-operation between workers or directors, 
compressed pay is more efficient than performance-based pay or tournament type 
pay. Lazear states that a compressed pay scheme is effective if the tasks of 
managers are team-oriented, and if each director has a non-co-operative, 
competitive personality. If directors' jobs are interdependent and if co-operation 
leads to higher productivity, pay compression will make them more co-operative. 
Social Comparison Theory 
CEO pay may be affected by other social psychological factors (O'Reilly 
et al., 1988). They argue that CEO compensation is determined through 
comparison with the compensation of those of other companies, this is possible 
because some members of the compensation committee may be CEOs of other 
companies. Using 105 firms in 1984 as a sample, they show that CEO 
compensation is positively and significantly related to that of other committee 
members as well as to outside directors' salaries from their own companies. They 
conclude that this result is consistent with social comparison theory" 
'4 However, this relationship can also be seen as the result of market mechanism of labour market 
for CEOs. If the labour market for directors works, compensations of CEOs may be correlated 
with each other. 
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3.3. Rank Order Tournament Theory 
In this section, we will examine rank order tournament theory, which 
analyses the internal employment structure of the firm. 
3.3.1. Characteristics of Rank Order Tournament Theory 
Rank order tournament is a type of employment structure within a 
company. The tournament system may motivate workers through competition and 
promotion (Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Lazear, 1995). Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
show that the rank order tournament system has some advantages over piece rate 
compensation schemes. 
Certain characteristics of rank order tournament are as follows. Firstly, 
people's salaries are determined not by performance, but mainly by their position 
within the company. In big companies, the amount top managers earn exceeds 
their contributions15. This difference between productivity and salary can be 
regarded as a prize for making it to the top, which encourages all employees to 
work hard promotion. 
Secondly, managerial vacancies are filled by promoting the company's 
S The company must finance this difference to keep the total labour cost equal to the total 
productivity of the company. In this model, employees who want to be promoted must work hard 
to win the game. Their salaries may be lower than their productivity. If a contestant wins the game 
and is promoted, the sum of salaries he received from the company is bigger than the sum of his 
contributions to the company. But if he is not promoted, his salary remains constant because it is 
attached to the position. Then his salary is still smaller than his contribution to the company, 
though he may still work hard to win the prize. In this way, the company can finance the extra 
bonus for the winner by lowering the losers' salaries. 
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own employees rather than recruiting from other companies. Newcomers will be 
assigned a job in the bottom layer of the company, and most employees will have 
entered via this route. They may then be promoted to higher ranked jobs through 
competition. 
Thirdly, the effort of contestants depends on the probability of promotion, 
and on the prize they will get once this happens. If employees think that the 
possibility of promotion is slight, they will have little incentive to work hard16, 
and likewise if the prize is small. Hence, the prize will be bigger in cases where 
there is a smaller probability of promotion to keep the effort of employees 
constant. In this case, some proportion of director's compensation can be seen as 
the bonus for winning the competition. Then, there may be a negative relationship 
between `probability for promotion' and `pay gap between top directors and 
employees'. 
Fourthly, as employees climb up the hierarchy and become part of the 
senior management, they must compete with many others at every layer. They will 
get a prize for winning at every stage, as their pay will increase. Tournament 
theory predicts that the prize for promotion will be larger, the closer one gets to 
the top. One reason for this is that the probability of someone winning becomes 
smaller, the more contests they win. Since contestants at the higher stages will 
have won many games before getting to this position, they will be more talented 
than contestants at lower layers, and the competition will be more severe. 
Therefore, to keep the incentive of each contestant constant, the prize must be 
16 To avoid this problem, large Japanese companies use `slow promotion'. Typically, it takes many 
years to be promoted, meaning that most employees will think that they have fair chance of being 
promoted. `Slow promotion' will be explained later in this chapter. 
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bigger. 
3.3.2. The Advantages of Tournament as an Incentive Device 
Tournament has several advantages as an incentive device. Firstly, this 
type of pay structure reduces the information cost of the company. In a company 
where the wage is determined according to the contributions of each employee, 
the company must know what each person's productivity is. However, in some 
circumstances, it is much easier to find out who is performing better than others, 
than to measure each person's absolute performance. For example, it may be 
difficult to assess two managers who are running different divisions of the 
company. If one division is subject to severe foreign competition and long-term 
labour problems, while the other produces high-demand products with few 
competitors, it may not appropriate to assess the contribution of the executives 
running these divisions in terms of absolute performance value (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
A company with tournament type pay structure does not need to know 
the exact productivity of each employee, but simply the order among employees 
i. e. who is the best candidate for promotion. The salary is attached to the position 
and is determined in advance: All the company has to decide is who will be 
promoted to the job. It is less costly to find out who the best person is than to 
establish the productivity of each individual employee. 
Secondly, employees have little risk of their salaries decreasing. In the 
tournament, there is always one winner in the competition, but no explicit loser. 
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Everyone in the company knows who the winner is, but not who the worst 
employee is. Furthermore, since every loser has an opportunity to win next time, 
people do not lose their incentive to work hard. If, on the other hand salary is 
determined by output, employees may receive very low wages due to external 
circumstances beyond their control. 
Thirdly, as the prize for the winner is set in advance, the company does 
not have any incentive to reduce labour costs by claiming that their employees' 
performance was not worthy of a high salary. Moral hazard is thereby prevented. 
3.3.3. The Limitations of Tournament Type Pay 
There are also certain limitations to the tournament system. Firstly, it 
may fails to motivate CEOs (Demsetz, 1995). In a tournament type pay structure, 
employees work hard to be promoted. But the CEO will have little incentive to 
work hard, because he cannot be promoted any higher. Part of his compensation is 
not based on his current performance, but on his past performance as a vice 
president. In addition, an employee who will be retiring, or who decides to give 
up competing with his colleagues will have equally little motivation to work hard, 
for the same reason. With little chance of promotion, such a person will have no 
reason to strive for the prize. Similarly, if the company has a smaller number of 
high positions, employees will lose the will to make an effort because they know 
that their chances of promotion are limited. 
Secondly, employees may seek promotion not by doing their job well, but 
by sabotaging their fellow employees. As promotion is based on relative 
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performance, sabotaging colleagues may increase one's own chances. In addition, 
there is the possibility of employees colluding not to work hard. If the winner is 
going to be the same whether or not everyone works hard, the workers may agree 
to be unproductive. Such collusion can create inefficiencies for the employer. 
3.3.4. Testing Tournament Theory Empirically 
Some attempts have been made at testing tournament theory (Demsetz, 
1995, Main, O'Reilly and Wade, 1993, O'Reilly, Main and Crystal, 1988). 
Tournament theory predicts that the prize will be bigger, the higher someone gets 
on the company ladder, because the competitors will be progressively more 
talented. Main et al (1993) found that the pay gap between the directors of 
adjacent layers increases as the layers climb up to CEO. They used the annual 
base salary and bonus of executives from more than two hundred public 
companies in 1980-1984. The average pay of a CEO is 142% larger than that of 
second tier executives, while the ratio becomes 75%, 44%, 28% as the level of 
executives falls. These figures are almost constant over the sample year. This 
result is consistent with tournament theory, though these differences may also 
reflect the different performance of individual directors. They also computed how 
much pay increases when a vice president is promoted to CEO. They found that 
the present value of the total pay difference between CEO and the vice president 
is considerably large. 
Main, et al. (1993) also estimated the determinants of pay difference 
between CEO and vice president. According to the tournament theory, there is a 
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positive relationship between the pay gap and the number of vice presidents, 
because the larger the number of vice presidents, the less chance any given one 
has of being promoted. They computed the present value of the total prize given 
to the CEO, showing a significant and positive relationship between log of the pay 
gap and number of vice presidents, a result consistent with the theory. In their 
sample, the average CEO receives a salary $325,000 higher than the vice- 
president, annually. Demsetz (1995) also confirmed that the pay gap increases in 
keeping with the position within the board. On the other hand, the results of 
O'Reilly et al. (1988) do not indicate a positive relationship between the level of 
CEO compensation and the number of vice presidents. 
3.4. Career and Promotion of Executives and Managers 
As rank order tournament theory suggests, there is a close relationship 
between the employment structure and pay system of companies. In this section, 
we compare career paths and promotion patterns in Japan and the UK, as 
differences in the promotion pattern may affect the incentive structure of the firm. 
In addition, we will illustrate the proportion of managers to total employees in 
both countries, using data from the Labour Force Survey and Census. 
3.4.1. Career Paths of Directors and Managers 
In this subsection, we analyse the career paths of directors in both 
countries. We are particularly interested in the following question: What 
-92- 
proportion of directors is nominated from among the existing employees of the 
company? This question may be important in terms of the incentive structure of 
the company, because employees will work hard if they think that there is 
sufficient chance of them getting promoted. If most directors are recruited from 
other companies, employees are likely to assume that they have little chance of 
becoming directors. According to tournament theory, if employees think they have 
little opportunity for promotion, the pay gap between top directors and other 
employees will be larger. 
Some studies have shown that in both the UK and Japan, a significant 
proportion of directors have no experience of working for other companies, 
although this proportion is higher in Japan. It takes many more years to reach 
director level in Japan than it does in the UK (Korn/Ferry, 1981, Yamamoto and 
Takase, 1987). The results of these studies are summarised in the following table. 
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Table 3-3 Career paths and promotion speed of directors in Japan and the 
UK 
Japan UK 
Proportion of `pure Large Small 
company bred' directors" 51% (Yamamoto et al., 22% 
1987) (Korn/Ferry, 1981) 
Promotion speed Slow Fast 
Average length of service 27 years 18 years. 
of director within the (Yamamoto et al., 1987) (Korn/Ferry, 1981) 
company 
According to these studies, in the UK, 22% of directors worked for one 
company only. Over 80% of directors worked for not more than 4 companies. The 
average length of service in a company was 18 years (Korn/Ferry, 1981). 
In Japan, 59% of directors worked previously for other companies, but 
this proportion was larger among top executives: 77% of chairmen had worked in 
other organisations and 60% of presidents. On average, it took 27 years for them 
to be promoted to their current position (Yamamoto and Takase, 1987)'8. Kato et 
al (1992) found that about 50% of chief executives in Japan 19 had already spent 25 
years or more in their current firm at the time of appointment. On average, they 
become presidents at the age of 56. 
" The proportion of directors who spend their entire career only in a single company 
Among the directors who have worked for other organisations, a large proportion may come 
from the government, banks, and parent companies. 
19 Their sample consists of some 1,000 of largest companies in Japan. 
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In many large Japanese companies, some of the directors are from the 
government, many from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry. In 1988, about 300 bureaucrats resigned to become directors 
or take up other high positions in companies (Hsu, 1994). These studies show that 
there is a difference in promotion structure between Japan and the UK. The 
internal structure of large Japanese firm is discussed later in this chapter. 
3.4.2. Managers in the Census and Labour Force Survey in the UK and 
Japan 
In this subsection, we examine some characteristics of managers in both 
countries, using census (1991, UK), census (1990, Japan), and the labour force 
survey (1995, Japan)" 
On average, managers in Japan are older than those in the UK. In Japan, 
more than 90% of managers are 40 or older, while in the UK, 51 % of managers 
are under 40, and 30% are under 30. 
Graph (3-1) shows the proportion of managers to total workforce in each 
age group. In the UK, significant proportions of the workforce are managers in the 
21-24 age group. In Japan, managers start to account for a significant proportion 
in the age group 45+, reaching a peak in the group of 55-65. This obviously 
suggests that it takes longer to be promoted in Japan. 
20 The definition of manager is different in the two countries, it seems that the British definition of 
manager is much broader than Japanese definition. 
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Graph 3-1 Proportion of managers to total workforce in the UK 
Graph 3-2 Proportion of managers to total workforce in Japan 
The proportion of managers to total workers by age 
group ( Japan, Labour Force Sruvey) 
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3.5. The Internal Structure of Large Japanese Firms 
In previous sections, it was suggested that there is a difference in internal 
structure between Japan and the UK. In this section, we will examine the 
employment structure of large Japanese firms. Firstly, we explain some stylised 
facts about this structure, which is often described in terms of `ranking hierarchy' 
(Aoki, 1988). Secondly, we compare the features of this ranking hierarchy with 
those of rank order tournament. Thirdly, we show that the rank order tournament 
motivates workers effectively in large firms in Japan. 
3.5.1. Ranking Hierarchy in Japanese Firm 
The main characteristics of ranking hierarchy can be summarised as 
follows (Aoki, 1988,1990,1994). 
Firstly, all the employees are ranked, and their basic wage is based on 
their rank, rather than the job they are doing. It is often the case that employees 
doing different types of jobs belong to same rank, and receive the same wage. 
Koike (1994) shows a strong relationship between rank and pay. He examined the 
pay system in a large production company in Japan, in which almost 75% of base 
pay could be attributed to job grade. Compensation in this company was mainly 
composed of four elements, namely `basic rates', `age rates', `job grade rates' and 
`merit rates'. There is a correlation between job grade and these components. 
According to Tachibanaki (1987), a large part of the earnings difference between 
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employees in Japanese companies can be explained by their rank. 
Secondly, newly recruited employees are allocated to the bottom rank of 
the hierarchy. They compete with each other for faster promotion. Decisions about 
promotion are mainly based on tenure and the boss's assessment. Tomita (1992) 
studied the individual level micro-data in a bank, and found that promotion is 
positively correlated with tenure and assessment. 
Koike (1994) gives the example of the job grade system for blue-collar 
workers in a large Japanese automobile company, suggesting that both relative 
and absolute performance evaluations are used. There are eight grades for blue- 
collar workers, from pl (junior workers) to P8 (foreman). New employees are 
allocated to the p l. grade, and compete with each other for faster promotion, 
which is based on skill development, such as breadth and depth of experience. 
One of the most important characteristics of this grade system is that the number 
of employees is not limited at the grades p 1-p5, which means that all workers who 
have the necessary breadth and depth of skills will be promoted up to the p5 grade. 
For example, the criteria for promotion to P5 (group leader) level are 1) the ability 
to perform all tasks in the subforeman's unit, and to teach these tasks to others. 2) 
the ability, as a leader, to promote quality and productivity in the unit. It is clear 
that workers are required to develop a wide range of skills. Once they are 
considered to meet these criteria, they are promoted. Thus, assessment is based on 
each employees' absolute performance. For the higher positions, on the other 
hands, i. e. job grades p6-p8, the number of slots is fixed, as these grades are 
directly connected with functional posts: Grade p6 corresponds to subforeman, 
and grade p7 and p8 correspond to foreman. As the number of positions is fixed 
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for these jobs, it is considered that absolute performance evaluation should not be 
widely used. 
Some authors suggest that the assessment of white-collar employees is 
based on relative performance evaluation in typical large Japanese companies 
(Hanada, 1994, Tomita, 1992). For example, employees may be evaluated as 
`good', `normal', or `bad'. The proportion of each category is fixed in advance. 
Usually, 50-60% of the employees are rated as `normal', and 25-30% are rated as 
`good' or `bad' (Hanada, 1994). Investigating a particular bank in Japan, Tomita 
(1992) showed that white-collar employees were assessed in this way. 
Thirdly, it is often said that `slow promotion' is one of the characteristics 
of large companies in Japan. There is little difference among employees as to 
speed of promotion at early stages of their careers, but a wider difference can be 
observed after 10-15 years of tenure (Tomita, 1992, Koike ed., 1991 a, Hanada, 
1994). 
Tonvita (1992) shows that the difference in rank among colleagues is not 
observed until 10 years after joining the company. According to his data, there is 
little difference in rank between employees who have been in the company for 12 
years since graduating high school, though the company has been evaluating each 
individual throughout. After 16 years, however, a significant difference in rank 
can be observed. Koike ed. (1991 a) also shows that selection among workers is 
observed after 15 or more years with the company, though this selection is based 
on their assessment over all the years they have been there. Based on interviews 
with almost 60 companies, Koike gives some examples of slow promotion. In a 
typical Japanese firm, some employees are appointed to managerial positions 
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when they are about 40 years old. Some are assigned to sectional managerial 
positions, and the rest to non-managerial positions, which is typically a lower rank 
compared with managerial positions. Until then, the differences among employees 
are not apparent. 
Hanada (1994) analysed the career of employees in a number of Japanese 
companies. He examined the careers of 259 employees, all of them male 
university graduates, who joined a manufacturing company in the same year. All 
these employees were promoted to level 2 or Kakaricho (section chief) after eight 
years. A difference in promotion speed could be observed in the 12 `h year, when 
20% of them were promoted to Kacho (subdivision manager). Further, 24% of the 
employees were promoted to this level the next year. It took 24 years for the first 
cohort to be promoted to level five. These data clearly indicate the existence of 
slow promotion in large Japanese companies. In the 28 `h year after joining the 
company, 23.8% of them were upgraded to level 5, and 27.5% to level 4. 
Fourthly, it may be the case that employees who fail to meet the required 
standards of their rank leave the company. It is sometimes considered to be 
disadvantageous to leave a company before retirement, in terms of working 
conditions. However, some do leave the company spontaneously because they 
realise that they have little chance of being upgraded. Others are forced to leave 
by their employer. The company may lay off them explicitly, or simply suggesting 
that they leave. The company may provide them with another job, in a subsidiary 
company, for example. In many cases, those who leave a company in the middle 
of their career will be unable to find a better or even comparable job. Their wages 
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may be smaller, and their new positions less powerful21. Because of these 
disadvantages, workers are reluctant to leave their original companies". 
According to Hanada (1994) people who fail to be promoted are highly 
likely to leave the company before reaching official retirement age, stating that 
there is a strong negative correlation between promotion speed and likelihood of 
leaving the company. Hanada examined this relationship using individual data 
from a well-known company. In this company, the selection of employees for 
promotion to level two positions begins 12 years after they join the company. In 
the 12th year, 20% of the cohort are selected for promotion to in level 2. Others are 
promoted during the 13Th-16`h years. Among those who are promoted in the 16 `h 
year, 71 % leave the company thereafter. It takes 16 years for even the first 
selected group to be promoted to level 3 position, and more than 22 years for 
others. Of those who take more than 22 years to be promoted to level 3,92% 
leave the company23. Similarly, it takes 20 years for first selected group to be 
promoted to level 4, and 25 years for the less successful. Among these latter, 91 % 
leave the company. In contrast, those who are selected for fast promotion rarely 
leave the company before retirement age. These data clearly illustrate that there is 
severe competition among employees for faster promotion, and that those who do 
not succeed are highly likely to leave. 
21 It is often the case that people change their company at a very early stage of their career, for 
example, 2 or 3 years after they graduate. This is not considered to compromise their career. 
22 Those who have special skills, or who are `head hunted' by foreign institutions, may be offered 
better conditions, but these are considered to be a special case. 
2' These losers may leave the company spontaneously, or the company may suggest that they do so. 
They may be able to find another job in a group company. 
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3.5.2. Comparison between Ranking Hierarchy [RH] and Rank Order 
Tournament [ROT] 
There are both similarities and differences between ranking hierarchy 
[RH] and rank order tournament [ROT]. 
Firstly, in both systems, an employee is promoted if he meets certain 
criteria. In ROT, promotion is solely based on relative performance evaluation, 
with the employee getting promoted if he achieves the best performance among 
his colleagues. In RH, tenure and assessment by the line manager are the two 
important factors for promotion. The assessment may be based on either absolute 
or relative performance. Koike states that absolute performance evaluation is used 
at the shop floor level. Some research suggests that white-collar workers are 
assessed by relative performance in large Japanese companies (Tomita, 1992, 
Hanada, 1994, Koike, 1994). On the other hand, Miyamoto (1999) states that 
employees are promoted to a higher rank on the basis of their absolute 
performance. As there is no explicit limit to the number of employees who can 
belong to certain ranks of the company, employees may be promoted when they 
have met certain criteria. 
Secondly, in ROT, the number of employees promoted to the upper ranks 
is fixed in advance while this is not necessarily so in RH, though see Koike (1994), 
Hanada (1994) who suggest that the number of promotion slots is fixed for 
managerial positions. 
Thirdly, in both systems, the amount of pay depends on rank rather than 
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individual or company performance. In RH, the base pay will be fixed in the short 
run. In ROT, the amount of pay for each rank is fixed in advance. 
Fourthly, in ROT, the pay gap between ranks may be larger than the 
actual difference in productivity. This difference can be an incentive device for 
other employees, encouraging them to work hard to be promoted. 
The two systems are different when it comes to companies which are 
growing rapidly. In this situation, many managerial positions are still to be created 
in the future, and the company will not need to use relative performance 
evaluation as there may be enough positions for all the employees who meet the 
relevant criteria. In contrast, if a company is not growing, the number of 
managerial positions will be fixed, and in such a case, relative evaluation is more 
appropriate than absolute performance evaluation. In general, as the growth rate 
of large Japanese companies slows down, we can say that the two systems become 
closer. 
Koike (1994) showed `ranking hierarchy type' promotion being used for 
blue-collar workers in a factory, with promotion based on absolute performance. 
By contrast, Hanada (1994) states that the number of managerial position is fixed, 
suggesting that `rank-order tournament type' promotion is used to fill managerial 
positions with white-collar workers. These studies suggest that both ranking 
hierarchy and rank order tournament are used in large Japanese companies. 
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3.5.3. Can Rank Order Tournament Work Effectively in Large Japanese 
Companies? 
According to Lazear (1995), one of the most important advantages of 
rank order tournament over the piece rate pay system is that companies can reduce 
their spending on monitoring employees' performance. In other words, this 
system works effectively if it is not easy for companies to assess the performance 
of individual workers24. As many scholars have suggested, in large companies in 
Japan, job descriptions are typically less clear cut than they are in western 
companies (Aoki, 1988,1990, Ito, 1994, Kagono, et al., 1983). In other words, it is 
difficult to determine each worker's contribution because the responsibility of 
each worker is not well defined. Rank order tournament may be effective in this 
situation, as exact performance figures are not required to assess each worker. 
Rank order tournament is supposed to be less effective if co-operation is 
very important, because of relative performance evaluation. Employees may 
engage in uncooperative behaviour in order to outdo their rivals. Considering that 
a co-operative attitude is one of the most highly-valued skills in Japan, it would 
appear that rank order tournament type pay/promotion scheme can not work, since 
relative performance evaluation is considered to discourage co-operation among 
workers. However, many Japanese companies avoid this problem by emphasising 
co-operative behaviour in assessing its employees. In typical Japanese companies, 
factors like a co-operative attitude, willingness to help others, and ability to 
24 Otherwise, piece rate pay may be better to motivate employees. 
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communicate with other team members, are important criteria in assessment. In 
this way, employees are supposed to `compete to co-operate', and co-operative 
behaviour can be encouraged even under relative performance evaluation25. 
One of the problems with this is that employees may merely behave as if 
they are co-operating with their colleagues. As it is not an easy mater to assess 
someone's `attitude to co-operation', employees may choose to be seen to co- 
operate. It may be the case that an employee colludes with his boss. In large 
Japanese companies, this is typically avoided by frequent job-rotation (Koike, 
1991b). As well as learning new skills, employees will work with many bosses, 
helping the company to assess them with less bias. In other words, there is less 
possibility that an employee will collude with a particular boss. 
We can summarise our discussion as follows. The ranking hierarchy and 
rank order tournament have similar structures, particularly when the company is 
not growing rapidly. In addition, as employees in large companies are assessed by 
their attitude to co-operation, it is unlikely that they will sabotage each other. In 
other words, the ranking hierarchy can be effective as an incentive device. 
This leads us to another question: Do Japanese firms have tournament 
type pay structure? We will address this question by examining the determinants 
of pay gap between director and employees. Tournament theory suggests that the 
pay gap will be larger when employees see themselves as having less chance of 
being promoted. If the pay gap is large enough, and if employees think they have 
at least a fair chance of being promoted to director, they will have an incentive to 
Z` There is a problem of collusion of employees in rank order tournament scheme. Employees may 
collude each other not to work hard. But in typical Japanese firm, this problem is avoided by 
frequent job rotation. 
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work hard. If they think that their chances are slim, the pay gap will have to be 
large enough to motivate them. Thus, we suggest following hypothesis which we 
will test this hypothesis in chapter 6. 
Hypothesis 3-4: The pay gap between director and employee is in a 
negative relationship with probability of promotion to director in Japan. 
3.6. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed previous studies into the determinants of 
directors' remuneration in Japan and the UK. Rank order tournament theory was 
also explained. In addition, we examined differences in the promotion patterns of 
directors in both countries. The internal employment structure of large Japanese 
firms was also discussed. 
As seen in the previous chapter, shareholders have considerable power 
over top directors. In response to the Cadbury and Greenbury recommendations, 
many large British companies are trying to strengthen the link between pay and 
performance, for example, by setting up remuneration committees composed of 
outside directors. Thus, this research hypothesises that there is a positive 
relationship between directors' pay and company performance in the UK. In Japan, 
by contrast, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between 
director's' pay and employees' wage in large firms. This hypothesis implies that 
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directors in large Japanese firms have incentives to look after their employees' 
wages. These hypotheses are tested in chapters 5 and 6. 
Although there have been many studies into the determinants of 
executive compensation, relatively few have been done on the effect of 
companies' top pay policies on their performance. This research aims to do 
exactly that. Principal-agent theory predicts that director's incentive will increase 
as pay-performance sensitivity increases. Thus we hypothesise that companies 
with high pay-performance sensitivity are more likely to perform well. It is further 
hypothesised that companies with annual incentive schemes are more likely to 
improve their performance. These hypotheses are tested in chapters 7 and 8. 
This chapter also summarised the results of empirical studies of the 
determinants of executive compensation in Japan and the UK. Although a strong 
relationship between size and top pay is observed in both countries, it is 
controversial whether or not there is a relationship between pay and performance. 
Moreover, rank order tournament theory was discussed as well as the 
promotion pattern of directors in Japan and in the UK. Previous studies suggested 
that it takes longer to be promoted to the director in Japan. Census and Labour 
Force Survey in both countries also suggest `slow promotion' in Japan. 
Lastly, this chapter explained some characteristics of the internal 
structure of Japanese firms, often described in terms of `ranking hierarchy'. It was 
shown that ranking hierarchy can be an effective incentive device for employees, 
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as there are many similarities with rank order tournament. We then hypothesised 
that there is a negative correlation between the possibility of employees getting 
promoted to the position of director and the pay gap within the company. This 
hypothesis will be tested in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4. Data Sources, Variables, and Basic 
Statistics 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines various types of data on executive compensation 
in the UK and Japan. Some basic statistics of executive compensations are also 
given. 
One of the difficulties in analysing the determinants of executive pay in 
Japan lies in obtaining a good data set. The remuneration packages of individual 
directors are not usually disclosed. Neither the commercial code nor stock 
exchange listing rules require companies to disclose this information. In this 
chapter, we present some of the data which are available on executive pay in 
Japan in order to examine the strengths and weaknesses of each types of data. It is 
shown that `annual report' data are less biased and more reliable than `income tax 
data'. In addition, some basic statistics about executive compensations are given, 
using various data sources, in an attempt to investigate the real nature of top pay 
in Japan. 
Similarly, this chapter also examines some data sets relating to executive 
compensation in the UK. More large British firms are disclosing the details of 
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their directors' remuneration packages in response to the recommendations of the 
Cadbury and Greenbury committees. We explain the strengths and weakness of 
each data set. In addition, basic statistics on directors' remuneration are shown. 
Lastly, we summarise the discussion. 
4.2. Japanese Data 
In this section, we examine some data sets relating to directors' 
remuneration in Japan. The strengths and weaknesses of these data sets are 
discussed in order to establish which is most appropriate for this research. This 
section also gives some basic statistics from our data in order to compare it with 
data used in previous studies. 
4.2.1. Sources and Variables of Executive Pay 
As mentioned above, the amount of executive compensation for each 
director is not usually disclosed in Japan, so, we can not directly observe the 
amount of compensation for CEOs in large companies. Instead, listed companies 
are required to report the total amount of remuneration for all their executives. 
Several previous studies on executive pay have used this data, while others use 
data based on income tax. In addition to this, some private institutions in Japan do 
collect and disclose a certain amount of data on top pay. We will discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of these various data sets in this subsection. Table (4-1) 
summarises the main characteristics of the available data sources on executive pay 
in Japan. 
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Table 4-1 Executive compensation data in Japan -1 
Data source Company Income Tax Seikei Romu Gyosei 
Annual Report Kenkyusyo Kenkyusyo 
(The Political (the Labour and 
Economy Administration 
Research Research 
Institute) Institute) 
Time Period Every year Limited Almost every Almost every 
year year 
Sample Company All listed Limited Limited Limited 
companies 
CEO Pay? No Yes Yes Yes 
Director's average Yes No Yes No 
pay? 
Pay or Income? Pay Total income Pay Pay 
Performance? Yes No No No 
Company name? Yes Yes No No 
Available from NEEDS Tax office Seikei Romu Gyosei 
DATABASE Kenkyusyo Kenkyusyo 
The amount of income tax is disclosed by the tax office every year, if it exceeds certain 
amount. However, there is no survey that calculates and discloses directors' actual 
income every year. 
- 111 - 
Data Based on Annual Reports 
Listed companies are required to report the total amount of the directors' 
monthly pay and their bonus. As they disclose all the names of their directors, we 
can then work out `directors' average pay' and `directors' average bonus'. These 
figures are disclosed in companies' annual reports, and are available from the 
NIKKEI NEEDS DATABASE. 
This data set has its advantages. One of these is that it is the only data 
disclosed by individual companies themselves, showing how much they pay. As 
these data are disclosed with other financial statement of the company, it is not 
difficult to match company performance and directors' compensation. 
The other advantage is that we are able to obtain a relatively large 
number of samples, every year, as all the listed companies (more than 1000) are 
included in this database. Hence, it is possible to examine pooled data, which is 
considered to be important as many researchers focus on longitudinal data in 
analysing executive pay. 
In addition, we can analyse directors' base pay and bonuses separately. 
There are two types of executive compensation in Japan: One is base pay, which is 
paid monthly, and the other is the bonus, which is paid at the end of the company 
fiscal year. Directors' base pay is disclosed as an item in the profit and loss 
account, while their bonus is disclosed as an item in the distribution of profit table. 
It may be an advantage that we can analyse bonus and pay separately. It is often 
said that directors' pay is relatively fixed, not reflecting the company's current or 
previous performance, while their bonus will vary according to the company's 
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performance. 
We obtain `director's average pay' by dividing `pay bill for directors' by 
`number of directors', which is disclosed in the annual report. It should be noted 
that there is a possibility that the resulting figures will be smaller than the real 
figures. Firstly, there may be hidden payments made to some non-title directors. 
In many large companies in Japan, it is often the case that a non-title director is 
also an employee of the company. 
When a new director is appointed from among the employees, the chosen 
employee usually terminates his existing contract, and makes a new one as a 
director. However, in some cases, the employee retains his old contract as an 
employee while also entering into his new one. In this case, the person receives 
both his employee's salary and his director's salary'. Usually, most of his salary 
consists of his employee's wage. Many companies do not include this part of the 
salary in their pay bill for directors. 
Secondly, the number of directors' includes the number of auditors. As 
described above, the directors' average bonus is calculated by dividing total 
directors' bonus by the number of directors. The number of directors includes not 
only directors, but also auditors. But in some companies, auditors receive only 
monthly pay, and do not receive any bonus because this is considered to be a 
' As described in chapter 2, non-title directors in Japan are usually full-time directors. Therefore, 
they are different from non-executive directors in the UK. Non-title directors are called `non-title' 
as they belong to the bottom layer of the hierarchy in the board of directors. 
2 Usually, the total amount of his salary is almost the same as that of directors who are not 
employees of the company. 
' In our sample, the average number of directors in a company is 29.2. The maximum number of 
directors in a company is 60 while minimum is 9 in our sample. 
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reward for performance. Thus, the calculated `director's average bonus' can come 
out smaller than the real figure. Taking this into account, this research focuses not 
only on the level of pay, but also on the change of pay, which is less affected by 
these problems. 
Data Based on Income Tax 
The other data source on executive compensation is the income tax of top 
directors. The amount of income tax someone pays is disclosed by the tax office if 
it exceeds a certain amount. As the income tax of the president of a large company 
may exceed this threshold, it will be possible to estimate his income by consulting 
the income tax table. 
For example, Seikei Kenkyusyo (The Political Economy Research 
Institute), a private research institute, disclosed the income of presidents in some 
large Japanese companies in 1991, using data from the tax office (Seikei 
Kenkyusyo, 1992). 
The advantage of this data set is that we can examine the individual 
income of presidents. As it is based on individual data, it is possible for us to 
analyse the relationship between company performance and the top director's 
income. This may make it easier to compare the results of our analysis with 
previous studies done in other countries, as most do use data sets based on 
individual compensation. In addition, in some companies, we can observe the 
income of senior directors, in addition to the income of president. 
However, there are also some disadvantages with this data set, namely 
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bias in estimating income, the problem of sample selection, and the problem of 
data availability. 
As this data set is based on income tax, estimated income includes not 
only directors' salary from the company, but also other income from various 
sources, meaning that their income is likely to be overestimated. For example, it 
may be the case that the president of a company is also a director of one of their 
subsidiary companies or other companies. For example, the chairman of Seven- 
Eleven Japan in 1992, was also a chairman of Denny's Japan, and a president of 
Ito-Yokado. We cannot know what proportion of his income came from each of 
these companies. Thus, it will be difficult to examine the relationship between 
firm performance and compensation. 
Secondly, the income tax office only reveals the amount of income tax 
paid by those who earn a considerable amount. As some directors do not receive 
such high compensation, the sample obtained by this approach is incomplete. 
A third important problem is that it is not easy to obtain income tax- 
based data every year. No other research institution calculates and discloses their 
income every year. The most recent obtainable data set is from 1991 (Seikei 
Kenkyusyo, 1992). 
Seikei Kenkyusyo Data 
Seikei Kenkyusyo (The Political Economy Research Institute) a private 
research institution, publishes executive compensation data every year (Seikei 
Kenkyusyo, 1995), in addition to the data set based on income tax mentioned 
above. They collect their data through questionnaire surveys and interviews. Their 
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data contains both listed and non-listed companies, though the sample size is not 
that large; For example, their 1995 data includes 55 listed companies, among them, 
41 listed in the premier section of the Tokyo stock exchange. There are also 164 
unlisted companies in the set. 
One advantage of their data is that it shows individual compensation paid 
by companies. In addition, the compensation for different positions within the 
board is given for some companies. For example, they show the compensation of 
the president, the senior executive directors, and the non-title directors. 
On the other hand, neither the name of the company nor its performance 
is disclosed, making it impossible to match executive pay and company 
performance. 
Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo Data 
Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo (the Labour and Administration Research 
Institute) collect top pay data through questionnaire surveys and interviews and 
disclose this in their journal Rosei Jihou (Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo, 1997,1995, 
1995,1994,1993,1992,1990,1988,1986). These data are different from 
previous sets. As they show only average compensation across companies, we can 
not obtain the relevant information for individual companies. Thus, it is clearly 
not possible to match company performance and director's salary. Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyusyo 's survey includes the compensation of non-title directors. 
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Comparison of Data 
Which of these data sets should we use? In order to decide, let us 
examine them in terms of reliability and availability. Starting with the question of 
reliability, we ask the following questions. Which data set contains the most 
accurate estimation of top pay information? Are their estimations biased? Is there 
any sample selection bias? Our argument is summarised in table (4-2). 
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Table 4- 2 Executive compensation data in Japan -2 
Annual report Income tax Seikei Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyusyo Kenkyusyo 
(The Political (the Labour and 
Economy Administration 
Research Research 
Institute) Institute) 
Bias in Yes N. A. N. A. N. A. 
estimating the Pay bill may be 
pay bill for smaller than 
directors actual amount. 
Bias in Yes (may not Yes Not definite Not definite 
estimating the be very serious) Estimated Company may Company may 
amount of Estimated figure may be not give correct not give correct 
individual top figure may be larger than figures on top figures on top 
pay smaller than actual amount pay. pay. 
actual amount. 
Bias in No Yes Yes Yes 
selecting (All the listed Only CEOs Only those Only those who 
sample firms companies whose income who received received and 
discloses) exceeds certain and responded responded to 
amounts are to questionnaire questionnaire 
chosen 
Who collects & Company Tax office Seikei Romu Gyosei 
discloses the Kenkyusyo Kenkyusyo 
data? 
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As discussed above, all the data sets have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Among them, Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo and Seikei Kenkyusyo data 
are based on independent questionnaire surveys. Although the Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyusyo data do not reveal the director's salary for individual companies, the 
Seikei Kenkyusyo do. 
One of the problems with these two data sets (Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo 
and Seikei Kenkyusyo data) may be the reliability of their top pay figures. As these 
are collected by private research institutions through questionnaire surveys, we 
have little guarantee that they are reliable. 
Further problems with the Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo and Seikei Kenkyusyo 
data may lie in the sample selection. As sample companies are selected by these 
institutions, it may not be easy to control their various characteristics, such as size. 
Turning to `income tax data', the advantage of this is that it comes from 
the tax office. As their figures are collected for tax purposes, they are likely to be 
reliable. However, as mentioned before, the amount of top directors' income in 
this data contains not only their company salary, but also any income from other 
sources. For example, top directors may own some stocks in their company, some 
are founders of the company, or belong to the founder's family, in which case, 
they will have a considerable amount of stocks, and their income may include 
revenues from these, such as dividends or capital gains. It is clear, then, that the 
figures in this `income tax data' may be considerably larger than people's actual 
salary from the firm. 
`Income tax data' are also problematic with respect to its sample in that 
- 119- 
the tax office only discloses the amount of income tax of people whose annual 
income exceeds a certain level. This is a serious problem because top directors 
who receive a relatively small amount of compensation will not be included. In 
other words, this `income tax data' has some bias in selecting sample companies. 
The top pay figures in `annual report data' are based on company annual 
reports. The company discloses the `total pay bill for all directors' and the `total 
amount of bonus for all directors'. These figures are reported in the financial 
tables of the annual report, and are audited by the CPA and reported to the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. Thus, the `pay bill for all directors' and the `total amount of 
bonus for all directors' does show the actual amount of directors' salaries, which 
are paid by the company. 
However, `annual report data' has some problems with the reliability of 
its figures. Firstly, there is the possibility that these will not contain some 
proportion of the salary of directors, i. e. that which is paid as `employee's wage', 
as described above, so, there is the risk that the `pay bill for all directors' figures 
will be smaller than the true amount. In addition, there is the further possibility 
that the `director's average pay' figures in `annual report data' may come out 
lower than they should be, because non-executive directors receive smaller 
salaries than other directors'. However, this problem is not particularly be serious, 
since most large Japanese companies do not actually have non-executive director. 
One of the crucial advantages of `annual report data' is that it allows us 
4 As described above, we calculate `average director's compensation' by dividing `pay bill for all 
directors' by the number of directors. It may be the case that the company has non-executive 
directors, though these are not common in large companies in Japan. 
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to obtain the pay data for all the listed companies'; In other words, there is little 
bias in selecting samples. As all the listed companies are included, we can control 
for various characteristics of the company, such as industry or size. 
Which of these data sets is more reliable? Each set has advantages and 
disadvantages from the viewpoint of reliability. Data based on public information 
('income tax data' and `annual report data' in the Tokyo stock exchange) may be 
more reliable in the sense that the data are collected via more standardised 
procedures, such as tax law, company law and stock market exchange rules. 
It may be true that questionnaire survey data are useful for examining top 
pay in Japan, but there is some risk of sample selection bias. In addition, as these 
data are collected and disclosed by private institutions, it is not easy for us to 
assess their accuracy and reliability. `Income tax' data also suffers from some 
biases in its sample selection. In addition, their data disclose the general income 
of the top directors, rather than their salary from the company in question. 
Although `annual report' data may also suffer from some bias, this may 
not be very serious, as noted above. In addition, there is little bias in sample 
selection, which may make the data more reliable. 
Let us next examine the data sets from the viewpoint of availability. 
Recall that one of the main purposes of this research is to analyse the relationship 
between directors' pay and company performance. This requires that information 
on both the executive salaries and the performance of individual companies is 
'NIKKEI data base also contains financial information of some large non-listed companies, in 
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available. 
This suggests that neither Seikei Kenkyusyo Data nor Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyusyo Data are not appropriate for our needs as they do not allow us to 
match firm performance with executive compensation. In addition, these data sets 
are not available every year. In other words, we cannot obtain panel data to 
analyse the relationship between director's salary and firm performance. Thus, 
Seikei Kenkyusyo Data nor Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo Data may not be appropriate 
for our research from the viewpoints of data availability. Similarly, we cannot 
obtain panel data sets using `income tax data', as it is not available every year. 
We can construct panel data sets using `annual report' data, as this is 
disclosed every year and is available through the NIKKEI NEEDS DATABASE. 
It is considered to be important to use panel data in our analysis because these are 
micro data. Firm level data are likely to be affected by firm-specific factors, 
unless we use panel data, where these factors can be excluded to some extent 
(Baltagi, 1995, Greene, 1993). In addition, we can observe `changes in top pay', 
as well as the level. Much of the research on the determinants of executive 
compensation focuses on the relationship between change in top pay and change 
in company performance. One reason for this may be that this relationship is 
considered to be stronger than that between the level of top pay and company 
performance, as these are affected by many other factors. We suggest then that 
`annual report data' are more appropriate from the viewpoint of availability as 
well as reliability. 
addition to those of listed companies. 
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4.2.2. How Much do They Earn? 
In this sub-section, we examine the basic characteristics of executive 
compensation in Japan. The main questions to be addressed are as follows. How 
much is the directors' average salary in a large Japanese firm? Is there any 
difference between presidents' pay and that of other directors? Table (4-3) and (4- 
4) summarises directors' pay figures, as reported in previous studies on directors' 
salary as well as in other articles. We will also analyse why some figures are much 
lower than others. Table (4-5) summarises top pay data by position within the 
board. 
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Table 4-3 Executive pay in Japan: Data from various sources 
Tachibanaki Kato et al Xu Xu Kaplan Kubo 
(1997) (1992) (1992) (1997) (1994) (2000) 
Directors' 36.6 m JPY 50.8 m JPY 37 m JPY 28.3 m JPY 18.2 m JPY 19.4 m JPY 
salary (193,000 GBP) (267,700 GBP) (195,000 GBP) (149,000 (96,000GBP) (102,000 GBP) 
(1995 yen) GBP) 
Whose salary President's President's President's salary Average pay Average pay Average pay per 
or income? salary income per director per director director 
Year 1992 1985 1984-1987 1983-1991 1981-1984 1995-1996 
Sample 1569 599 firms 37 firms, 82 listed 121 largest 210 listed firms 
Large firms 104 samples firms listed firms 
(Employees, 
1000+) 
Source Questionnaire Income tax Seikei Kenkyusyo Annual report Annual Annual report 
report 
Top pay/ 6.5 5.25 4.8 2.38`' 
Wage ratio 
1.1 GBP = 190 yen 
2. JPY: Japanese yen, GBP: Sterling pound, USD: US dollar 
3. Tachibanaki's figure is based on their original questionnaire survey. They 
do not ask about executive compensation directly, but ask respondents to 
choose one of 7 ranges of pay level, such as 30 million JPY to 50 million 
JPY. 
4. Top pay/wage ratio is the pay gap between director and employees. 
However, it may not be appropriate to compare these figures as each 
study uses a different method to calculate the ratio. 
5. All the figures are in 1995 yen adjusted by consumer price index (CPI). 
b In our sample, the average wage for employees is 8.14 m yen, including both monthly wage and 
their bonuses. 
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Table 4-4 Executive pay in Japan: Data from various sources 
(Continued) 
Nikkei Business Seikei Kenkyusyo (The Business Week Nikkei Business Romu Gyosei 
(1998) Political Economy (1993) (1998) Kenkyusyo 
Research Institute) (the Labour and 
(1992) Administration 
Research 
Institute) 
Directors' 46.5 m JPY 3,244.8 m- 313.8 m 858.7 m -47.4 m 27.7 m JPY 15.5 m JPY 
salary (245,000 GBP) JPY (17,078,000- JPY (4,519,000- (146,000 GBP) (82,000 GBP) 
(1995 yen) 1,651,000 GBP) 249,000 GBP) 
Whose salary President's pay Chairman, Top executives Non-title Non-title 
or income? vice chairman or directors' salary directors' salary 
President 
Year 1996 1991 1991 1996 1997 
Sample Companies whose All the listed and large Top executives of Companies 2653 firms 
capital is larger non-listed companies the 50 largest whose capital is All listed 
than 10 billion yen Japanese industrial larger than 10 companies and 
or companies billion yen or large non-listed 
52.6 million GBP 52.6 million companies 
GBP 
Source Questionnaire and Income tax Income tax Questionnaire Questionnaire 
interview by Seikei and interview and interview 
Kenkyusyo by Seikei 
Kenkyusyo 
ncludes Business Week's 
ata as a sub-sample 
1.1 GBP = 190 yen 
2. Business Week, April 26,1993 
3. Nikkei Business, January 5,1998 
4. JPY: Japanese yen, GBP: Sterling pound, USD: US dollar 
5. All the figures are adjusted to 1995 yen by CPI. 
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Tables (4-3) and (4-4) show the level of executive compensation in Japan. 
These figures are based on different data sources, covering different times. Some 
figures show the president's income while others show the director's average 
salary. Some figures are based on the data from 1981-84, and others on the data 
from 1996. Thus, amounts of pay or income vary from sample to sample, 
Notice that some data are much higher than others. Why, for example, is 
Business Week's data much higher than other data, such as Kaplan's? The largest 
figures are found in the data of Seikei Kenkyusyo and of Business Week, as they 
show the income of Japan's highest earning presidents. Both figures are based on 
the same income tax data, though Seikei Kenkyusyo's data cover a larger sample. 
In these data sets, the highest earning executive in Japan receives 3,245 million 
yen, or 17,078 thousand GBP. As this figure is based on income tax, it includes 
not only the salary from the company, but also various income from other sources. 
The smallest figure is found in Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo's data: just 15.5 million 
JPY. One reason for this difference may be because he focuses on the average 
directors' compensation, rather than the president's income. 
The above tables show that the presidents in Japan earn on average 
around 200 thousand to 250 thousand GBP. In addition, the average directors' 
salary is around 100 thousand to 150 thousand GBP. 
As discussed above, presidents' salaries are likely to be overestimated 
while directors' average salaries are likely to be underestimated. For example, 
Kaplan's (1994) data may underestimate directors' average salary, due to the 
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presence of part-time directors and employee-directors'. Among the above 
samples, Nikkei Business (1998) and Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo Data are free from 
this problem, as their data are based on questionnaires and interviews. According 
to Nikkei Business, the average director's salary is 146 thousand GBP on average 
for 1996, while Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo gives a figure of 82 thousand GBP for 
1997. This difference stems from a difference in their samples, namely that Nikkei 
Business data are based on much bigger companies, and suggests that size may be 
a major factor in explaining directors' pay in Japan. In our sample, the figure is 
102 thousand GBP in 1994-95, suggesting that our data are not very different 
from that from other sources. 
Table (4-3) also shows the basic statistics of our data set. We can 
compare this with other data in tables (4-3) and (4-4). This is an important way of 
checking the reliability of our data: We need to know how our data fit in with 
other data. In our data, director's average salary' is 102 thousand GBP. Director's 
average salary in Xu's data set (Xu, 1997) is 149 thousand GBP, higher than the 
amount in our own data. Why should this be? One reason may be that Xu takes 
his data from an economic boom period. As will be described in chapter 5, in 
large Japanese firms, a certain proportion of profit is distributed to the directors 
when the company is in good condition. As many Japanese companies achieved 
good results during that particular period, directors' salaries may well have been 
' Some non-title directors in large Japanese firms are also employees of their company, and are 
paid both as a director and as an employee. Thus their salary is composed of employee's wage and 
directors' salary. As this `employee's salary' proportion of their salary is not included in 
`directors' pay', we cannot include this `employee's salary' in our analysis. 
8 Average director's salary in our data set in table (4-3) includes both director's pay and their 
bonus. 
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higher then (Okushima, 1996, Xu, 1997). In contrast, our own data set is based on 
the recession period of 1995-1996. As many companies suffered serious setbacks 
during that period, directors' salaries were almost certainly lower. Okushima 
(1996), Xu (1997) suggest that directors will not be paid bonuses when the 
company is not performing well. As many companies were in financial distress 
during our data period, some of them probably did not pay their directors any 
bonus. This may explain the discrepancy between our data and Xu's9. 
Table (4-3) also shows the pay gap between directors and average 
employees. It is noticeable that the figures for this vary across studies. Our data 
set reports the smallest pay gap between directors and employees, namely 2.3 8. 
Why is the pay gap in our data set smaller than those in others? This may reflect 
the fact that the four studies all used different methods to calculate the pay gap. 
One study took employee's average wage from another data set (Kaplan, 1994) 
while another uses president's salary (Xu, 1992), rather than director's average 
salary. 
Kaplan (1994) reports that the pay gap between directors and employees 
is 4.8. He compared director's average salary as calculated from his own data set 
with employee's average wage, which he took from another study. The average 
wage data in Kaplan's study are based on data about employed Japanese males, 
reported in other paper. In other words, he drew his information on director's 
salary and employee's wage from different samples. As the wage data he used 
may have been calculated from a much wider sample, the resulting average wage 
9 In our sample from 1994-1995, the ratio of directors' bonus to their total annual income is 16%, 
as directors' average pay is 16 million yen while their bonus is 3 million. According to Xu (1997), 
the ratio of bonus to total annual salary of director is 26% in 1983-1991. 
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may be smaller than that in the largest companies. This means that the pay gap 
reported in Kaplan's data may be larger than it actually is in the large companies 
on which Kaplan bases his director's salary figure. 
Xu (1992) reports that the average pay gap is 6.5, the largest among the 
four studies. However, it is not appropriate to compare this with the pay gap in our 
own data set, because Xu calculated the gap between president's salary and 
employee's wage, while we used director's average pay. As president's salary is 
likely to be larger than the average director's pay, it is reasonable to expect Xu's 
pay gap to be larger than ours. Xu (1997) calculates the gap between director's 
average pay and male employee's wage, but this is still larger than our own figure. 
This may be because his male employee's wage data include only cash 
compensation for employees, excluding benefit and other labour costs, while our 
own wage data do include labour costs. It has been shown that the main reason 
that the pay gap figure varies across studies is that each of them uses a different 
method and different data. 
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Table 4-5 Executive pay by position within the board in Japan 
Tachibanaki Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo Nikkei Business 
(1997) (the Labour and 
Administration Research 
Institute) 
Year 1992 1997 1996 
Chairman 44.94 m JPY 36.62 m JPY 45.39 m JPY 
(Kaicho) 
(237,000 GBP) (193,000 GBP) (239,000 GBP) 
Vice Chairman 32.02 m JPY 
(Fuku Kaicho) 
(169,000 GBP) 
President 36.65 m JPY 34.15 m JPY 46.54 m JPY 
(Shacho) 
(193,000 GBP) (180,000 GBP) (245,000 GBP) 
Vice President 35.43 m JPY 29.99 m JPY 37.3 m JPY 
(Fuku Shacho) 
(186,000 GBP) (158,000 GBP) (196,000 GBP) 
Senior Executive Director 22.06 m JPY 22.94 m JPY 27.94 m JPY 
(Senmu) 
(116,000 GBP) (121,000 GBP) (147,000 GBP) 
Executive Director 26.85 m JPY 18.99 m JPY 23.8 m JPY 
(141,000 GBP) (100,000 GBP) (125,000 GBP) 
(Jyomu) 
Non-title director 18.31 m JPY 15.46 m JPY 27.68 m JPY 
(96,000 GBP) (81,000 GBP) (146,000 GBP) 
(Torishimariyaku) 
Sample 1569 2653 firms Companies whose capital is 
Large firms All listed companies and large larger than 10 billion yen or 
(Employees, 1000+) non-listed companies 52.6 million GBP 
Source Questionnaire Questionnaire and interview Questionnaire and 
interview by Seikei 
Kenkyusyo 
1 GBP = 190 yen 
JPY: Japanese yen, GBP: Sterling pound, USD: US dollar 
Nikkei Business, January 5,1998 
Romu Gyosei Kenkyusyo (Labour and administration research institution), (1997), 
"Yakuin Hoshu Shoyo, Teinensei, Ote Chushobetsuno Zittai" (Executive 
Compensation, Bonus, Mandatory Retirement, of large and smaller companies), 
Rosei Jihou, No. 3305 
All the figures are adjusted to 1995 yen by CPI. 
- 130- 
There is very limited information available on the pay differences among 
directors within the board. Annual reports do not disclose such information. Table 
(4-5) shows the results of some surveys. 
Tachibanaki (1997) and Noda (1995) report directors' salaries by their 
rank within the board. Their figures are based on questionnaires carried out on 
directors in Japan. The questionnaires are sent to listed firms and large life 
insurance companies that are not listed. It is worth noting that they do not ask for 
the actual amount of compensation, but ask simply for one of the pay categories. 
Their results show that the compensation of top executives (chairperson, vice 
chairperson, president, vice president) is much higher than that of other directors. 
In large companies with more than 1000 employees, the average salary of the 
chairperson is 237 thousand GBP while that of non-title directors is 96 thousand 
GBP. 
It is not clear whether the chairman is the highest paid director or not. 
Among the three surveys in Table (4-5), two show that chairman is the highest 
paid position, while according to Nikkei Business, the presidents' salary is higher. 
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4.3. UK data 
4.3.1. Sources and Variables of Executive Pay 
This section examines available data sets on executive compensation in 
the UK. After discussing the strengths and weaknesses of each data set, we will 
explain why we chose to uses the Monks partnership data. In the UK, listed 
companies are required by the stock exchange to disclose their highest paid 
executive's remuneration. Certain institutions collect and disclose information 
about top pay in the large companies: the Monks partnership, the Income Data 
Service (IDS), and DATASTREAM. Some characteristics of these data sets are 
summarised in Table (4-6). 
Table 4- 6 Executive compensation data in the UK 
Data source Monks IDS 
(1995) 
DATASTREAM 
Time Period Every year Every year 
Sample Company All listed companies FT-250 companies All listed companies 
CEO Pay? Yes Yes Yes 
Detail of CEO pay? Yes Yes No 
Other Top Pay? Yes'° No No 
Performance 
variables included 
Profit, EPS, Sales, 
and Capitalisation 
Not included Any performance 
variables 
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Data Published by the Monks Partnership 
The Monks Partnership, a consulting firm, publishes a broad survey of 
executive compensation, giving details of directors' remuneration and the main 
performance figures for the firm. One of the advantages of this data set is that it 
reveals the details of directors' remuneration, showing the fixed salary and annual 
bonus of the highest paid director, in addition to the salaries of the five highest 
paid directors. This enables us to know if the company has an annual incentive or 
other long-term incentive scheme. Another advantage of their data is that it 
includes a large number of companies. In addition, as this data set is published 
each year, we can obtain pooled data. 
The disadvantage of the Monks partnership data is that it contains only 
limited information on company performance compared to DATASTREAM. 
However, it is considered that Monks' data contain enough variables for our 
analysis: profit, earnings per share, and stock market capitalisation. 
DATASTREAM 
The strength of DATASTREAM is that it contains a lot of information on 
the financial condition of companies. DATASTREAM is a large database that 
includes not only company account data but also macroeconomic indicators. In 
particular, it contains very detailed information on the company's financial tables, 
in addition to stock market data. This database also shows the salaries of the 
highest paid directors. Thus, it is possible to analyse the relationship between the 
1° The salaries of the top five highest paid directors are shown. 
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salaries of highest paid director and the performance of companies. Another 
advantage of DATASTREAM is that it covers all the listed companies and many 
others besides. 
The disadvantage of DATASTREAM is that it does not give detailed 
information about directors' remuneration, showing only the highest paid 
directors' salaries. It does not tell us the amount of fixed pay, annual bonus, and 
other incentives. 
Data Published by the Income Data Service 
The Income Data Service (IDS) discloses some information about 
directors' remuneration. For example, IDS (1995) gives the top pay in FT 250 
companies. They show the amount of CEO pay as well as fixed pay and annual 
bonuses. IDS's data set covers 250 companies, which makes it smaller than the 
other two sets. One of the weaknesses of IDS is that it is not disclosed every year. 
As a result, we may not be able to obtain a pooled data set and it will not be 
appropriate to use IDS's set as the main data for our research. 
Comparison of Data 
Which of these data should we use as our main data set? One of the most 
important points is that in all of these sets, most figures, including top pay data, 
are based on the same source: the company's annual report. Most previous studies 
on executive pay in the UK use such data. 
Since all the data sets are based on the same source, there will be little 
difference in their reliability. What about availability? Firstly, note that IDS's data 
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may not be appropriate for our research, as we cannot obtain panel data sets. As 
discussed above, this data set is not published regularly. The choice is then 
between DATASTREAM and the Monks partnership. One of the strengths of 
DATASTREAM is that it contains various financial data from the company, on the 
other hand, it provides limited information about top pay. By contrast, the Monks 
partnership provides very detailed information on top pay. As our main concern is 
with executive compensation, the Monks partnership data will therefore be very 
useful. In addition to giving the amounts of directors' salaries, they also show 
whether the company has some kind of pay scheme, such as an annual incentive 
scheme. Bearing all this in mind, we shall use the Monks partnership's data, rather 
than DATASTREAM's. This is in keeping with the main goal of our research, 
which is to analyse the relationship among executive compensation, corporate 
governance, and firm performance, with special emphasis on directors' incentives. 
4.3.2. How Much do They Earn? 
In this sub-section, we examine the basic statistics on directors' pay in 
the UK. As mentioned above, many large UK companies disclose the salaries of 
individual directors, and we are therefore able to focus on top directors' pay. Table 
(4-7) summarises the amounts of top director's salaries reported in various 
studies. 
This table shows that the amount of directors' pay varies according to the 
sample. For instance, according to IDS (1995), top directors in FT-SE 250 firms 
are paid on average 588 thousand GBP in 1994/5, while Conyon and Nicolitsas's 
data show the median pay of top directors of small companies to be just 66 
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thousand GBP in 1992. These figures suggest a positive correlation between firm 
size and directors' pay, as shown in many previous studies. 
Table (4-7) also shows top executive compensation data according to our 
data set. The average top director's pay in our set is 225 thousand GBP, based on a 
sample of 1431 companies in 1994-95. As our data set is much larger than the 
others, it includes many relatively small listed companies, meaning that the top 
director's salary figures may be smaller than those in other studies that focus on 
large companies. For example, IDS (1995) reports that the average top executive 
compensation in FT-SE 250 companies is 588 thousand GBP, much higher than 
the figure in our sample. Conyon (1997) reports an average figure for top 
director's pay of 254 thousand GBP, which is similar to that in our data. 
The above discussion suggests that some proportion of the variation in 
top director's pay across studies in table (4-7) may be attributed to differences in 
the samples in terms of firm size. As average top pay in our data set is lower than 
it is in the data sets using larger companies as a sample, it is appropriate to 
conclude that our data set is consistent with other data sets. 
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Table 4-7 Executive pay in the UK (in GBP) 
Gregg, Machin, McKnight IDS Conyon Conyon and 
Szymanski (1996) (1995) (1995) Leech 
(1993) (1994) 
Total pay 183,901 485,639 587,833 222,699 140,027 
(median) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) 
Year 1982-1991 1994 1994 / 95 1990-1994 1986 
Sample 288 large 90 listed firms FT-SE 250 28 Privatised 294 listed 
listed firms companies Utilities firms 
Cosh and Conyon Conyon and Kubo 
Hughes (1997) Nicolitsas (1999) 
(1997) (1998) 
Total pay 151,373 254,991 65,684 225,915 
(median) (mean) (median) (mean) 
Year 1994 1988-1993 1992 1994-1995 
Sample 64 electrical 213 listed 39 1431 
firms firms small firms listed firms 
All figures are adjusted to 1995 GBP by retail price index (RPI). 
4.4. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has examined some data sets on directors' remuneration in 
Japan and in the UK. One of the problems in studying directors' pay in Japan lies 
in the difficulty in obtaining sufficient information. Listed firms are not required 
to disclose details of the pay packages of individual directors. This chapter 
reviewed some of the data sets that are available, examining advantages and 
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disadvantages of each. It was suggested that `annual report data' are more reliable 
than other sources. One reason for this is that such data are least affected by biases, 
although it must be said that all of the available data sets do have some biases. 
There is relatively little bias in the selecting of samples in `annual report data' : All 
the figures are reported using standardised procedures, such as company law and 
stock exchange listing rules. In addition, these figures are audited by CPA. 
In addition, `annual report data' have some advantages from the 
viewpoint of availability. We can use large pooled data, as it is possible to obtain a 
large number of observations for each year. `Annual report' data also shows the 
actual salary the company pays directors, while the alternative data source shows 
only their total income. 
Using various sources and empirical studies, then, it was shown that the 
average income of company presidents in Japan is around 170 thousand to 250 
thousand GBP while the average director makes around 100 thousand to 150 
thousand GBP. However, it was noted that there are big differences in the figures 
across studies. 
We also examined some available data sets on executive compensations 
in the UK, showing the strengths and weaknesses of each set. It was suggested 
that Monks' data set contains the most detailed information on executive pay, 
including the amount of fixed pay, and annual incentives. 
Previous studies have shown that top directors in the UK receive around 
90 thousand - 600 thousand GBP on average. The amount varies across studies as 
the figures are taken from different time periods and samples. It was suggested 
that there is a positive relationship between company size and top pay, and that 
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top pay seems to have increased rapidly in the last 10 - 20 years, as suggested by 
earlier work. 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between 
directors' pay, corporate governance, and firm performance. Using these data sets, 
we will analyse these relationships in the following chapters. In Chapters 5 and 6, 
we analyse the determinants of executive compensation in Japan and in the UK. 
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Chapter 5. The Determinants of Executive 
Compensation: Hypothesis and Methodology 
5-1. Introduction 
In Chapters 5 and 6, this research analyses the determinants of executive 
compensation in the UK and in Japan, following the literature review and 
institutional analysis in the previous chapters. The purpose of these chapters is to 
analyse the director's incentive in large companies in Japan and in the UK, with 
particular emphasis on the relationship between corporate governance and 
executive compensation. This chapter outlines the methodology and set of variables 
employed in this study. 
In this chapter, firstly, we will explain the objectives of large companies in 
the UK and Japan. Then, we will examine how the difference in the corporate 
governance in Japan and in the UK affects the determinants of executive 
compensation in both countries. We employ the principal-agent theory to draw our 
research hypotheses in the UK, and employ a joint determination hypothesis to 
draw our hypothesis in Japan. In addition, we also show how directors' pay is paid 
in practice in these countries. 
Then, we show our research models that are analysed in Chapter 6. Sets of 
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variables are explained and the expected effect of each variable on directors' salary 
is examined. Finally, we show our research model for both countries. 
5-2. The Objective of the Firm in Japan and the UK 
In this section, the objectives of large companies in Japan and in the UK 
are examined. We examine why directors in large Japanese firms are motivated to 
pay attention to the welfare of employees in managing the company. 
5-2-1. The Objective of the Firm in Japan 
Many studies suggest that Japanese firms are pursuing the welfare of their 
employees, rather than the interest of shareholders (Aoki, 1984,1988,1990, Aoki 
and Itami, 1985, Dore, 1987, Komiya, 1988, Itami, 1994, Iwai, 1988, Kagono and 
Kobayashi, 1988, Kuwahara, 1988, Tachibanaki, 1995, Noda, 1995). If this is the 
case, we can say that Japanese firms are similar to `labour managed firms'. In other 
words, the firm behaves as if the true owner of the firm is an employee and the 
managers are agents of their employees. According to studies by Tachibanaki 
(1995) and Noda (1995), directors in large Japanese companies believe that one of 
the most important goals of directors is to protect employment and the welfare of 
their employees, although they are equally concerned with the financial well being 
of the company'. Over ninety percent of directors believe that protecting the 
' In addition, Tachibanaki (1995) and Noda (1995) point out that expanding their business, 
contributions to the society, and increasing dividend are important objectives of the top managers in 
large Japanese companies. Their studies are based on questionnaires whose sample was 2246 
directors in large companies in 1992. 
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employment and employees' welfare is one of the most, if not most, important 
goals of directors. According to Kagono et al. (1983)2, the most important objective 
of the Japanese company is the market share and new products, whilst share prices 
are least important. 
5-2-2. The Reasons Why Managers are Motivated to Prioritise Employee's 
Welfare in Japan 
The above arguments suggest that large Japanese firms prioritise 
employee's welfare. So why are managers motivated to prioritise the welfare of 
their employees in Japan3? There are three main reasons (Itami, 1993). Firstly, as 
seen in Chapter 2, shareholders of large Japanese firms have very limited power to 
control the top managers. There are very few non-executive directors in large 
companies. There is no remuneration committee or nomination committee in most 
companies. The current management team usually controls annual general 
meetings of shareholders. The board of directors and auditors have little power to 
control the president of the firm (Matsumoto, 1991, Kubori, 1996, Fukao et al. 
1997). 
In addition, the majority of shares of large listed companies is owned by 
other institutions, such as banks and group companies. Large shareholders try to 
control the company only when the company is in financial crisis (Aoki, 1990, 
Sheard, 1989, Kaplan and Minton, 1993). The financial market may fail to monitor 
2 Their study is based on a questionnaire survey of directors in large companies in Japan. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) explain two main reasons why economists see shareholders as the 
`owner' of the firm. One reason is that the physical asset is more vulnerable than human capital. 
Shareholders may have more authority to control the firm as they face greater risk than the owner of 
human capital, or than the employee does. The second reason is that the shareholders may have 
longer perspective than the employees do. 
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top directors as there are few hostile take-overs4 (Odagiri, 1994). 
These arguments suggest that shareholders have very limited power to 
control top managers of large Japanese companies. In other words, directors may 
not be penalised even if they fail to achieve good stock market performance. 
Secondly, most directors in large Japanese firms are ex-employees of the 
company'. It may be the case that some directors, at the same time as being 
directors of the company, are also employees'. In addition, the number of directors 
is very large in some large companies. In our sample, the average number of 
directors in a company is 29.2, while the maximum is 60. In the companies whose 
number of directors are very large, some directors may regard themselves as 
employees rather than top directors'. Thus, they are considered to have some 
incentives to pay attention to the welfare of the employees as they were, or they are, 
employees of the firm. 
Thirdly, in Japan employees are considered to be `implicit investors' to the 
company in a long-term employment relationship. It is often the case that an 
employee's salary is less than his contribution to the company when he is young. 
His salary increases as he become older because of the seniority based pay system. 
When he becomes older, his salary may be more than his contribution to the 
' As discussed in chapter 2, many large Japanese companies own stocks in other large companies 
within the same company group to prevent being taken over. Because of this cross-shareholding, 
large shareholders may not withdraw their capital even if the performance of the firm is not 
satisfactory. Instead, these large shareholders try to intervene with the management team by sending 
new directors, for example (Aoki, 1990, Kaplan and Minton, 1993). 
Both employees and ex-employees are implicitly investing in the company. 
6 When an employee is nominated as a director, he usually quits being an employee. He is given a 
new contract as a director with the company and terminates the contract as an employee. However, 
in some cases, he continues the contract as an employee while he starts a new contract as a director 
of the same company. In this case, he is both an employee and a director of the firm. 
' It is often the case that these junior directors have responsibilities for certain divisions of the 
company. 
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company. In other words, he receives money that is implicitly deposited to the 
company. Because of this implicit investment, employees may be considered to be 
implicit equity holders of the company. In addition, whilst in long-term 
employment, many employees acquire firm specific skills. It may be the case that 
employee skills specific to the firm, are an essential asset to the company. If this is 
the case, employees may be the owners of asset that is the core asset of the firm. 
The above argument explains why top managers in large Japanese firms 
focus more on employee's welfare, rather than shareholder's interest8. 
5-2-3. The Objectives of the Firm in the UK 
Much of the literature employs the principal-agent theory to analyse the 
relationship between top managers and shareholders' (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990, 
Gibbons, 1997). As described in previous chapters, shareholders of large UK 
companies have more power to control top directors than those in Japan. In addition, 
many large UK companies are trying to strengthen the tie between executive pay 
and firm performance in response to Cadbury and Greenbury recommendations 
(Cadbury committee, 1992, Greenbury committee, 1995, Monks partnership, 1994, 
Williams, 1994). For example, many large UK companies have annual incentive 
schemes, to attempt to intensify the link between top pay and firm performance. 
8 Formally speaking, large Japanese firms are not `labour managed firms' as banks and group 
companies may excersise their power when the firm is in serious financial distress (Kaplan and 
Minton 1993). There are many studies that analyse the behaviour of labour managed firms (Mead, 
1972,74). They assume that labour managed firms maximise employee's wage subject to other 
costs. The company may not be insolvent by maximising employee's wage if they maximise wage 
on the condition that they pay all the costs, such as capital costs. 
9 Kay and Silberston (1995) state that corporate managers should be regarded as trustees of the assets 
of the company and that the objective of the managers should be to further the interests of the 
business. 
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According to Monks partnership (1994), 71% of FT-SE 350 firms have annual 
bonuses. Managers may be motivated by these annual incentives to work hard to 
improve performance with a clear view of their goal, as annual incentive schemes 
may set some performance targets (Williams, 1994). Large UK companies also try 
to improve disclosure and accountability of executive compensation from the 
viewpoint of shareholders. For example, about 40% of the members of board of 
directors in large UK companies are non-executive directors. In 1992 most large 
UK companies had a remuneration committee (Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995). 
In addition, top directors in large UK companies face more pressure from 
the financial market to improve stock market performance compared to those in 
large Japanese companies. Companies may be taken over if top directors fail to 
achieve good stock market performance. Many shares are owned by individual 
investors rather than by institutional shareholders (Prowse, 1994). 
The above argument suggests that shareholders have considerable power 
over the company. Managers who fail to achieve good stock market performance 
may be punished by the financial market by hostile take-overs. In other words, 
directors in large UK companies have strong incentive to focus on stock market 
performance in order to manage the firm. . 
5-3. The Determinants of Executive Pay 
Following the discussions in the previous section, this section examines 
the determinants of executive compensation in Japan and in the UK. One of the 
main focuses in this section is on the effect of the corporate governance style on the 
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determinants of executive compensation. 
5-3-1. Principal-Agent Theory 
As described in Chapter 3, many scholars have studied the determinants of 
executive compensation. One of the main topics in these studies lies in the 
relationship between executive pay and shareholder's return. As our discussion in 
Chapter 2 shows, the principal-agent theory has been employed to explain this 
relationship. 
Most previous studies on top compensation referred to the principal-agent 
theory when they analysed the determinants of top compensation. As a principal, 
shareholders try to motivate top manager to work towards higher shareholders' 
return. However, managers may have their own goals and may want to pursue their 
own interest in managing the company. Although shareholders want to monitor the 
top directors, shareholders may not have enough information or knowledge for this. 
Therefore, shareholders may design a contract which motivates managers to work 
towards the shareholders' values. Shareholders may link executive compensation 
with shareholders' returns. If this is the case, there is a positive relationship 
between shareholders' returns and executive compensation. As top pay depends on 
the stock market performance, directors may be motivated to work hard to improve 
the stock market value of the company. In addition, if shareholders want managers 
to work toward profit, then director's pay will depend on profit of the company. 
Shareholders may want managers to pursue profit because top director's effort may 
be reflected more in the profit than in stock market performance. 
As discussed in chapter 2, shareholders in large UK firms have more 
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power over top managers than their Japanese counterparts. Most large UK 
companies have remuneration committees (Conyon, et al., 1995, Main and Johnson, 
1993), which is often composed mainly by non-executive directors, who are 
relatively independent from CEO. These arguments lead to our research 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5-1: In the UK there is a positive relationship between 
directors' compensation and company performance, particularly stock 
market performance. 
5-3-2. Joint Determination Hypothesis: Why is There a Positive Relationship 
between Directors' Pay and Employees' Wages in Japan? 
In this subsection, we describe how directors' pay and employees' wages 
are paid in large Japanese companies, sketching out our hypothesis on the 
relationship between the two variables. 
How are employees' wages paid in Japan? 
Koike (1994) and Shimada (1994) show how an employee's wage is paid 
1° lt is noted that the top manager is legally not an agent of the employees. Directors are nominated in 
the annual general meeting of the shareholders. 
" In addition to wage, employees may want job security. However, this research focuses on the 
relationship between director's salary and employee's wage. One reason is that it is not easy to 
measure job security of the company. 
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in a typical Japanese firm12. Employees usually receive monthly pay and bonuses. 
One of the most important characteristics of pay in large Japanese 
companies is that wages increase every year through `annual wage increase' 
(Mizuno, 1987, Sano, 1989, Hart and Kawasaki, 1999). The amount of wage 
increase is determined through a spring offensive, in which the company union 
bargains with employers every year. It is often the case that the amount of bonus is 
also bargained for in the spring offensive. 
As company performance is one of the most important factors that affect 
this bargaining in addition to inflation rate, both employees' monthly wage and 
their bonus reflect company performance (Mizuno, 1987, Sano, 1989, Hart and 
Kawasaki, 1999). Sano (1981) and Hart and Kawasaki (1999) showed a positive 
relationship between profit and wage increase. Both sales and profit are considered 
to be important performance figures, as sales determine the company's ability to 
pay. 
As seen in chapters 2 and 3, another main characteristic of employees' 
wage in large Japanese firms is that a firm's performance is reflected through the 
amount of bonus given. A bonus usually makes up 20-30% of an employee's total 
annual salary (Hart and Kawasaki, 1999)13. As shown by Freeman and Weitzman 
(1987), there is a strong relationship between a firm's performance and an 
employees' bonus. The amount of bonus changes every year, reflecting the 
company performance, and so employees are sharing the risk with other investors, 
12 There are many studies that analyse the determinants of an employee's wage in large Japanese 
firms (Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985, Mincer and Higuchi, 1988, Shimada, 1981). According to 
these studies, age-wage profile is steeper in Japan than in the US. 
" According to Hart and Kawasaki, (1999), bonuses consist of 19% of the total labour cost in Japan 
while in the UK it is 1.09%. 
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such as shareholders. In addition, as an employee's bonus is calculated as a 
proportion of their monthly pay, their bonus also reflects the change in their 
monthly pay. 
The above discussion shows that in large companies in Japan, both 
monthly wages and bonuses reflect a firm's performance, that is their sales and 
profits. We can then express the determination of an employee's wage as follows. 
Employees' monthly wage =f (sales, profit, other factors14) 
Employees' bonus =f (sales, profit, employees' monthly pay, 
other factors) 
(Equation 5-1) 
How are directors' compensations determined in Japan? 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, directors' salary usually consists 
of monthly pay and an annual bonus in large Japanese companies. The proportion 
of bonus is usually around 10-30% of the total annual salary, reflecting the firm's 
performance15. Directors receive an annual bonus at the end of the fiscal year. The 
amount of bonus reflects a firm's profit, as it is paid as part of the distribution of 
profit. Xu (1997) and Abe et al (1997) suggest that directors do not receive their 
bonuses when a company performs badly. The amount of bonus for individual 
14 Other factors include for example, education, rank and inflation rate (Koike, 1994, Tachibanaki, 
1987). 
" In our sample from 1994-1995, the ratio of directors' bonuses to their total annual income is 16%, 
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directors is determined by presidents, according to their rank (Abe et al., 1997, and 
Okushima ed., 1996). 
Directors' monthly pay is also determined by presidents (Abe et al., 1997, 
and Okushima ed., 1996), according to a pay table which is based on the rank and 
performance of the firm, such as its sales and profit. As a director's bonus is 
calculated as a proportion of their monthly pay, it also reflects the change in 
monthly pay. 
It is often the case that a director's monthly pay increases after wage 
bargaining between management and employees. As a director's monthly pay is 
often determined as a proportion of the highest paid employees' monthly wage, it 
will increase when an employee's wage increases. In addition to employees' wages, 
company performance, and the rate of inflation are also important factors that 
determine the amount of a director's monthly wage (Abe et al., 1996). 
Then, we can write the determinants of directors' monthly pay and their 
bonus as follows 
Change in directors' monthly pay =f (sales, profit, change in employees' 
wage, other factors") 
Change in directors' annual bonus =f (sales, profit, change in directors' 
monthly pay, change in employees' wage, other 
factors) 
(Equation 5-2) 
while Xu (1997) reports it is 26% in 1983-91. 
-150- 
Why are both directors and employees' paid in a similar way?; Joint determination 
hypothesis 
Equations (5-1) and (5-2) show that the salaries of both directors and 
employees are determined in similar ways in large Japanese companies. The next 
question then arises. Why are both directors and employees paid in a similar way? 
One of the most important reasons may be that from the viewpoint of corporate 
governance, both directors and employees are in similar positions in the firm: Both 
of them are implicitly investing in the company. 
As discussed in chapter 2, employees in large Japanese firms are investing 
in a company by acquiring firm specific skills and by implicit investment through 
deferred compensation (Itami, 1993, Kagono and Kobayashi, 1988), suggesting 
that they have a strong incentive to monitor top management. Directors are also 
implicit investors in the company, as in large companies most of them are ex- 
employees, as is shown in chapter 2. As both employees and directors are implicit 
investors in the company, both a director's salary and an employee's wage can be 
seen as the return for their investment. As these are returns on their implicit 
investment, their salaries and wages reflect a firm's performance. In other words, 
they are sharing the risks of the company with other stakeholders, such as banks and 
large shareholders. 
16 Other factors include for example inflation rate, their age. 
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Hypothesis 
The above discussion shows that both a director's compensation and an 
employee's wage are paid in similar ways: Both employees and directors receive 
monthly pay and bonuses. Both a director's salary and an employee's wage are 
determined in similar ways, and reflect the firm's performance, such as their profit 
and sales. It is also suggested that both a director's salary and an employee's wage 
can be seen as the return for their implicit investment in the company. As they are 
paid in similar ways, and as an employee's wage is one of the important factors 
determining a directors' pay, we can draw the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5-2: In Japan, there is a positive relationship between 
directors' pay and employees' wage 
So, this research will test these hypotheses in this chapter and in 
Chapter 6. 
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5-3-3. Company Size and Top Pay 
Much of the previous research on executive compensation shows that 
compensation of the CEO depends largely on the size of the company, such as the 
number of employees or the sales. The research suggests that the coefficient for size 
is similar across the countries, industries and time (Rosen, 1990). Rosen pointed out 
that the elasticity of CEO's compensation with respect to the company size is 
around 0.25. As explained in Chapter 3, there are two theories that explain why 
there is a strong relationship between size of the company and top manager's 
remuneration". By focusing on the hierarchical structure of the firm, the first theory 
is developed by Simon (1957) and Lydall (1968). The other theory is developed by 
Rosen (1990) who focuses on the marginal productivity of the directors in large 
organisations. 
As shown in Chapter 3, Simon (1957) derives this relationship from the 
following assumptions: 1) The labour market determines the wage of new entrants 
for the company. Then, the wage of new workers, who belong to the bottom layers 
of the firm, is similar in every firm. 2) Manager's pay is greater than that of the 
worker he supervises. This pay gap ratio between boss and subordinate is similar in 
every firm. 3) The number of workers that one manager can supervise is similar in 
every firms. If these three conditions are fulfilled, then CEO pay may be 
determined by the number of employees within the company and the pay of senior 
and middle managers can be expressed as a function of the number of employees 
1' Some researchers suggest that this relationship shows that directors may be motivated to maximise 
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who are directly or indirectly supervised by them. Simon also shows that the 
relationship between the number of employees and executive compensation is log- 
linear. 
Rosen (1982) also shows theoretically why top pay relates to its size. He 
assumes that the ability of top managers affects the productivity of the whole 
company. Marginal productivity of top managers in a big company is larger than 
that of top managers in a small company even if they have the same ability, because 
the ability of the CEO of a large company will influence more people than that of 
the CEO of a small company. Therefore, an efficient market will allocate managers 
with high ability to a large company and they will receive a higher wage because of 
their high productivity. 
Thus, following these arguments, we will include size variables in 
estimating top pay in Japan and in the UK. The main reason for including size 
variables is to control the size effect to the director's salary in both countries" 
This research will include the size variable in our equations that estimate 
the determinants of top pay in the UK and Japan. For Japan's data, we will use both 
sales and number of employees as the size variables. For UK's data, we will use 
sales as a size variable. The coefficients for these variables are expected to be 
positive. 
the size of the company (Cosh, 1975). 
18 As described in chapter 3, above theories on the relationship between director's salary and firm 
size do not mention incentive aspects of director's pay. 
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5-3-4. Personal Characteristics and Directors' Pay 
Relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship between CEO's 
remuneration and their personal details, such as age and experience (Ingham and 
Thompson, 1995, Kato and Rockel, 1992a). It is suggested that directors' pay will 
increase as their tenure is long and they are relatively old, as both age and tenure 
may show director's experience. 
Kato and Rockel (1992a) show that the professional details of top directors, 
such as education and tenure, have significant effects on directors' pay in the US 
and in Japan. In the UK, Ingham and Thompson (1995) show that there is a strong 
relationship between age and CEO compensation while education and tenure as a 
CEO have little effect on their pay. 
Much empirical research on wage shows that there is a positive 
relationship between pay and experience. According to the human capital theory, 
pay will increase according to experience because productivity may increase as one 
gains more experience (Becker, 1964). However, Medoff and Abraham (1980) 
report that they fail to find positive relationship between experience and 
productivity while they find a positive correlation between experience and 
earnings. 
In this research, we will include `average age of directors' and `average 
tenure of directors' in Japan as our independent variables. The coefficients of these 
variables should be positive. 
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5-3-5. How Directors' Pay 19 is Determined in Japan20 
According to Japan's company law, directors' compensation must be 
approved by shareholders at the annual general meeting (AGM). All types of 
compensation, such as pay, bonuses and retirement bonuses are required to be 
approved at the AGM. However, it is unlikely that the AGM does not approve 
director's compensation plan proposed by current directors. 
In practice, at the AGM, current management teams propose `the 
maximum pay bill for directors' which the company can pay and then it is approved 
by the AGM. This pay bill is usually larger than the amount actually paid so that 
current management teams do not have to propose pay bills for AGM every year21. 
The shareholders do not know how much money will actually be paid for directors 
on approval. Although the actual payments for directors are disclosed in annual 
reports, amounts of compensation for each of the directors are not disclosed. 
19 Japan's company law treats auditors as directors as well. So, in this discussion, the word 
`directors' includes auditors unless specified otherwise. 
20 There is little literature to show how executive compensation is determined in Japan's large 
companies. Abe et al., (1997) and Okushima, ed., (1996) are useful sources for this topic. 
21 In practice, many companies set the `maximum pay bill for directors' for one month, rather than 
for one year. 
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Table 5-1 Approval and disclosure of directors' compensation in Japan 
Approval by AGM of Disclosure 
shareholders 
Maximum pay bill for Yes Yes 
directors that company Not every year Disclosed in AGM 
can pay 
Pay bill for directors No Yes 
actually paid by the Disclosed in annual 
company report 
Compensation for each No Not disclosed 
of the directors 
Annual general meeting (AGM) of shareholders 
Source: Abe et al., 1997, Okushima ed., 1996 
It should be noted that the `maximum pay bill' that the company is able to 
pay may not be the same as the pay bill that the company pays in reality. Table (5- 
1) summarises the approval and disclosure of pay bill in Japan. Usually, the 
`maximum pay bill' is larger than the `actual pay bill' paid by the company. 
It is not required that this `maximum pay bill' has to be approved every 
year. For example, this pay bill should be renewed when the number of directors 
increases. In Nippon Steel the `pay bill which the company can pay for all of the 
directors was on the agenda of the AGM only 6 times from 1975 until 1997. In 1996, 
amongst 2286 listed companies in Japan, only 140 companies changed their pay bill 
for directors. 
Companies are required to explain the reason why the pay bill should be 
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increased by company law. The reasons actually explained in the AGMs include 1) 
an increase in the number of directors, 2) inflation and 3) an increase in employees 
wages. Usually company performance, such as stock price, is not used to justify the 
increase in the pay bill. Thus, company performance, such as the profit before tax or 
stock price, are not considered, either by the directors or shareholders, to be an 
important factor for the determination of the executive compensation. 
After the `maximum amount' is set in the AGM, the board of directors 
decides how much pay should be paid to each director within this maximum. In 
practice, the president is asked by the board to decide the pay package for each 
director. Then, the president decides the pay package for everyone, including 
himself. 
So what then are the factors that determine executive pay in Japan in 
practice"? In general there are two types of executive compensation in Japan's 
large companies; directors' pay and directors' bonuses23. 
Directors' pay is usually paid each month. Firstly, the monthly wage of 
non-title directors is determined, which should exceed the monthly wage of the 
highest paid employee. So, monthly salaries of non-title directors24 are determined 
by adding a fixed amount to the monthly wage of the `highest paid employee'. As 
for the senior executives, their pay depends on their rank and as the rank within the 
Z2 Fukao et al. (1997) and Abe et al. (1997) are a useful source for this section. 
23 There are other types of compensation, such as stock options, company cars, company houses etc. 
But stock options are still not widely used in Japan, as company law did not allow this until recently. 
Sometimes other benefits, such as golf club membership, company car, company house, are very 
generous. In addition, the director usually receives retirement bonuses on retirement. In many 
companies, the amount of retirement bonus is calculated based on 1) the rank of the director, 2) the 
tenure as a director, 3) the amount of monthly pay when the director retires. 
2a As described in previous chapters, a non-title director in Japan is not a non-executive director in 
the UK. Non-title directors in large Japanese companies are usually working full-time in the 
company. Non-title means that they do not belong to a higher managerial board, such as JOMUKAI. 
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board goes up, then the pay also rises. The pay of JOUMU must be higher than that 
of non-title directors and the pay of the president must be higher than that of 
JOUMU. It is often the case that a company has a table showing the ratio of the 
amount of pay among different ranks and the pay of each director is determined 
according to that table. In this case, the age and tenure is not considered. Thus, the 
pay of two directors with different age and tenure can be the same if they belong to 
the same rank within the board. 
In addition to monthly pay for directors, most listed companies pay 
bonuses to their directors. Their bonus is paid from company profit so if the 
company fails to make enough profit, it is often the case that directors receive no 
bonus. For example, if the company reduces the amount of dividend to the 
shareholders, directors will not receive bonuses25. 
5-3-6. The Determinants of Director's Pay in the UK 
There are three main types of cash compensation for directors in the UK; 
fixed salary, annual incentive (AI) and long-term incentive (LTI). In addition to 
cash compensation, other form of compensation, such as stock option, may be paid 
to directors. Though not all the companies have all these types of compensation, 
most large companies in the UK have some kind of annual incentive. 
It is often the case in large companies in the UK that the amount of annual 
incentive is determined according to firm performance. Typical annual incentive 
25 Freeman and Weitzman (1987) suggest that employee's wage in Japan depends on company 
profit. 
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schemes in large UK companies can be described as follows. First, the performance 
measure for company performance, for example, profit before tax, is chosen. Then 
the performance target is set in terms of this performance measure. 
The amount of annual incentive may be linked to the firm performance, 
though this link may not necessarily be able to be described by a formula. Usually, 
some minimum performance target is set and if managers fail to achieve this target, 
then they will not receive any bonus. It is often the case that the link between bonus 
and performance is larger as performance improves. 
The maximum amount of annual bonus is usually set and is shown as a 
percentage of the director's fixed salary. Usually, the maximum amount is within 
the range of 20 to 50% of the fixed salary. This maximum amount of bonus is set to 
prevent companies from paying enormous amount of bonus to directors. 
Based on these figures, the formula to calculate the amount of annual 
bonus is set at the beginning of the company year, though the formula may not be 
explicit. It is common practice to define the amount of annual bonus as the 
percentage of the person's fixed salary. At the end of the term, the amount of annual 
incentive is calculated based on this formula and company performance. Thus, 
directors are likely to know their performance-bonus sensitivity a year in advance. 
So, we can assume that the director's effort is influenced by current year's 
performance-pay sensitivity. 
Income Data Services (1996) report that profits and growth in earnings per 
share are the most important measures for company performance, accompanied by 
individual achievement in relation to agreed targets. Williams (1994) reports that 
the most widely used performance measures among companies are profit both in 
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the Hay consulting survey and in the Monks partnership survey. Hay reports 67% of 
companies use profit as the measure for company performance, while Monks shows 
that 77% of companies measure their performance by profit. In both surveys, EPS 
comes next to profit, 49% in the Hay report and 52% in the Monks report. They 
show that these two measures are much more widely used compared to other 
measures, such as cash flow or stock price. 
5-4. Variables 
In this section, we will explain the variables that are used in our analysis. 
In addition to other data sources and definitions, we show the expected effect of 
these variables on director's remuneration. 
5-4-1. Japan's Data 
In this research, 210 of Japan's large listed companies are used as the 
sample26. The stock price of these companies are used to calculate the NIKKEI 
INDEX, Japan's most widely used stock market index27 and the time period 
covered is 1995 and 1996. Most variables, including directors' pay and their bonus, 
are taken from the NIKKEI NEEDS DATABASE. Other variables are taken from 
Toyo Keizai Yakuin Shikihou (Directory of Directors) and Kabushiki Toshi 
26 Although Nikkei NEEDS DATABASE contains financial data of all the listed companies, some 
important information is not included, such as the number of directors and stock market return. This 
information is not available electronically. 
27 NIKKEI index calculated using the share price of 225 companies. Among them, 15 financial 
companies are excluded from our sample. 
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Shuekiritsu (Rate of Return on Stocks in Japan). The NIKKEI NEEDS 
DATABASE and Toyo Keizai Yakuin Shikihou is based on each company's annual 
report. The shareholder's return, which is taken from Kabushiki Toshi Shuekiritsu 
(Rate of Return on Stocks in Japan), is calculated by NIHON SHYOKEN KEIZAI 
KENKYUSHO (Japan Institute of Securities and Economics), and is based on stock 
price and dividend. 
Variables (Japan) 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; ADPAY and ADBONUS: ADPAY, directors' 
average compensation, is calculated by dividing the pay bill for directors by the 
number of directors28. ADBONUS, the director's average bonus, is calculated by 
dividing total bonus for directors by number of directors. Change of ADPAY and 
change of ADBONUS are calculated by taking first the difference of these variables. 
Every listed company is required to report the pay bill for directors in their annual 
report. These pay variables are dependent variables in this research and the data are 
taken from the NIKKEI NEEDS DATABASE. The data source is each company's 
annual report. 
The strengths and weaknesses of several executive compensation data sets 
are described in Chapter 4 and it is suggested that the data based on company's 
annual reports are most appropriate in terms of reliability and data availability. 
However, there is a possibility that the `director's average pay' figures may be 
smaller than the actual figures, as noted in Chapter 4. 
There are two main reasons why the `director's average pay' and 
'8 The number of directors includes auditors. 
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`director's average bonus' may be smaller than the real figures. First, the director's 
average pay may be smaller than the real average figure. In many of Japan's large 
companies, it is often the case that a non-title director is also an employee of the 
company29. In this case, the person receives his salary both as the employee and as 
the director. His salary can be separated into employee and director salary. Usually, 
most of this salary is paid as employees' wages. Many companies do not include 
this `employee part of the salary' in their director's pay figure. 
Secondly, the calculated director's average bonus figure may be smaller 
than the actual one. As described above, the director's average bonus is calculated 
by dividing the total director's bonus by the number of directors. The number of 
directors does not only include directors, but also auditors. In some companies 
auditors only receive monthly pay and do not receive bonuses. Thus, the calculated 
`director's average bonus' can be smaller than the real figure. 
SHAREHOLDERS' RETURN: The shareholders' total return (ROR) is reported 
on Kabushiki Toshi Shuekiritsu (Rate of Return on Stocks in Japan). This ROR, 
shows the percentage gain for shareholders, including the dividend, capital gain 
from stock price evaluation and other gains, such as stock. If the coefficient for this 
ROR is positive and significant, then the director may have an incentive to work 
toward the shareholders' return, to gain more income. 
PROFITABILITY: Both profit before tax (PBT) and return on capital (ROC) shows 
the profitability of the company. ROC is calculated by dividing profit by capital. 
'9 As described in chapter 2, non-title directors are usually full-time directors of the firm. They 
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These variables show how profitable the company is. If the coefficients for these 
variables are positive and significant, then the managers have an incentive to pursue 
the profit. 
AWAGE: AWAGE shows the employees' average wage of the company. This is 
calculated by dividing the total labour cost by the number of employees. Thus, this 
variable includes all the labour costs to the company, including both cash 
compensation and other benefits. Cash compensation includes both monthly salary 
and bonus. The hypothesis predicts that the coefficient of an employee's average 
wage is positive and significant. 
DIRECTORS' PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DETAILS: Directors' 
average age and tenure: Age and tenure of directors may show their experience, 
skill, or their human capital. If these skills are important in their jobs and if their pay 
is based on their individual performance, then the coefficient for these variables 
may be positive and significant. 
Alternatively, the coefficients for these variables may show the difference 
of salaries of directors in different position within the board. In large companies in 
Japan, it is often the case that senior executives, such as presidents or chairmen, are 
older than other executives. As compensation of these senior executives may be 
larger than those of other directors, the coefficients for age and tenure may reflect 
the pay difference between positions within the board. Some specialists in this field 
say that the directors' pay in Japan's large companies is determined by their rank 
belong to the bottom layer of the hierarchy within the board of directors. 
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(Abe et al., 1997). If this is the case, the relationship between pay and age/tenure 
may not be strong. 
SIZE: In this research, two size variables, SALES and number of employees (NOE) 
are used. Following previous studies30, both variables are log-transformed. In the 
previous studies, both variables show a strong correlation to executive pay. The 
coefficients for these variables in this research are also supposed to be positive and 
significant. These size variables are included to control the size effect on top 
executive compensation. 
5-4-2. UK's Data 
Almost 1500 listed companies data are used as the sample. 1994 and 95 
data are collected for each company. The data analysed here are taken from Monks 
partnership's "United Kingdom Board Earnings, October 1995" and "United 
Kingdom Board Earnings, October 1994". These data sets contain comprehensive 
data on executive compensation and company performance, including the detailed 
composition of highest paid director's pay. This data are taken from annual reports 
of listed companies, for example, the 1995 data set consists of 1431 quoted 
companies in the UK whose annual reports are available in September 1995. The 
data source for these surveys are companies' annual reports. 
'o Size variables are log-transformed because the variance of size variable, such as sales is much 
- 165 - 
Variables (UK) 
TOP DIRECTORS' PAY: Three types of their pay are observed in each firm; fixed 
salary, annual incentive and total salary. The amount of total salary is not 
necessarily the sum of the fixed salary and annual incentive, as some companies 
have long-term incentive scheme. The stock option is not included. It may be the 
case that highest paid director is not a CEO of the company. 
The dependent variables are total salary of highest paid directors, their 
fixed salary, annual incentive and the change of these three salaries. 
PROFIT: Profit (PI) and change of profit (DPI) are used as independent variables to 
explain the highest paid director's salary. The amount of profit may be affected by 
the size of the company but our survey does not use log of profit, log of profit 
cannot be recorded when the amount of profit is negative. Our hypotheses suggest 
that the coefficients for these profit variables are positive. The coefficients for profit 
variables may be particularly significant to explain top director's annual bonus 
because in many large British companies, profit is one of the most frequently used 
performance variables to indicate performance target, in addition to Earnings Per 
Share. 
EARNINGS PER SHARE: Earnings Per Share (EPS) is also used as the 
independent variable to show company performance. Our hypothesis predicts that 
the coefficients of EPS will be positive and significant, suggesting that top 
director's pay in the UK depends on performance. If this is the case, directors may 
larger than that of other variables, such as shareholders' return. 
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have an incentive to work toward earnings per share. We expect that the coefficient 
for annual bonus will be particularly significant and positive as EPS is also one of 
the most frequently used performance variables to determine the amount of annual 
bonus. 
STOCK MARKET CAPITALISATION (CAP): In addition to profit and EPS, this 
research will use stock market capitalisation as an independent variable to explain 
top directors' pay in the UK. Stock market capitalisation shows the `value of the 
company' in the stock market and therefore, reflects shareholders' wealth in the 
stock market. Thus, if the coefficient of CAP is positive and significant, top 
directors may have strong incentives to work toward the `value of the company'. 
Our hypotheses suggest that the coefficient of CAP will be positive and significant 
in the UK. 
SIZE: Following previous studies, a size variable is included in our equations. Log 
of sales is used to explain top directors' pay in the UK. As described in Chapter 3, 
many previous studies show that top director's pay in the UK is correlated to 
company size. Thus, we expect that the coefficients for size variables will be 
positive and significant. This size variable is included to control the size effect on 
director's pay. 
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5-5. The Model 
In this section, we explain our models in estimating the determinants of 
executive compensation in the UK and Japan. After describing our basic model, we 
will show models for each country. 
5-5-1. The Basic Model 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the financial incentive of 
directors in Japan and in the UK. We will estimate the determinants of executive 
pay in both countries, trying to examine our hypotheses. 
Firstly, we try to analyse the relationship between firm performance and 
top directors' pay in both countries. In the UK, this research tries to estimate the 
relationship between firm performance and top directors' pay. We expect that there 
is a positive and significant relationship between top pay and performance, such as 
stock market capitalisation and company profit. In Japan, we will analyse if firm 
performance affects top directors' pay, as well as the effect of employee's wage on 
top pay. 
In addition to performance variables and wages, we include in our model 
the company size variable and directors' personal characteristics, as described in 
the previous section. 
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Our basic model can be written as follows. 
Director's compensation =f (performance, wage, other variables) 
(Equation 5-3) 
It should be noted that wage is included only for Japan's data. Our focus is 
on the coefficient of the performance and wage, trying to test our hypotheses 
described above. Size variables, such as sales and the number of employees are 
included to control the size effect on director's compensation, which is reported in 
many previous studies (Rosen, 1990). 
Before we proceed to explain the equations for each country, some 
econometric problems are mentioned in estimating these equations. Since micro 
data of individual companies are used, there will be a problem of heteroscedasticity 
(Ciscel and Carrol, 1980 Dunlevy, 1985). The variance of each variable, such as 
sales, number of employees, profit, average wage, cannot be assumed to be constant. 
The variance of profit in large companies will be larger than that of small 
companies. To avoid these problems, we will use heteroscedasticity-adjusted 
standard error and adjusted t-values to test the significance of each coefficient. 
In addition, there may be some multi-colinearity between independent 
variables and the sales, profit and wages of the company may be correlated to some 
extent. 
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5-5-2. Japan's Model 
In this sub-section, we explain the equations to estimate the determinants 
of directors' average salary in Japan. One of the main questions is whether there is a 
positive relationship between director's pay and employee's average wage. In 
addition, we will analyse the correlation between directors' salary and other 
performance variables, such as profit and stock market return. Our joint- 
determination hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between directors' salary 
and employees' wage. Independent variables include size, directors' age and tenure. 
As directors receive annual bonuses in addition to their pay, we will estimate the 
determinants of these salaries separately. 
The following equation is estimated to analyse the determinants of 
directors' average pay and their average bonus. 
Directors' pay =f (performance, wage, size, age and tenure) 
Director's bonus =f (performance, wage, size, age and tenure) 
(Equation 5-4) 
It is not necessarily clear whether the executive compensation in the year 
`t' depends on the performance in the year `t' or that in the year `t-1'31. The profit 
31 In previous studies that estimate the determinants in western countries, many scholars assume that 
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and shareholders' return of the term `t-1' is available at the beginning of term T. 
Employees' wages are paid throughout the year. The profit, shareholders' return of 
the term `t' is available at the end of the term T. Directors' pay is paid every month. 
Since the director's monthly pay is adjusted according to the change of employee's 
wage, directors' pay may not necessarily be the same each month and is paid 
throughout the year. After the profit figure of the company at `t' is available the 
amount of director's bonus at term `t' is set. Then, after the profit (t-1), 
shareholders' return (t-1) and wage (t) are determined, the directors' pay for the 
term `t' is set. After profit (t), shareholders' return (t) and wage (t) is set, the 
directors' bonuses for the term `t' are set. Thus, the equation to be estimated can be 
specified as follows: 
DP(t) =f (Pi(t-1), SR(t-1), W(t), size (t), directors' age(t)5 
directors' tenure(t)) 
Change in directors' pay (t) 
= DP(t)-DP(t-1) 
=f( Pi(t-1)-Pi(t-2), SR(t-1)-SR(t-2), W(t)-W(t-1), size(t)) 
DB(t) = f( Pi(t), SR(t), W(t), size(t), directors' age(t), directors' tenure(t)) 
executive pay in the year `t' depends on the company performance in the year `t- 1'. 
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Change in directors' bonus (t) 
= DB(t)-DB(t-1) 
=f (Pi(t)-Pi(t-1), SR(t)-SR(t-1), W(t)-W(t-1), size(t)) 
(Equation 5-5) 
DP: Directors' pay 
DB: Directors' bonus 
Pi: Profit 
SR: Shareholders' return 
W: Wage 
These equations are estimated using a least squares dummy variable model 
(fixed effect model)". In this estimation, dummy variables are assigned to each 
individual company to exclude individual effects. 
5-5-3. UK's Model 
Similarly, this research estimates the determinants of top directors' pay in 
the UK. Dependent variables include the fixed salary of the highest paid director, 
their annual bonus and total salary. We also use the change of these variables as 
dependent variables. 
Many previous studies that analyse the determinants of executive 
compensation in the UK assume that the pay in the year (t) depends on the 
performance in the previous year, or year (t-1). However, Conyon (1997) and 
32 As we will show in next chapter, the results of the estimation of least squares dummy variables and 
- 172- 
Ingham and Thompson (1995) suggest that directors' pay is affected by the firms' 
performance of the same year, rather than that of the previous year. 
We assume that top directors' pay in the year (t) is mainly affected by the 
company performance in the year (t-1). In many large companies in the UK, the 
amount of director's annual bonus is determined according to their performance in 
that year. It is often the case that companies have some kind of formula to calculate 
the amount of bonus they will receive from the firm's performance. Thus, we 
analyse the relationship between directors' pay in the year (t) and firm performance 
in the same year (t). In addition, we will include change in earnings per share, 
change in profit, and the previous year's profit as independent variables as these are 
frequently used performance measures in large UK companies. Thus, our equations 
are as follows: 
DS(t) =f (Pi(t), Pi(t-1), EPS(t), Stock market capitalisation (t), In (sales)) 
Change in director's salary (t) 
=DS(t)-DS(t-1) 
= f(dPROFIT(t), dEPS(t), Profit(t), Profit (t-1), Stock market 
capitalisation (t), In (sales)) 
(Equation 5-6) 
DS: Directors' salary (total pay, fixed pay and annual bonus) 
Pi: Profit 
dPROFIT (t): Profit(t)-Profit(t-1) 
those of the random effect model are quite similar. 
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EPS: Earnings Per Share 
dEPS: EPS(t)-EPS(t-1) 
5-6. Conclusion 
This chapter describes the research model to analyse our hypotheses on 
executive compensation in the UK and Japan. The objectives of large companies in 
the UK and Japan are discussed, as well as institutional aspects of directors' pay in 
both countries. As described in Chapter 2, shareholders have considerable power 
over top directors in the UK, while in Japan they have very limited power to control 
the firm. Instead, top managers in large Japanese companies pay more attention to 
the employee's interest rather than to the shareholder's return. 
Following that, the principal-agent theory is examined, drawing up our 
research hypotheses. Particular emphasis is laid on the relationship between 
directors' salary and employee's wage in Japan. In the UK, this research focuses 
particularly on the relationship between directors' pay and stock market 
performance. 
This chapter shows that in large Japanese companies, both a directors' 
compensation and employees' wage are paid in similar ways: Both employees and 
directors receive monthly pay and bonuses. Both directors' salary and employees' 
wage are determined in similar ways, and reflect the firm's performance, such as 
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their profit and sales. It is also suggested that both directors' salary and employees' 
wage can be seen as the return for their implicit investment in the company. As they 
are paid in similar ways, and as employees' wage is one of the important factors 
determining a directors' pay, we can draw the following hypothesis that there is a 
positive relationship between a director's pay and an employee's wage. 
The next chapter shows the results of our empirical investigations on the 
determinants of executive compensation in both Japan and the UK. In addition, 
Chapter 6 examines the pay gap between directors and employees in Japan. 
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Chapter 6. The Determinants of 
Compensation: Results in the UK and Japan 
6-1. Introduction 
Executive 
In this chapter, by estimating the determinants of executive compensation, we 
test the hypotheses that are given in Chapter 5 and the results of these estimations in both 
countries are given. 
As described in Chapter 5, the determinants of executive compensation in both 
Japan and the UK were estimated. Firstly, this research shows the results of our empirical 
investigations using Japan's data. We examine whether there is a positive and significant 
relationship between directors' average pay and employees' average wage. We also test 
whether the coefficient of shareholders' return is significant or not. If the coefficient for 
shareholders' return is not significant, directors may not have an incentive to work toward 
shareholders' return. Next, the results of our estimation in the UK are given. Particular 
emphasis is laid on the relationship between firm performance and directors' pay. 
In general, both of our hypotheses are confirmed. In Japan, there is positive 
relationship between director's salary and employee's average wage while shareholder's 
return has little effect on the director's salary. We used both the levels of director's salary 
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and change in director's salary as dependent variables, obtaining similar results that 
support our hypothesis. 
In contrast, in the UK all the performance variables, including stock market 
performance, have a positive effect on the director's compensation. Again, we obtained 
these results by using both levels of director's salary and their changes as dependent 
variables. 
In addition to showing the results of these regressions, this chapter examines the 
pay gap between directors and employees in Japan. Particular emphasis is laid on the 
relationship between pay gap and promotion probability of employees. Rank order 
tournament theory predicts a negative correlation between pay gap and employee's 
probability to be promoted. Then, we analyse whether the pay gap is affected by 
employees' probability of being promoted. 
6-2. Result from Japan's Data 
In this section, we show the results of regressions that analyse the determinants 
of directors' average pay and their average bonus in Japan. As described in previous 
chapters, particular emphasis is laid on the relationship between directors' average pay 
and employees' wages. As described in Chapter 5, these equations are estimated using the 
least squares dummy variable model'. 
The results of regressions are summarised in Tables (6-1) to (6-4)2. Table (6-1) 
shows the results of regressions on the directors' average pay and Table (6-2) shows the 
'As we will show in the following section, we can obtain similar results if we use the random effect model 
for estimating these equations. 
Z Tables (6-1) to (6-12) are at the end of this chapter. 
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results of regressions on the directors' average bonus. In Table (6-3), the dependent 
variable is the change in directors' average pay, and in Table (6-4), the dependent variable 
is the change in directors' average bonus. 
Table (6-1) shows the results of regression on the director's average pay. The 
dependent variable is the directors' average pay and the independent variables are 
directors' average age, their average tenure, log of number of employees, log of sales, 
shareholders' return (lagged), profit before tax (lagged), return on capital (lagged), 
employees' average wage3, and constant. One of the most important results in this table is 
that the coefficient for the employees wage in Equation 1, is positive and significant at the 
I% level. This shows that there is a positive relationship between directors' average pay 
and employees' wage in Japan. Alternatively, no other company performance variables, 
such as the shareholders' return and the profitability of the company, are significant. 
These variables fail to explain the variation of directors' pay. The coefficients for the 
shareholders' return of the company, the profit, and the return on capital, are not 
significant, and the coefficient for the return on capital is negative. These coefficients 
show that the director's average salary does not depend on the shareholders' return. It is 
also shown that the profit has little effect on director's monthly pay. These results support 
our hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between employees' wage and 
directors' salary in large Japanese firms. 
It should be noted that the coefficient for employees' wage is not significant 
when sales are included as an independent variable. In equation 2 in table (6-1), the 
coefficients for both sales and employees' wage are not significant. One of the main 
'As shown in Chapter 5, the average employee's wage includes both cash compensation and other benefits. 
Cash compensation includes monthly salary and bonus. 
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reasons may be that there is a correlation between sales and employees' wage4, as sales 
are an important determinant of employees' wage in large Japanese companies. 
As described in chapter 5, employees receive a monthly wage and bonuses in 
large Japanese companies. The amount of employees' wage and bonus are determined 
through `spring bargaining' between employer and the company union. According to 
Kawasaki and Hart (1999) and Sano (1981), both employees' monthly wage and their 
bonus reflect company performance. Both sales and profit are considered to be important 
performance figures, as sales determine the company's ability to pay. In addition, 
Freeman and Weitzman (1987) showed that there is a positive relationship between 
bonuses and firm performance. A positive correlation between employees' wage and 
sales in our data is consistent with these studies. 
The other important results in Table (6-1) are that, most coefficients for sales are 
strongly significant and positive. These results are consistent with previous studies. In 
contrast, the coefficients for the log of numbers of employees, are not significant at all, 
and sometimes negative. So, we cannot conclude that the size variables are an important 
factor for the determination of directors' pay in Japan. According to Simon's theory5 
(Simon, 1957), or Rosen's theory (Rosen, 1990), the executives' pay depends on the 
number of employees of the company. Our results do not confirm these theories. 
Table (6-1) also shows that directors' average age is not an important factor for 
' The correlation coefficient between sales and employees' wage is 0.399. 
'According to the study by Simon (1957), CEO's compensation X can be written as follows. 
N=A X-° 
N: number of employees in the firm 
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the determination of their pay. In fact, the coefficients for the directors' age are all 
negative and there is a weak relationship between directors' tenure and directors' pay. 
Three out of eight coefficients for directors' tenure are significant at the 10% level. These 
coefficients suggest that some part of the directors' pay can be explained by their tenure. 
This may be because higher rank directors receive higher pay than non-title directors do 
and also the tenure of those higher rank directors is longer than that of non-title directors. 
Table (6-2) shows the results of similar regressions. The dependent variable is 
the directors' average bonus, and the independent variables are the same as in Table (6- 
1). One of the most important results in Table (6-2) is that the coefficients for the 
profitability variables are positive and strongly significant. The coefficient for the profit 
before tax in Equation 3 is significant at the I% level, and the coefficient in Equation 4 is 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for return on capital, another profitability 
measure, in Equation 5, is significant at the 5% level. These coefficients show that 
director's bonus depends on the profit of the company. 
The coefficient for the employees' average wage, in Equation 7, is also 
significant at the I% level. This result is consistent with our discussion in chapter 5 that 
both a director's salary and an employee's wage are determined in similar way. 
The coefficients for shareholders' return are negative. These coefficients show 
that there is no positive relationship between director's bonus and shareholders' return. It 
is suggested that directors in these companies have little financial incentive to work 
toward shareholders' interest, because directors may receive little reward for pursuing 
A and a: constant 
'Our AWAGE, employee's wage includes their bonus. 
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shareholders' interest. 
In Table (6-2), the coefficients for the directors' age are not significant, and they 
are sometimes negative. These coefficients suggest that the director's bonus does not 
depend on the age of directors'. In contrast, the coefficient for the directors' tenure in 
Equations 1 and 3, are significant at the 5% level. Thus, there is a positive relationship 
between the tenure and the directors' bonus. This may be because higher rank directors 
have a longer tenure than non-title directors. As higher rank directors also receive a larger 
bonus, then we can observe a positive relationship between tenure and bonus. 
All the coefficients for the sales in Table (6-2) are positive and significant at the 
I% level. These results show that sales is a very important factor for the determination of 
directors' bonus. But the coefficients for the number of employees, are not significant, 
and sometimes they are negative. Both sales and number of employees, are considered to 
represent the size of the company. 
Table (6-3) shows the results of the regression on the change in director's 
average pay. The dependent variable is the change in director's average pay, and the 
independent variables are the same as in Table (6-1), except for directors' age and tenure, 
which are excluded. The most important results in this table are that coefficients for the 
change in employees' wage are positive and significant. These results show that the 
increase of directors' pay depends on the increase of employees' wage. The coefficients 
for the change in wage in Equation 1 is significant at the I% level, and in Equation 2, is 
significant at the 10% level. As in Table (6-1), these results support our hypothesis that 
' There is a possibility that pay rises with age for each director. If this is the case, directors' average pay is 
not affected by age because the speed of promotion for each director varies. 
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directors' pay in Japan depends on employee's wage. 
The other important result in this Table (6-3) is that the coefficient for change in 
shareholders' return, in Equation 3, is positive and significant at the 10% level. This 
result shows that there is a relationship between shareholders' return and directors bonus. 
The coefficient for the profitability variables, the change in profit, and the change in 
return on capital, are not significant. The coefficients for the return on capital are 
negative. 
Most coefficients for sales are positive and significant at the 1% level, though 
the coefficients for the number of employees are not significant, or negative. This result is 
of interest as most previous studies suggest a positive relationship between director's 
compensation and firm size. 
Table (6-4) shows the regression on the change in director's average bonus. The 
dependent variable is the change in director's average bonus. The independent variables 
are the same as in Table (6-3). 
The most important result in Table (6-4) is that the coefficients for change in 
profit are positive and significant. The coefficients are significant at the 1% level both in 
Equations 3 and 4. The coefficient for the change in return on capital in Equation 5 is 
positive and significant at the 10% level. These results show that the directors' bonus 
depends on the profit of the company. We can not find any positive relationship between 
shareholders' return and the directors' bonus. The coefficients for the change in 
shareholders' return in Equations 1 and 2 are negative. The coefficient for the employees' 
average wage in Equation 7 is positive and significant at the 1% level. This shows that 
there is positive relationship between employee's wage and director's bonus. 
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In Table (6-4), we find a strong relationship between the sales of a company and 
its directors' bonus. In Equations 2,4 and 6 the coefficients for the log of sales are 
positive and significant at the 1% level, however, coefficients for the log of number of 
employees are not significant and sometimes negative. 
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6-3. Evidence from the UK Data 
In this section, we will explain the results of our empirical investigation on the 
determinants of executive compensation in the UK. Particular emphasis is laid on the 
relationship between firm performance and directors' pay, trying to analyse if top 
directors in the UK have any financial incentives to manage the company in order to 
improve firm performance. As described in the previous chapters, our main hypothesis is 
that in the UK there is a positive relationship between directors' pay and company 
performance, particularly stock market performance. 
Tables (6-5) to (6-10) show the results of top pay regressions in the UK. Table 
(6-5) shows the results of regressions that analyse the determinants of total pay of highest 
paid directors. The total pay includes all the cash compensation, including fixed pay, 
annual incentive, and long-term incentive. In addition, Table (6-5) shows that both 
profitability and stock market capitalisation are significant factors for the determination 
of top pay in the UK. All coefficients for the performance variables are positive and 
significant. The coefficients for the profit, lagged profit are both positive and significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficients for the profit change and EPS changes are also 
significant. In addition, the coefficient for the market capitalisation is also positive and 
significant at the 1% level. These results show that both profit and stock market 
capitalisation have a strong link with top pay in the UK's listed companies. Table (6-5) 
also shows that there is a positive relationship between company size and top pay. All the 
coefficients for the log of sales is positive and significant at the I% level. 
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Table (6-6) analyses the determinants of `change in total pay'. The coefficient 
for the change in EPS in Equation 2 is positive and significant at the 5% level. But other 
profit variables in Equations 1,3 and 4 are not significant. The coefficient for stock 
market capitalisation in Equation 5 is positive and significant. The coefficients for the log 
of sales is not significant, and some of these coefficients are negative, showing there are 
little relationship between size and the change in total pay. 
Table (6-7) shows the results of regression on fixed pay. The coefficients for the 
profit and lagged profit in Equations 3 and 4 are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
showing a strong link between profit and fixed pay. The coefficient for the stock market 
capitalisation in Equation 5 is also positive and significant at the 1% level. All the 
coefficients for log of sales are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating the 
strong size effect on fixed pay. 
Table (6-8) shows the determinants of change in fixed pay. Among the profit 
variables, only the change in EPS has a positive and significant effect. The coefficients 
for other profit variables and stock market capitalisation are not significant. As given in 
the Table (6-6), the coefficients for the log of sales is not significant and some of them are 
negative, showing that there is little relationship between size and the change in fixed pay. 
Table (6-9) shows the results of a similar analysis on the annual incentive. The 
coefficients for the change in profit and change in EPS is positive and significant at the 
5% level and 1% level, though the coefficients for the profit are not significant. The 
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coefficient for stock market capitalisation is not significant. The coefficients for the log of 
sales are positive and significant at the I% level. 
Table (6-10) shows the results on the change in annual incentive (Al). The 
coefficients for the `change in profit' and the `change in EPS' are positive and significant 
at the 10% level while other performance variables fail to explain the change in annual 
incentive. All the coefficients for the size variable, log of sales are positive and significant 
at the I% level. 
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that directors' pay in the UK 
depends on firm performance. As there is a significant relationship between top pay and 
firm performance, such as stock market value of the company, directors may have 
financial incentives to pursue firm performance. 
6-4. Cross-National Comparability and Summary Table: To What Extent can We 
Compare the Results of These Two Countries? 
In the previous sections the determinants of executive compensation in Japan 
and in the UK were examined. In this section, we examine the cross-country 
comparability of these results. Firstly, we describe the main differences in the estimation 
models of the two countries. Then, we estimate some additional equations trying to show 
that our main results will hold even when we control these differences. 
As described in previous sections of this chapter, there are some differences 
between the Japanese model and that of the UK. There are two main differences and they 
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are the difference in independent variables and that in estimation method. 
There are some differences in the choice of independent variables between Japan 
and the UK. Some equations in Japan include employee's wage as an independent 
variable, while wage is not included in the UK's model. Director's age and tenure are 
included in the equations in Japan while in the UK they are not. This may be a problem as 
the two models are not `matched' as they include different independent variables. 
In addition, we use a different estimation method for each country. For Japan's 
data we used the fixed effect model while the random effect model was used for UK's 
data'. This may be a problem in comparing the coefficients between two countries. For 
example, as we use the fixed effect model for Japan's data, we are estimating the 
determinants of `the difference' of variables. The fixed effect model estimation can be 
seen as if estimating the relationship among changes of the variables (Johnston and 
DiNardo, 1997, Greene, 1993). Therefore, it may be inappropriate to compare the 
magnitudes of coefficients directly between the two countries. This is because Japan's 
model estimates the relationship among `changes of variables' while the UK's model 
estimate does not, even though the dependent variables are `the level' of director's 
compensation in both countries. 
Then, we ask the question, to what extent can we compare our results? In this 
section, we estimate some additional equations for both countries to examine cross- 
country comparability and then to show we can obtain similar results if we control the 
above-mentioned effects. This research estimates the determinants of director's pay in 
Japan and those of fixed pay in the UK. 
We used the random effect model for the UK because UK data is too large to calculate heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard error using least squares dummy variable model. 
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Table (6-13) shows the results of these estimations. These equations are 
estimated for comparison of two countries. We use the random effect estimation for these 
equations in both countries as then, the econometric problem that is described above is 
insignificant. In addition, the independent variables are matched as close as possible, for 
example, we use same sets of independent variables in Equation 3 in Japan and in 
Equation 5 in the UK. 
In general, our results in Table (6-13) are quite similar to those in previous 
sections. It is suggested that there is a significant difference in the determinants of 
executive compensation in Japan compared with those in the UK. The coefficients profit 
and stock market performance are positive and significant by 1% in the UK while they are 
not significant in Japan and the coefficient of wage is significant in Japan. In other words, 
directors in the UK have financial incentives to manage the company to pursue profit and 
stock market performance. 
As described in the previous sections, one of the main reasons for a positive 
relationship between wage and director's pay in Japan may be that a significant 
proportion of an employee's wage is the bonus9. This is because employees' bonus in 
Japan reflects performance of the firm (Freeman and Weitzman, 1987). Therefore, we can 
observe the relationship between employees' wage and director's pay because both 
director's pay and employees' wage may depend on the firm's performance. It is also 
noted that the proportion of bonus to total salary is similar for both directors and 
employees. Both employees and directors receive around 30% of their salary as a bonus. 
It is noted that employees' wage is not included in the UK's regression. Thus, it 
is not possible to examine the effect of employees' wage on director's pay in the UK. 
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However, it may be the case that we cannot observe any significant relationship between 
employees' wage and director's pay in the UK, as it is often the case that employees in 
large UK firms do not receive bonus schemes that reflect firm's performance. In other 
words, the effect of the firm's performance on employees' wage may be small in the UK. 
'As described in previous chapters, our employee's wage includes their bonus. 
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Table 6-13 Summary table of chapter 6 
The determinants of executive compensation in Japan and the UK 
Japan Japan UK 
E. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6 
profit 0.000013 0.000015 0.129 
(0.000017) (0.000017) (0.011)*** 
stockmarket -0.0053 -0.0088 0.0244 
(0.019) (0.0194) (0.0016)*** 
In(sales) 1.325 1.433 1.801 1.939 31.529 34.65 
(0.365)*** (0.344)*** (0.353)*** (0.326)*** (1.49)*** (1.638)*** 
wage 0.773 0.777 
(0.207)*** (0.205)*** 
const. -6.948 -8.221 -6.681 -8.27 -33.035 -43.079 
4.31 4.069 ** (4.426) (4.179)** 7.287 *** 7.517 *** 
R-s . 
0.174 0.164 0.139 0.127 0.329 0.449 
*** Statistically significant at the I% level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
Statistically significant at the 1% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Random effect GLS regression is used to estimate these equations. 
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The relationship between employees' wage and directors' pay in large UK companies 
As suggested in above sections, there are some differences in our estimations in 
Japan and the UK. Almost 1500 large companies data are used in the UK as the sample 
while 210 large companies are used in Japan. In addition, there are some differences in 
the choice of independent variable, as employees' wage is not included in the UK's 
model. 
In this subsection, we will test whether there is a relationship between 
employees' wage and directors' salary in large UK firms. 
Discussions in the above sections have shown that there is a positive relationship 
between employees' wage and directors' pay in large Japanese companies. In chapter 3, it 
is also suggested that both directors' salary and employees' wage are influenced by 
company performance in Japan through spring bargaining. The amount of annual wage 
increase is influenced by both sales and profit (Mizuno, 1987, Sano, 1989, Hart and 
Kawasaki, 1999). According to Hart and Kawasaki (1999), there is a positive relationship 
between profit and wage increase. Sales are also considered to be an important factor in 
this bargaining process as the amount of sales may show the company's ability to pay for 
its employees. 
As described in chapter 5, both directors' monthly pay and their bonus increase 
when employees' wage increase, as directors' salary is often determined as a proportion 
of the highest paid employees (Abe et al., 1996). In addition, directors' salary is also 
affected by firm performance in these companies (Abe et al., 1997, Okushima ed.. 1996). 
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Therefore, we showed that there is a positive relationship between directors' pay and 
employees' wage in the Japan. 
In contrast, there are few such mechanisms in the UK by which directors' salary 
is influenced by employees' wage. In most large UK companies, directors' pay is 
determined by a remuneration committee, which is often composed of non-executive 
directors. Remuneration committees try to set directors' salary according to firm 
performance, such as Earnings Per Share (EPS), profit, or stock market return. In other 
words, we can predict that there will be little relationship between directors' salary and 
employees' wage in the UK. 
In this subsection, we test this relationship between top pay and employees' 
wage in large UK companies. The main objective is to compare this relationship between 
the UK and Japan, as we have already shown a positive relationship in Japan. We will 
estimate the determinants of executive pay in the UK, using employees' wage as an 
independent variable. 
As our main aim is to compare the results between the UK and Japan, we will 
choose samples which will match the Japanese sample. In this section, we will choose 
210 companies from UK's dataset which we have used in the above sections. We have 
chosen these companies as the size distribution of the companies will be similar in both 
samples1°. Sales are used as the criteria to construct a new sample as sales are one of the 
lo Specifically, we have sorted the whole UK samples by the amount of sales. As described in 
chapter 4, there are 210 companies in the Japanese sample. In this sample, there are 139 
companies whose sales are larger than 1,000 GBP in 1993, and 71 companies whose sales are 
less. In our original UK sample, there were 116 companies whose sales are larger than 1,000 
GBP and we include all these 116 companies in our new UK sample. In addition, we 
randomly chose another 94 companies from the original UK sample, whose sales is 
less than 
1000 GBP. 
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most important factors that affect the amount of executive compensation. 
Table (6-14) shows the results of these regressions. Dependent variables are 
fixed pay, and annual incentive (AI) of highest paid director in the UK. Independent 
variables includes ln(sales), stock market capitalisation, profit and employees' average 
wage. The equations 5 and 6 in this table are same as equations 1 and 2 in table (6-13). 
It is clearly shown that there is little relationship between directors' salary and 
employees' wage in the UK. Both fixed pay and annual incentive are not influenced by 
employees' wage in large UK companies. 
This test finds no relationship between directors' salary and employees' wage in 
large UK companies. It is also confirmed that there is a significant difference in the effect 
of employees' wage on directors' salary between the UK and Japan. In Japan, there is a 
positive relationship between employees' wage and directors' pay. 
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6-5. Tournament Pay 
We have analysed the financial incentive of directors in previous sections. As 
described in chapter 3, rank order tournament theory suggests that there can be another 
kind of incentive scheme for top directors. This may be of particular importance in large 
Japanese companies. As a large number of directors are ex-employees of the company, 
promotion may be act as an important incentive in these companies. 
In this section, the pay gap between directors and employees in Japan is 
analysed. The purpose of this section is to test whether or not there is tournament type 
pay structure in Japan. The determinants of pay gap are estimated using micro data of 
Japan's large companies. Tournament theory suggests that the directors' pay may be 
larger than their productivity. This means that the pay gap between directors and 
employees may be larger than the difference of their productivity. This `overpayment to 
the directors' may be efficient under some circumstances, because other employees may 
work harder to be promoted. As discussed in Chapter 3, if the pay gap is large enough, 
employees may be motivated to work hard. However, if employees think they have very 
little possibility to be promoted, then they will not work hard unless the bonus for 
gaining promotion is very large. Thus, this theory suggests that the pay gap between 
director and employee will be larger as the possibility of promotion will be smaller. In 
this research, the relationship between pay gap and the possibility of promotion is 
estimated. The estimation shows that there is a significant negative relationship between 
pay gap and the possibility to be promoted, as tournament theory suggests. 
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6-5-1. Rank Order Tournament and Pay Gap 
It is sometimes claimed that compensation for executives are larger than their 
productivity, or that they are overpaid, compared with their real contribution to the 
company. One reason why companies `overpay' their directors is that the directors' 
compensation does not work only to motivate director himself, but also to motivate 
other employees. If the director's compensation is high enough, then many employees 
may work hard to be promoted to the director. 
As described in Chapter 3, rank order tournament theory analyses incentive 
structure within firms. Rank order tournament has some characteristics. Firstly, 
according to rank order tournament theory, directors' pay may be larger than their real 
contribution to the company. In a company which has a `tournament type pay system', 
the payment for directors includes some premium for gaining promotion to climb to the 
top of the corporate hierarchy. Employees are likely work hard if the bonus for gaining 
promotion is large. 
Secondly, in a rank order tournament, the promotion to a managerial position is 
filled internally within the firm. This may encourage employees to work hard, as the 
possibility is there for one of them to be promoted as soon as there is a vacancy to a 
higher position. Then, the promotion decision is based on relative performance rather 
than absolute performance. 
Thirdly, salary is related to the position, rather than the performance and the 
amount of salary is fixed in advance. Employees who achieve better performance will 
receive a higher salary only after they are promoted to the higher positions. 
Fourthly, the effort of employees may depend on the probability that they are 
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promoted to higher positions within the company. If employees feel that they may 
become their companies' directors by climbing up the corporate ladder, they are more 
likely to be motivated to work hard. However, it may be the case that employees do not 
work hard if they think that they stand little chance of promotion. If this is the case, the 
pay gap between directors and employees must be large to motivate employees, as they 
may have the incentive to work hard if the prize for gaining promotion is very large. 
If director's salary is much larger than employee's average pay, then 
employees may work hard even when their chances of promotion are low. In other 
words, pay gap between directors and employees may be large if the probability of 
employees to be promoted is low. The firm may want to keep `the bonus for gaining 
promotion' high when the competition for promotion is very hard to win. 
One of the most important implications of the rank order tournament theory is 
that the incentive for employees may depends on the pay gap between director's pay 
and employee's average wage, rather than the level of director's pay. The tournament 
theory predicts that the pay gap between directors and employees must be made larger 
when the probability of promotion is smaller. If the possibility of promotion is small, 
employees may be less motivated as the effort is relatively unimportant to be promoted. 
However, if the pay gap is large enough, employees may be motivated to work hard. 
Thus, we can deduce following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6-1: The pay gap between directors and employees is inversely 
proportional to the employee' probability of being promoted. 
If the pay gap is large, employees may work hard even though the possibility 
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of promotion is low. If employees believe they do not have any possibility, they will not 
work hard toward promotion unless the reward for the promotion is very large. 
As shown in Chapter 3, there are some studies that suggest that the `rank order 
tournament' type of promotion is used in managerial positions in large firms. 
Assessment of individual performance is not easy as the job description of white-collar 
workers is not clear (Aoki, 1988,1990, Ito, 1994, Kagono et al., 1983). The tournament 
theory suggests that a `tournament type pay system' is effective when it is not easy to 
assess individual performance. One reason is that the `tournament type pay structure' 
does not require information on absolute performance of each employee. White-collar 
workers tend to be assessed by their relative performance in Japan (Tomita, 1992, 
Hanada, 1994, Koike, 1994). Promotion is based on tenure within the firm and 
assessment by their boss (Tomita, 1992), showing that vacancies in managerial positions 
is filled by internal promotion. These studies suggest that tournament is used in large 
Japanese firms, therefore, we will test the above hypothesis in large Japanese firms. 
Some studies have tried to test the tournament theory. The study by Main et al. 
(1993) shows that the pay gap between the directors of adjacent layers increase as the 
layers climb up to the CEO level. The average CEO pay is 142% larger than average 
pay of second tier executives, while the ratio becomes 75%, 44%, 28% as the level of 
executives go down. This result is consistent with the tournament theory. According to 
the theory, as the competition to be promoted will be more intense as the person goes up 
the corporate hierarchy, the reward for being promoted should be larger. Demsetz 
(1995) also shows the increasing pay gap between directors on ascending the company 
ladder up to the CEO. He shows that the ratio of the pay gap between the CEO and 
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second highest paid director is 40%, while the ratio of pay gap between third and fourth 
highest paid director is 14%. 
Main et al. (1993) also show that the pay gap between the CEO and the vice 
president has a positive relationship with the number of vice presidents. This result is 
also consistent with tournament theory, because large number of vice presidents means 
a lesser probability of each vice president being promoted. However, O'Reilly et al. 's 
(1988) result does not show the positive relationship between the level of CEO 
compensation and the number of vice presidents. 
6-5-2. Tournament Theory: Research Method 
To test the above hypothesis, the determinants of pay gap between directors and 
employees will be estimated. The data set employed here is the same as the one used in 
the previous chapter. Data on 210 companies in 1995 and 1996 are used. These 
companies are listed companies and used as the sample for NIKKEI STOCKMARKET 
INDEX. For each company, each year, we obtain the following variables. Directors' 
average pay, directors' average bonus, employees' average wage, the number of 
directors, the number of employees and sales. 
Firstly, the following Equation will be estimated to test the relationship 
between pay gap and the probability of being promoted. The hypothesis is that the pay 
gap is larger when the employee has little probability of being promoted. 
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Pay gap =f (prom, size, dummy) 
Paygap 1: (directors' pay + bonus) / employees' wage 
Paygap2: directors' pay / employees' wage 
Prom: number of directors / number of employees 
(Equation 6-1) 
Paygapl = 
Paygap2 = 
directors' pay + directors' bonus 
employees' wage 
directors' pay 
employees' wage 
Two types of pay gap variables are calculated. Paygap 1 is calculated by 
dividing directors' total annual salary by employees' wage. This shows the ratio of 
compensation directors receive compared with employees. Paygap2 is calculated by 
dividing directors' pay by employees' wage. Paygap2 excludes directors' bonus. Both 
paygap 1 and paygap2 are used because bonus is considered to be compensation for their 
performance rather than the premium payment for being promoted to the director'. 
According to the tournament theory, there will be a negative correlation 
between pay gap and probability of promotion. If employees think that they have little 
possibility of being promoted to the position of director, the company needs to increase 
the pay gap to motivate them. If pay gap, or the premium payment for the winner is 
large enough, then employees are more likely to work harder to join the contest. Thus, 
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the pay gap between director and employee is larger when the possibility of promotion 
is smaller. If the coefficient for promotion is negative and significant, then it is 
consistent with our hypothesis. Of course it is often the case that the director in a 
company is not recruited from its employees. It is true that some directors in Japan's 
large companies come from a member of the family of the company's founders, their 
parent company, the government, or a bank. Thus, the variable `prom' is not exactly the 
probability of promotion. However, it is also true that most directors in Japan's large 
companies are chosen from their employees. Then, it may not be inappropriate to use 
`prom' as the proxy for employee's probability of promotion. 
The effect of the size variable on the pay gap is also estimated. Both pay gap 1 
and pay gap 2 are used as dependent variables. As a size variable, log of sales is used. It 
is sometimes argued that the wages of newly recruited, recently graduated workers are 
almost the same across companies, because the market determines their wages. Once 
they are promoted to higher ranks within the companies, their salary may increase 
according to their position within the company. As larger companies tend to have more 
layers within their hierarchy, the salary of `highest paid employee' in a large company is 
larger than that of a small company. As the directors' pay is larger than the salary of the 
`highest paid employee', the pay gap between directors and employees are considered to 
be bigger in larger companies. Thus, we can predict that the coefficient for the size 
variable may be positive and significant. 
Both company dummy and industry dummies are used independently in our 
Our employees' wage figure includes employees' bonus in addition to monthly payment. 
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estimation. According to the tournament theory, the pay gap also depends on the risk 
each company or industry faces. If the performance of the person depends largely on 
chance, rather than their effort, then pay gap may be larger to motivate employees and 
those employees only make an effort if the premium for promotion is large enough. If 
the pay gap is small, and if performance depends on chance, then the employee is likely 
not to work hard because working hard may bring no reward. One of the biggest 
uncertainties is the fluctuation of demand of their product. Thus, companies in the same 
industry may share the risk that arises from their product market. Each company also 
faces other risks that are specific to that company. That risk may come from their 
management strategy or their geographical location. In our analysis, both company 
dummy and industry dummy are used independently. Company dummies are supposed 
to proxy company specific factors including the risk that the company faces. Industry 
dummies are supposed to proxy industry specific factors that include the industry 
specific risk, such as the fluctuation in the market. 
6-5-3. Tournament Theory: Results 
Tables (6-11) and (6-12) show the results of the regression. The dependent 
variables are pay gap and the independent variables include promotion probability, size 
and dummy variables. The dependent variable in Table (6-11) is the paygap 1, which is 
the ratio between director's salary (pay + bonus) and employee's wage. The most 
important result in Table (6-11) is that the coefficients for the promotion are all negative 
and significant. The coefficients for promotion in Equations 1 and 2 are significant at 
the 1% level. The coefficients for promotion in Equations 3 and 4 are also significant, at 
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the 5% and 10% level, respectively. These results show that the pay gap between the 
directors and the employees are larger when the director/employee ratio is smaller. 
It should be noted that the coefficients for sales in Table (6-11) are not 
significant. In Equation 4, the coefficient for In (sales) is negative. One reason may be 
that we used employee's average pay to calculate pay gap between directors and 
employees. There are many middle and senior managers in large companies, who 
receive higher pay and in such a case the employee's average pay may be larger in large 
companies. In addition, we use director's average pay in calculating the pay gap 
between directors and employees. As there are many directors in large companies, the 
director's average salary may be smaller in large companies where even the top director 
receives a very high salary. Therefore, the pay gap in large companies may be small 
because the employee's average wage may be large and the director's average salary 
may be small. This may be one of the reasons why we fail to find a positive relationship 
between pay gap and firm size. In Equation 4, the coefficient for promotion probability 
is smaller than that in Equation 3 while In (sales) is included in Equation 4. The 
coefficient in Equation 4 becomes smaller as the coefficient for In (sales) is negative. 
In Equation 4 in Table (6-11), industry dummies are included as independent 
variables. According to the rank order tournament theory, pay gap between directors and 
employees may depend on the relationship between effort and performance. If the 
performance of employees depends more on `luck' than their effort, employees may not 
have enough incentive to work hard. In this case, the pay gap should be larger to 
motivate employees. There may be many factors that affect the relationship between 
effort and performance. If industry specific factors affect this relationship, the pay gap 
may vary across industries. 
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Table (6-12) shows the results of similar regressions that estimate the 
determinants of the pay gap between directors and employees. In Table (6-12), the 
dependent variable is the pay gap between the director's average pay and the 
employee's wage, excluding the director's bonus. The results in Table (6-12) are similar 
to those in Table (6-11). There are significant negative relationships between pay gap 
and promotion probability. It is noted that in Equation 8, the coefficient for sales is 
significant. However, it is still unclear if size does affect the pay gap, as other 
coefficients for size variables are not significant. 
We can summarise the results in the Table (6-11) and (6-12) as follows: There 
is a strong and significant negative relationship between the pay gap and the probability 
of promotion. The pay gap between directors and employees is larger when employees 
perceive a lower chance of promotion, supporting our hypothesise. 
6-6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the directors' incentive in large 
companies in Japan and in the UK, with particular emphasis on the relationship between 
corporate governance and executive compensation. The main questions analysed are as 
follows: 1) Is there a positive relationship between directors' salary and employees' 
wage in Japan? 2) Is there a link between profit, stock market capitalisation and top pay 
in the UK? 
The main findings of this research from Japan's data can be summarised as 
2 One limitation of this study is that we estimate only one pay gap between directors and employees and 
do not estimate the successive steps in the hierarchy. 
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follows. There is a strong relationship between directors' compensation and employees' 
wage, while no positive relationship has been found between shareholder's return and 
top pay. This research also finds a positive relationship between director's bonus and 
profit of the company. In contrast, this research finds that top pay in the UK is positively 
correlated with most company performance variables, including profit, stock market 
capitalisation and sales. 
In this chapter, firstly, the determinants of directors' pay and their bonuses in 
Japan's large companies are estimated. The independent variables include shareholders' 
return, profit, return on capital, employees' average wage, directors' age, their tenure, 
number of employees and sales. We can summarise the main results from Japan's data 
as follows: 
1) In Japan, there is a positive relationship between directors' salary and 
employees' wage. These relationships are positive and strongly significant. 
2) In Japan, shareholder's return has little effect on director's pay and their 
bonus. 
3) In Japan, the coefficients for the profitability variables are not significant 
in the regression on the directors' pay. 
4) In Japan, there is a positive relationship between directors' bonus and 
profit. This relationship is strong. 
5) In Japan, there is a strong positive relationship between sales and pay, and 
between sales and bonus but no significant relationship exists between 
number of employees and pay or bonus. 
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This research can not find any relationship between shareholders' return and 
directors' pay, suggesting that directors have little incentive to pursue shareholders' 
interest, because they will receive little reward for doing so. 
In contrast, we find a positive relationship between an employee's wage and a 
director's salary, which is consistent with our discussion in chapter 5, that both directors 
and employees are paid in a similar way in large Japanese companies. 
This research finds a strong relationship between profit and directors' bonus in 
Japan. This relationship suggests that directors' have a financial incentive to pursue the 
profit of the company, in addition to employees' wages. 
Many previous studies find a strong link between size of the company and 
executive pay. This research finds a positive relationship between sales and pay in Japan, 
and between sales and bonus, however, another size variable, number of employees, 
explains neither directors' pay nor their bonus. As it may be the case that there are many 
directors in large companies, the compensation of non-title directors, who belong to the 
bottom layer of the hierarchy within a board, may be much smaller than the president's 
salary. If this is the case, the director's average pay may not be very large even if the top 
director of a large company receives a large amount of salary. The other reason may be 
that the size effect is captured by tenure and it may be that it takes a long time to 
become a director in a large companies'. 
' We observed a positive relationship between sales and the director's salary. This may be because sales 
may show the firm's performance as well as the size of the company. 
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This research also analyses the determinants of executive pay in the UK's large 
listed companies. The pay equation is estimated from data from almost 1500 of UK's 
listed companies between 1994 and 1995. The main findings from the UK sample are as 
follows: 
1) In the UK, profit (both current and previous) has a significant effect on the 
total- and fixed pay. 
2) In the UK, stock market capitalisation has a significant effect on total- and 
fixed pay. 
3) In the UK, the `change in EPS' has a significant effect on the `Change in 
total pay' and on the `change in fixed pay' 
4) In the UK, `change in profit' and `change in EPS' have a significant effect 
on the annual incentive and its change. 
5) In the UK, there is a significant relationship between log of sales and the 
amount of compensation given. 
In addition, we analyse the pay gap between directors and other employees in 
large Japanese firms. The rank order tournament theory implies a negative correlation 
between pay gap and the possibility of employees of being promoted. If employees see 
little chance of being promoted to the top layer of the corporate hierarchy, then a large 
pay gap is needed to motivate them. If the pay gap is not large enough, the employees 
have little incentive to work hard. The work in this chapter finds a negative relationship 
between pay gap and the promotional opportunities of workers in Japan. This result is 
consistent with our discussion in Chapter 3 describing the fact that the `rank order 
- 207 - 
tournament' type of employment structure is used for managerial positions in large 
Japanese firms (Koike, 1994, Hanada, 1994, Tonvita, 1992). 
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Chapter 7. The Effects of Pay Policy on Company 
Performance: Hypothesis and Methodology 
7-1. Introduction 
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the effect of company's pay policy on corporate 
performance. The purpose of these two chapters is to analyse whether company's 
`way to pay to their director' matters or not. In this chapter, we describe our 
hypotheses, research method and our data. Particular emphasis is laid on the 
definition of the pay-performance sensitivity that this research introduces as a new 
concept. 
The purpose of Chapters 7 and 8 is to investigate the effect of executive 
compensation on company's performance. In this chapter, hypotheses and data, 
research methods are described. One of the main questions in Chapters 7 and 8 is 
whether the company's pay policy affects company performance. In particular, an 
attempt will be made to investigate whether or not the company that changes its pay 
policy improves its performance. For example, in the UK, can the companies, 
which recently introduced an annual incentive, improve their profit? This study 
does not focus on the effect of `the amount paid to directors' on company 
performance, but on the effect of `the way compensation is paid'. 
- 221 - 
There are relatively few studies on the relationship between pay scheme 
and performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b), while many studies on the 
determinants of executive compensation exist (Conyon, 1995, Conyon et al., 1995, 
Cosh, 1975, Jensen, et al., 1990a, Gregg et al., 1993, Main, et al., 1993, Rosen, 
1990). Jensen and Murphy (1990b) analysed the effect of performance pay 
sensitivity on company performance. By estimating the pay-performance 
sensitivity, they can categorise companies by their pay-performance sensitivity. 
They choose `best' companies whose sensitivity is highest, and `worst' companies 
whose sensitivity is lowest among their sample. They then compared the 
performance of the two groups of companies. One group consists of 25 companies 
whose CEOs have the `best' incentives in companies within the US, while the other 
group consists of 25 companies with the `worst' incentives. In the companies with 
the `best' incentives, CEOs receive the highest reward for creating additional 
shareholder's wealth. In the `best' company, the CEO receives $232.53 for $1000 
change in shareholder wealth, while in the `worst' company, the CEO receives - 
$1.41 for creating $1000 shareholder wealth. 
Jensen and Murphy analyse data between 1970-1988 and show that the 
performances of companies with the highest pay-performance sensitivities are 
much better than those with the lowest. The average return on stock is 14.5% 
among companies with the `best' incentives and 10.8% among companies with the 
`worst' incentives. 
Abowd (1990) analysed the effect of performance based executive 
compensation on company performance, using data from 1981-86 on 250 large 
companies in the US. He showed that strong sensitivity of compensation to 
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corporate performance yields better economic return the following year. He used 
the logistic model to test whether performance sensitive pay yields better future 
performance. 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) tested whether tournament has an 
incentive to increase performance. Working with data on the professional golf 
tournament, they analysed the effect of the level and structure of prizes in the 
professional golf tournament (PGA) and the each player's performance. They find 
that a higher prize leads to better results, particularly in the later rounds of a 
tournament, when the players tend to be tired. Other things equal, as the prize 
money increases, the score will become lower for every player. This result suggests 
that tournament does work as an incentive device. 
In this chapter, the effect of the pay policy on the company policy in both 
the UK and in Japan will be studied. The following questions are analysed: 1) Do 
those companies with higher pay-performance sensitivity achieve better 
performance than those without? 2) Can the performance of the company that 
intensifies the performance-pay sensitivity outpace the performance of other 
companies? 3) Is the performance of the company with annual bonus better than 
those without? 4) Does the company that introduces an annual incentive program 
for executives, improve its performance? 
This research estimates logistic and probit regressions to analyse these 
hypotheses. Dependent variables are dummy variables that indicate whether the 
company improves its performance or not. The performance variables include 
profit and earnings per share for the UK, and for Japan, profit, return on capital and 
wage. Wage is included because it is assumed that the employee's welfare is one of 
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the important objectives for directors in Japan, as seen in previous chapters (Aoki, 
1984,1988,1990, Aoki and Itami, 1985, Dore, 1987. Komiya, 1988, Itami, 1994, 
Iwai, 1988, Kagono and Kobayashi, 1988, Kuwahara, 1988, Tachibanaki, 1995, 
Noda, 1995). As shown in Chapter 6, in Japan there is a strong link between 
director's compensation and employee's wage. 
We compare the results of our estimations between the two countries, UK 
and Japan. This comparison is considered to be of importance because both 
countries have a different attitude toward executive compensation. In the UK, many 
companies are trying to create a relationship between company performance and 
top pay, in response to recommendation from the Cadbury and Greenbury report, 
although there is a debate on the effect of these recommendations. In contrast, few 
large Japanese firms show an interest in linking company performance and 
director's pay. 
Our results can be summarised as follows. In the UK there is a positive 
relationship between `way to pay' and corporate performance. Companies with a 
high pay-performance sensitivity are more likely to improve their profit and 
earnings per share. The companies that intensify the sensitivity are more likely to 
improve their performance. In addition, in the UK the companies with an annual 
incentive are also likely to improve their profit and EPS. In contrast, Japan's data 
do not show a positive relationship between the performance-pay sensitivity and 
company's performance. 
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7-2. Do Incentives Matter? 
Many previous studies on the determinants of executive compensation 
assume that executive compensation depends on firm's performance, though their 
relationship may be explicit or implicit'. The directors' compensation may increase 
when the company achieves good performance. These studies implicitly assume 
that the top director and shareholders are in a `principal-agent' relationship. 
Principal-agent theory predicts that as the performance-pay sensitivity increases, 
directors are more motivated, therefore, high performance-pay sensitivity may 
yield a higher company performance. Top directors in the company with high pay- 
performance sensitivity will work hard and perform better. However, there are 
relatively few studies that examine the effect of pay-performance sensitivity on 
firm performance (Abowd, 1990, Jensen and Murphy 1990a, 1990b). 
The above arguments lead us to the following hypotheses. First, we will 
test whether companies with high pay-performance sensitivity achieve higher 
company performance. By estimating the relationship between pay-performance 
sensitivity and performance, we are able to calculate by how much each 
performance improves in percentage terms when a company increases its 
sensitivity by 1 %. The hypotheses analysed here are: 
' Many large companies in the UK indicate their performance measure and performance target. 
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Hypothesis 7-1: The performance of those companies with high 
performance-pay sensitivity is larger than that of those with low 
sensitivity. 
Hypothesis 7-2: The companies that intensify their performance-pay 
sensitivities achieve a higher company performance than other companies. 
Most British companies have some kind of incentive program, such as 
annual bonus or a long-term incentive. An annual bonus is quite common among 
large UK companies, while the long-term incentive is not widely used. In our 
sample, in 1995, only 13.8% among 1436 companies had some kind of long-term 
incentive, while 68.9% had an annual incentive. According to the Monks 
partnership (1994), only 19% of FT-SE 350 companies have long-term incentives, 
compared to 71 %, which have annual incentives'. 
There may be two main reasons why these companies introduce an 
incentive program; namely the `motivation effect' and the `goal-setting effect'. As 
described above, the principal-agent theory predicts that higher pay-performance 
sensitivity will motivate top directors. As directors may receive a higher salary 
according to their performance, they have more of an incentive to work hard and 
thus, the company will achieve a higher performance. 
In addition, these incentive schemes may help top managers to understand 
what their goal is in managing the company. Usually, a remuneration committee 
(Williams, 1994) 
2 In addition, Williams (1994) cites that 7% of companies have a long-term incentive plan 
from the 
Hay consulting report (1993). 
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sets the performance target at the beginning of the year. Top executives are notified 
of their performance objectives and some `formula' to calculate their bonus. 
According to Williams (1994), many companies report that the major 
benefit of introducing an incentive scheme to top directors are that directors focus 
their attention on the defined performance objectives. Marsden and French (1998) 
also suggest that the `goal setting effect' is more effective than the `incentive effect' 
in improving productivity in their sample taken from workers in the public services. 
Companies introduce annual bonuses to motivate directors to raise their 
awareness of short-term performances (Williams, 1994). In particular, one of the 
most important objectives in introducing an annual incentive scheme is to help the 
top directors to focus on performance targets that can be measured. These annual 
incentives do not only motivate directors to work hard, but also they make directors 
focus on some performance measures, set by a remuneration committee, such as 
growth of EPS and profit. It should be noted that these performance measures can 
be measured every year. In other words, firms may be able to assess the 
performance of top directors every year. In particular, those directors who are 
working towards recently applied annual incentive schemes may have a greater 
incentive to concentrate on the short-term targets of one year. These hypotheses will 
now be tested. 
Hypothesis 7-3: In the UK, those companies with an annual incentive 
scheme will achieve higher company performance than those without 
one3. 
' As described in chapter 5, almost all the listed companies in Japan have an annual bonus. Thus, it is 
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Hypothesis 7-4: In the UK, those companies that have recently introduced 
an annual bonus will achieve better performance. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested using the micro data of listed companies in 
the UK and in Japan. As virtually all the large companies give annual bonuses in 
Japan, hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested only for those companies in the UK4. 
7-3. Data 
UK data 
The data analysed here are the same as the one we used in the previous 
chapters'. This data are taken from the Monks partnership's "United Kingdom 
Board Earnings, October 1995", and "United Kingdom Board Earnings, October 
1994". These data sets include comprehensive data on executive compensation and 
company performance, including the detailed composition of the highest paid 
director. For example, the 1995 data set covers 1431 quoted companies in the UK, 
whose annual reports are available in September 1995. Thus, the coverage of this 
data set is large. 
One of the advantages of this data is that it includes the detail of the pay 
packages, such as the amount of annual /long-term incentive, pension contribution, 
not possible to compare the performance of companies with an annual bonus to those without. 
° Some large companies in Japan report no director's bonus. These companies may not have an 
annual bonus plan. However, it is possible that the bonus is set to 0 because of bad company 
performance. As we can not distinguish between the two possibilities, we will not be able to test 
hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Details of this data set, including reliability, are discussed in chapter 4. 
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and benefit, for the highest paid director'. In addition, this data give us information 
on whether a company has an annual incentive. Therefore, we can distinguish 
between those companies that do not have any annual incentive scheme and those 
that do not pay out any annual incentive because the company's performance is not 
sufficient. This data also includes previous year's figures for top pay, profit and 
earnings per share. Thus, the time coverage for these variables is 3 years, from 1993 
to 1995. For other variables, the coverage is 2 years from 1994 to 1995. 
Japan's data 
In this research, we use the same data set as the one we used in previous 
chapters. In Chapter 4 we examined the reliability of this data set. 210 of Japan's 
large listed companies are used as our sample. The stock prices of these companies 
are used to calculate the NIKKEI INDEX. The data for 1995 and 1996 are used. 
Most variables, including directors' pay and their bonuses, are taken from the 
NIKKEI NEEDS database. Other variables are taken from the Toyo Keizai Yakuin 
Shikihou (Directory of directors) and the Kabushiki Toshi Shuekiritsu (Rate of 
Return on Stocks in Japan). Both the NIKKEI NEEDS database and the Toyo Keizai 
Yakuin Shikihou are based on each company's annual report. The shareholder's 
return, which is taken from the Kabushiki Toshi Shuekiritsu (Rate of Return on 
Stocks in Japan), is calculated by the NIHON SHYOKEN KEIZAI KENKYUSHO 
(Japan institute of securities and economics) and is based on stock price and 
6 However, this data set does not include stock option data. Therefore, we cannot assess the effect of 
stock option on firm performance. In addition, it is not possible to compare the performance of the 
company with those without stock option. However, it may not be worth to comparing the 
performance those companies with stock option with those without because almost all the large 
UK 
companies have some kind of stock option scheme (Monks partnership, 1994). 
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dividend. 
The company discloses the total amount of directors' pay and their 
bonuses, in addition to the number of directors. This research calculates director's 
average pay (ADPAY) and director's average bonus (ADBONUS) by dividing the 
total amount of pay and bonus for all the directors by the number of directors. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is noted that this research focuses on 
`director's average pay', instead of top director's pay for Japan. Some may think 
this is a serious problem as we focus on top directors in the UK. However, we 
believe that this is appropriate because the role of the top director and the board of 
directors are not the same in Japan as the UK. In general, in the UK, the CEO is 
responsible for the day to day operation of the company, while in Japan, directors 
have this responsibility. In the UK, the board of directors is supposed to monitor the 
CEO on behalf of the shareholders and there are some non-executive directors' on 
the board. In contrast, in Japan, each director is responsible for running certain 
sections of the company. In addition, there are very few external directors in Japan. 
Thus, the board of directors is supposed to discuss day to day business operation, 
rather than to monitor the top managers8. 
Cross national comparability 
Data from both Japan and the UK provides information on executive 
compensation and company performance; there are however, many differences. 
Firstly, with regard to the executive compensation data, the UK's data provide 
' According to Conyon et al. (1995), almost 40% of directors in large UK firms are non-executive 
directors. 
8 In our sample, the average number of directors in a company is 29.2. The maximum number of 
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information on the highest director's pay while Japan's data provide information on 
the director's average compensation. Secondly, with regard to performance 
measures, the UK's data provide information on profit and earnings per share, 
while Japan's data provide information on profit, return on capital and employees' 
wage. Thirdly, with regard to the coverage, Japan's data provide information on 
210 large company's data, whereas data from the UK are taken from almost 1500 
companies. Thus, the UK data include smaller companies and data of financial 
companies, which is not the case of the data from Japan. 
7-4. How Can We Measure the Pay-Performance Sensitivity? 
The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between 
company's performance and their pay policy, such as pay-performance sensitivity. 
However, it is not easy to observe each company's pay-performance sensitivity 
directly, as their pay policy varies across time and across the spectrum of industries'. 
Thus, pay-performance sensitivity should be estimated from disclosed information. 
Although much research has been carried out on the relationship between director's 
pay and company's performance, relatively little has been studied on pay- 
performance sensitivity for each company10. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) estimated 
each company's pay-performance sensitivity by running pay-performance 
regression for more than 400 companies. Their approach to pay-performance 
sensitivity has some advantages. Firstly, it is possible to assess the relationship 
directors is 60, while the minimum is 9. 
Some companies in the UK reveal how annual bonus is determined. 
1° Most studies estimate the pay-performance relationship across companies. 
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between each company's pay-performance sensitivity and its performance. It is 
important to observe individual company's sensitivity when the relationship 
between sensitivity and performance is examined, as both sensitivity and 
performance vary between companies. The other advantage is that sensitivity is 
stable over time, as Jensen and Murphy estimated this sensitivity using more than 
10 years of data. However, their approach has some weaknesses. Firstly, as they 
estimate the determinants of executive compensation for each company, they 
assume that the pay-performance sensitivity is unchanged over time. This may be 
an incorrect assumption as many companies are trying to strengthen the link 
between company performance and top pay. For example, annual incentive 
schemes were not widely used in the UK 10 years ago compared to these days. Thus, 
secondly, we are unable to assess the effect of `change in pay policy' on firm's 
performance by their sensitivity measure. For example, we cannot test the 
hypothesis that those companies that intensified their sensitivity will perform better. 
To test this hypothesis, the pay-performance sensitivity for each company must be 
analysed each year. 
This research will employ a more direct approach to calculate each 
company's performance pay. We calculate the sensitivity using current and 
previous year's pay and performance data and it is defined as the percent change in 
payment divided by the percent change in company's performance. Alternatively, 
we can define performance-pay sensitivity as: 
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sensitivity 
Apay 
pays 
Aperformance 
performance, 
Apay = pay, - pay, _, 
4pay 
Aperformance 
performance, 
Pay, 
Aperformance = performance, - performance, _, 
Using this definition, each company's pay-performance sensitivity for 
each year has been analysed. This sensitivity shows the percentage change in 
director's pay when the company's performance changes by 1 %. If this sensitivity 
is 1, that means that a1% increase in the company's performance yields a 1% rise 
in the director's compensation in that company. " 
We have also calculated the `sensitivity change dummy variable'. As 
performance-pay sensitivity is calculated for every year, we are able to observe if 
this sensitivity increases or not in each company. For example, this research 
computes this pay-performance sensitivity in 1994 and 1995 for each UK company. 
Thus, it is possible for us to identify whether the sensitivity increases in 1995 for 
each company. This research then defines `sensitivity change dummy variable'. If 
this sensitivity for year t is larger than or equal to that for the year t-1, then we 
interpret that this company intensifies the pay-performance sensitivity in the year t. 
In that case the `sensitivity change dummy variable' is set to 1 otherwise, this 
'The denominator in this definition includes performance at the year `t'. We will discuss later in 
this chapter how this variable affects pay-performance sensitivity. This may be important as we will 
examine the relationship between this sensitivity and performance at the year t. 
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dummy is set to zero. 
These sensitivity figures for each company are obtained for the years 1995 
and 1994 in the UK, since our data set includes information on percent change in 
compensation and percent change in company performance for each year. 
To calculate the sensitivity for 1995, we need the pay and performance 
data for both 1994 and 1995. To calculate the sensitivity change dummy for 1995, 
we need the sensitivity for 1994 and 1995. Thus, we need pay and performance for 
1993,1994 and 1995. As our data set for the UK includes data on top pay and 
performance for 1993-1995, we can obtain the sensitivity change for 1995. As for 
Japan's data, the maximum time period covered is between 1992-1995 and 
therefore, it is possible to calculate the sensitivity change dummy for 1994 and 
1995. Thus, this research uses a panel data set for Japan and cross-section data for 
the UK so we will apply different estimation methods for data from each country. 
As both the data and estimation methods are different, it may not be appropriate to 
compare the magnitude of coefficient directly. 
For the UK's data, we calculate this sensitivity for two compensation 
components and two performance figures. As a compensation measure, we use 
annual bonus and total compensation, and as performance measures, we use profit 
and earnings per share (EPS). Thus, four sensitivity measures are obtained: 1) 
annual bonus-profit sensitivity, 2) total compensation-profit sensitivity, 3) annual 
bonus- EPS sensitivity, and 4) total compensation- EPS sensitivity. We will analyse 
the effect of these sensitivity measures on company's performance. After these four 
sensitivity measures are calculated for 1994/5, we calculate the `sensitivity change 
dummy' for 1995 for each company. We have chosen profit and EPS as the 
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performance measures because these are most frequently used performance criteria 
by remuneration committees in large UK companies (Williams, 1994, Monks 
partnership, 1994). 
We assume that the pay-performance sensitivity in the year t will have an 
effect on the company performance of the same year t, rather than the year t+112. In 
typical large companies in the UK, the performance-pay sensitivity for term t is set 
at the beginning of term t by the remuneration committee of the company. Usually, 
the remuneration committee sets the performance target and some `formula' to 
calculate the bonus using this performance. Directors are informed in advance of 
the target performance and how their bonuses will be calculated, so that they have 
an incentive to work toward the company's performance over the term t. After 
being informed, directors are supposed to work toward these performance targets. 
Thus, this research assumes that the pay-performance sensitivity in year t in the UK 
affects the motivation of directors in the same year t. 
This research uses. the data of both annual bonus-performance sensitivity 
and total pay-performance sensitivity. In general, annual bonus is more sensitive to 
performance than total compensation because it is introduced to make managers 
focus on particular performances such as profit or earnings per share. However, it 
may be the case that our annual bonus-performance sensitivity does not reflect the 
real sensitivity of the company. One reason is that the company may change the 
proportion of annual bonuses and fixed bonuses that it pays out. For example, the 
proportion of annual bonuses to total pay may increase from 10% to 30%. In this 
12 As described in chapter 5, it is often the case in large UK companies that directors are given 
performance targets at the beginning of the term. Remuneration committees also notify directors 
about possible rewards for achieving targets. In this case, directors know their pay-performance 
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case, our annual bonus-performance sensitivity can not measure real sensitivity 
because the amount of annual bonus increases with or without good performance. 
This may be serious problem as it is often the case that the company changes its pay 
package. In addition, directors' incentives may not only depend on annual incentive, 
but also on the total pay. Thus, this research calculates total pay-performance 
sensitivity in addition to annual bonus-performance sensitivity. 
For Japan's data, this research assumes that the pay-performance 
sensitivity in the year t affects the performance in the year t+1. The main reason is 
that in Japan the pay-performance sensitivity for the year t is shown at the end of the 
year. The director's bonus is paid at the end of the year, after they have been 
informed of the performance. Thus, directors are aware of the pay-performance 
sensitivity for the year t at the end of the year. If this is the case, the pay- 
performance for the year t affects the performance of the year t+1 because the 
directors have no knowledge about the sensitivity for the year t when they make a 
decision about the amount of their effort for the year t13 
It should be noted that we make different assumptions on the time point 
when the sensitivity the year t affects the performance of the company. We assume 
that in the UK, the sensitivity in the year t will affect the performance in the year t. 
In contrast, in Japan we assume that the sensitivity in the year t affects the 
performance in the year t+ 1. These assumptions are made, as there is a difference in 
the way that compensation is paid in practice. In general, in the UK, pay- 
sensitivity for the year at the beginning of the year. 
13 This assumption is held even if there is a turnover of directors between the year t and year t+1. 
The 
reason is that, in a typical large Japanese company, director's pay is in accordance with the rank, 
rather than the person (Abe et al., 1997). Thus, we assume that the motivation of the new 
director in 
the year t+1 depends on the pay-performance sensitivity in the year t. 
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performance sensitivity for the year t is determined at the beginning of the year t, 
while in Japan, directors know the sensitivity for the year t at the end of the year t. 
It may be of importance to make it clear that pay-performance sensitivities 
in these countries are estimated using different statistical measures because of the 
difference in the accounting procedure in Japan and in the UK, 
One of the most important advantages of this pay-performance sensitivity 
over other alternative measures that are discussed below14 is that this sensitivity 
index may well relate to the top director's incentive. We define this pay- 
performance sensitivity index to analyse the relationship between pay-performance 
sensitivity and firm performance in order to examine whether director's incentive 
matters. Thus, our sensitivity index is required to be related to director's incentive. 
In other words, it is required to reflect the degree of association between pay and 
performance. As our pay-performance sensitivity shows the percentage change in 
pay when performance improves by 1%, it may reflect the director's motivation 
better than other alternative sensitivity indices, which are discussed below. 
Alternative definitions of sensitivity 
Though this research will use the above definition of pay-performance 
sensitivity, it is possible to define pay-performance sensitivity in other way. For 
example, the ratio between profit and director's annual bonus can be interpreted as 
a kind of pay-performance sensitivity. We will discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of these alternative definitions of pay-performance sensitivity in the 
chapter appendix, describing why this research uses our pay-performance 
'a We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of alternative sensitivity indices in chapter 
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sensitivity. 
7-5. The Model 
Using our pay-performance sensitivity, this research analyses the 
relationship between `way to pay' and company performance. The theory predicts 
that more sensitive pay schemes will motivate directors and thus yield higher 
company performance. 
As the dependent variable, we use a dummy variable that indicates if the 
company improved its performance compared with its previous year's performance. 
We try to estimate the relationship between this performance dummy and the 
company's various pay policies. As our main purpose is to analyse whether the 
company's pay policy affects company's performance, our basic model to be 
estimated can be described as follows: 
performance. dummy =f (sensitivity, pay. scheme) 
(Equation 7-1) 
In addition to pay-performance sensitivity, independent variables include a dummy 
variable that indicates if the company has an annual bonus, and a dummy variable 
appendix. 
"s For example, if the CEO of company A with profit -100 receives 10, this alternative sensitivity is 
calculated as -0.1. However, we can not say that the CEO receives -10% of the performance as his 
reward for the achievement. 
16 This may be possible if we consider the stock option. However, the data that we have on top pay do 
not include the information on stock option. 
" In many large companies in Japan, the director's bonus is not paid when the company profit is 
seriously low. 
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that indicates if the company has introduced an annual incentive plan this year. As 
almost all the Japanese companies in our sample are considered to have an annual 
bonus, the annual bonus dummy and new annual bonus dummy are only used for 
the UK data. By applying this basic equation, we can specify the equations to be 
estimated for each country's data. 
UK model 
Firstly, this research will examine if those companies with annual 
incentive (AI), or with new AI are more likely to improve their performance than 
those without. We also examine if those companies with high pay-performance 
sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance than those without. Next, 
we will estimate the following equation: 
Pr(Aprofit, >_ 0) =f (AI1, newAI1, sensitivity,, sensitivitychange f, 
industy) 
(Equation 7-2) 
Al: dummy variable that shows if the company has an annual incentive. 
This variable is set to 1 if the company has an annual incentive and to 0 if 
not. 
NewAl: dummy variable that shows if the company has introduced an 
annual bonus this year. This variable is set to 1 if the company has 
introduced an annual bonus this year and to 0 if not. 
Sensitivity: performance-pay sensitivity, including both annual bonus- 
18 There are 194 cases where profit increases and 225 cases where profit decreases. 
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performance sensitivity and total pay-performance sensitivity. 
Sensitivity change: dummy variable that shows if the pay-performance 
sensitivity increased this year. This variable is set to 1 if the company 
increases its sensitivity and to 0 if not. 
Industry: industry dummies (two digits) 
We will estimate this equation using logistic regression. This equation will 
be estimated based on cross-sectional data in 1995. 
As the dependent variable is a dummy variable, we can interpret this as the 
probability that the company improves its performance. Then, we will focus on the 
coefficients of each independent variable. In general, we predict that all the 
coefficients for independent variables are positive. According to our hypotheses, 
we can expect that the coefficient for Al should be positive and significant because 
directors who receive an annual bonus are motivated to work and to focus on 
measure of performance. 
In this analysis one of our focuses is on the coefficient for newAl because 
this variable shows the change in company's policy. As we can predict that a 
recently introduced bonus plan will motivate managers, the coefficient for this 
variable will be positive. If this coefficient is significant, it provides a support for 
our hypothesis. The newAl variable is set to 1 when the company introduces an 
annual incentive in that year, and zero otherwise. 
We predict that the coefficient for sensitivity will be positive, because 
directors with high sensitive-pay are considered to be more motivated toward 
performance criteria. Another main emphasis of our study is laid on the coefficient 
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for sensitivity change because this coefficient also shows the effect of the 
company's change in pay policy. Many large UK companies change performance- 
pay sensitivity these days in their annual bonus program, trying to increase 
director's incentives toward performance. If the coefficient for sensitivity change is 
significant and large enough, those pay policies are considered to be effective. The 
sensitivity change dummy is set to 1 when the performance-pay sensitivity 
increases, remains unchanged and to 0 when it decreased. Each equation includes 
an industry dummy to exclude industry specific factors, such as their market 
condition on their products. 
Japan model 
We will estimate similar equations using Japan's data to analyse the effect 
of company's pay policy. Firstly, we will estimate the following equation to 
examine the correlation between pay-performance sensitivity and future 
performance improvement. 
Pr(Aprofit, j >_ 0) =f (sensitivity,, sensitivitychange,, const., 
) 
(Equation 7-3) 
Sensitivity: performance-pay sensitivity, including annual bonus- 
performance sensitivity and total pay-performance sensitivity. 
Sensitivity change: dummy variable that shows whether the pay- 
performance sensitivity increased this year. This variable is set to 
1 if the 
company intensifies its sensitivity or to 0 if not. 
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We estimate this equation using the data on 1993,94 and 95. Some of the 
equations are estimated using these 3 year's data, and some are estimated using 
only 94 and 95 data'9. As our data set is panel data, we estimated these equations 
using the random effect probit model. 
Our main focus is on the coefficient for pay-performance sensitivity. This 
coefficient is supposed to be positive, because directors with highly sensitive pay 
are considered to be more motivated toward higher performance. Another main 
focus of our study is on the coefficient for sensitivity change because this 
coefficient also shows the direct effect of the company's change in pay policy. If the 
company strengthens the link between pay and performance, then the directors may 
be more motivated. The coefficient for this sensitivity change is supposed to be 
positive, because the directors with strengthened performance-pay sensitivity may 
be more motivated. 
There are some differences between this equation and the UK-equation. 
Firstly, the dependent variable in equation for Japan is future performance while it 
is current performance in the UK model. This difference is based on our assumption 
on pay-performance sensitivity. We assumed that in the UK, pay-performance 
sensitivity is shown at the beginning of the term, while in Japan, it is shown at the 
end of the year. Thus, the dependent variable in Japan's model is performance 
dummy (t+1), while that in the UK model is performance dummy (t). 
The other difference is that Japan's model does not include AI (Annual 
incentive dummy) and newAl (new annual incentive dummy). This is because 
19 We use 1993-95 data for equations not including sensitivity change, and 1994-95 data for 
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almost all the companies in Japan have an annual bonus scheme. In addition, the 
industry dummy is not included in Japan's model. 
Causality problem 
These models predict a positive relationship between performance and 
pay-performance sensitivity. However, there is a possibility that we can interpret 
positive coefficients for pay-performance sensitivity in another way. There is a 
possibility that excellent managers may choose a high sensitivity contract. If, 
directors can expect high performance in advance, and if they can exercise some 
power to the remuneration committee, they may wish their pay to be highly 
sensitive to the performance. Alternatively, if they cannot expect good performance, 
they may not wish their pay to be sensitive to performance. If either of these is the 
case, then we may observe a positive relationship between performance and pay- 
performance sensitivity. 
However, it may not be the case in the UK, as many large companies have 
a remuneration committee. Some of these companies claim that remuneration 
committees are mainly composed of non-executive directors and are therefore 
independent from top directors. If this is the case, the above problem may not be 
serious because CEOs may have limited power in deciding their own compensation 
package. 
In addition, there is a possibility that directors may transfer to other 
companies seeking higher pay-performance sensitivity when they think that the 
company may achieve higher performances that year. However, significant 
equations including sensitivity change. 
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numbers of directors in large UK companies are promoted from within the 
company. According to a study by Korn/Ferry (1981), in the UK, 22% of directors 
worked for one company only. The average length of service in a company was 18 
years (Korn/Ferry, 1981). Directors in large UK companies may have relatively 
little scope to change to other companies seeking higher pay-performance 
sensitivity. 
In Japan, the pay-performance sensitivity for the year t is observed after 
the performance for the year t is observed. If this is the case, the `reverse causality' 
problem may not be serious because pay-performance sensitivity is not set in 
advance. In addition, as significant numbers of directors are promoted from within 
the company, they may have little scope to transfer to another company seeking 
higher pay-performance sensitivity. 
Are there same variables on both sides of the equation? 
In this section, we will examine if this equation allows different 
interpretations. Even if we find a positive correlation between sensitivity and 
performance sensitivity, some may claim that this correlation is due to the fact that 
the performance variable is included on both sides of the equation20. We will 
examine the detail of our model to show that this argument will not necessarily 
hold. 
It is true that both sides of our estimation include a performance variable 
because pay-performance sensitivity is calculated from pay and performance. For 
`0 Sensitivity is calculated from pay and performance. 
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example, our UK model is as follows. We will examine the sign effect of profit (t) 
on both sides of equation, for example. 
LAA --pay 
Pr(Aprofit, >_ 0) =f (sensitivity, others) =f( 
pay` 
, others) Aprofitt 
profits 
(Equation 7-4) 
Both profit (t) and profit (t- 1) are on both sides of the equation. As for the 
left-hand side of the equation, it is obvious that profit (t) has a positive effect. In 
other words, the larger the profit (t) is, the larger the left-hand side is if other things 
are equal. Now we would like to know the sign effect of profit (t) on pay- 
performance sensitivity. 
Pay-performance sensitivity can be written as follows: 
sensitivity = 
pay` - payt-1 
" 
profit, 
profit, -profit, -, pay, 21 
+ 
profit, -, = (1 
profit, -profit, -, 
pay, -pay, -, 
pay, 
As the pay (t) can not be negative, the sign effect of profit (t) on pay- 
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performance sensitivity depends on the sign of profit (t- 1) and that of (pay (t) - pay 
(t-1)), or delta pay. If both are positive, the sign effect of profit (t) on sensitivity is 
negative. Similarly, if both profit (t-1) and delta pay is negative, the increase of 
profit (t) will make sensitivity smaller. Thus, it has been shown that the sign effect 
of profit (t) on both sides of the equation of the UK model is not necessarily the 
same". Similarly, the sign effect of performance on Japan model is not stable, 
depending on the sign of other variables. 
The above discussion suggests that the effect of that performance variable 
is not stable even though the same performance variable is found on both sides of 
our model. Thus, if this research finds a positive relationship between pay- 
performance sensitivity and performance improvement, it may be appropriate to 
interpret this relationship as the support for our hypothesis, rather than as the 'same 
variable effect'. 
In addition to this 'same variable effect'. some may claim that the 
company size may have some effect on our estimation. It may be true that in the UK, 
large companies are more likely to have a more detailed pay plan for their directors, 
such as an annual incentive. However, as our dependent variable is the dummy 
sensitivity = 
Profit, Pay, -pay, -, 
profit, - profit, -, pay, 
21 profit, -profit, -, 
+ profit, -, pay, -pay, -, 
profit, - profit, -, pay, 
profit, - profit, -, + 
PrOft, -I pay, - pay, -, 
ro It ro I ro It, pay, Profit, -P fl 1-1 P 
ftl -P0, 
We can obtain the same result by differentiating pay-performance sensitivity with respect to profit 
(t). 
asensitivity - profit, -, pay, -pay, -, ap r ofi t, (profit, -prqfit, -, )' pay, 
The sign effect of profit (t) on sensitivity depends on the sign of profit (t- 1) and that of (pay(t) - pay 
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variable that shows if the company improves its performance or not, it is unlikely 
that our dependent variable may be affected by size of the company. As for Japan's 
data, neither a performance improvement dummy or pay-performance sensitivity is 
particularly affected by company size. 
(t- I )). 
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Appendix Alternative Definitions of Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
In this appendix, the strengths and weaknesses of alternative definitions of 
pay-performance sensitivity is discussed. 
First of all, the ratio between profit and director's annual bonus can be 
interpreted as a kind of pay-performance sensitivity or we can define alternative 
pay-performance sensitivity as follows: 
Alternative. Sensitivityl = 
bonus, 
performance, 
This sensitivity shows how much proportion of performance, such as profit, is paid 
to the director. The largest advantage of this approach to pay-performance 
sensitivity may be that this sensitivity is easy to interpret. As the director has a 
responsibility for the performance of the company, they may take some portion of 
the performance of the company. 
However, this alternative sensitivity, 1, has some disadvantages over our 
pay-performance sensitivity. Firstly, it is difficult to interpret this sensitivity when 
the company's performance is negative, or when the performance figure is smaller 
than director's pay". Secondly, this alternative sensitivity, 1, fails to reflect the 
change in performance. The change in performance, such as the profit growth is 
considered to be as important as the absolute value of profit. 
" For example, if the CEO of company A with profit -100 receives 10, this alternative sensitivity is 
calculated as -0.1. However, we cannot say that the CEO receives -10% of the performance as his 
reward for the achievement. 
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Thirdly, it may be difficult to compare the pay-performance sensitivities of 
the companies by using this alternative sensitivity, 1. This is because the variance 
of the performance, such as profit, is much larger than that of top pay. It may be the 
case that the profit of company A is more than 100 times larger than that of 
company B. However, it may not be often the case that the top pay of the company 
A is 100 times as large as that of the CEO in company B 24 . Thus, this alternative 
sensitivity, 1, will overestimate the pay-performance sensitivity in smaller 
companies, and will underestimate the pay-performance sensitivity of large 
companies. In addition, it may not be easy to compare this alternative sensitivity, 1, 
between companies because the proportion of bonus to total pay varies. This 
alternative sensitivity, 1, will overestimate the sensitivity of the company where 
annual bonus consists of a large proportion of the total compensation. In addition, 
because of the same reasons listed above, it is difficult to compare the sensitivity in 
the UK with that in Japan. Because of these reasons, this research will be based on 
pay-performance sensitivity rather than alternative sensitivity, 1. 
Finally, it may not be appropriate to interpret this alternative sensitivity, 1, 
as a reflection of the director's incentive. One reason is that this sensitivity index 
does not include the director's fixed pay, therefore, it fails to show the degree of 
association between performance and director's pay. 
Alternative sensitivity 2 
The other alternative pay-performance sensitivity can be defined as 
follows. In a typical large UK company, the annual bonus for the CEO is calculated 
This may be possible if we consider the stock option. However, the data that we have on top pay do 
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as a proportion of fixed pay. We can describe this relationship as follows: 
Annual. Bonus = (, 8)fixedpay 
Beta shows the proportion of the annual bonus to fixed pay. This proportion 
depends on the performance, usually profit or earnings per share, or both and this 
relationship can be described as follows: 
/3 = (y) performance 
By substituting this second equation into the first, we obtain the following 
equation. 
Annual. Bonus = (, Y)performance - Fixedpay 
By dividing both sides of the equations by fixed pay, we obtain the following 
equation. 
Annual. Bon u (y)performance 
, 
YFixed. 
pay --": 
As the coefficient gamma shows the relationship between the performance and 
director's pay, we can define alternative pay-performance sensitivity by 
transforming this equation. 
not include the information on stock option. 
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Alternative. Sensitivity2 =- y= 
Annual. Bonu 
Fixed 
. pay 
performance 
The biggest advantage of this alternative sensitivity 2 is that it is calculated based 
on common practice in the UK. However, there are similar weaknesses as the 
previous alternative sensitivity measure, particularly when we try to compare this 
sensitivity between companies and countries. 
This alternative sensitivity 2 fails to reflect the effect of 'change in 
performance' on top pay and it is difficult to compare it between companies of 
different size. This sensitivity varies according to the proportion of annual bonus to 
total pay. In addition, it is impossible to assess the director's total pay-performance 
sensitivity. 
The other disadvantage of this alternative sensitivity is that it is calculated 
on the practice in the UK. Thus, in addition to the reasons listed above, it is not 
appropriate to apply this approach to Japan's data. In Japan, the directors' annual 
bonuses are not calculated as the percentage of their fixed pay. Rather, they are 
calculated as the percentage of profit before tax". These arguments also suggest 
that this sensitivity measure also fails to reflect the director's motivation, as it does 
not show the degree of association between pay and performance. 
Lastly, this alternative index may show the proportion of annual incentive 
to fixed pay, rather than the degree of association between pay and perfonnance. In 
this definition, the numerator shows the proportion of annual bonus to fixed pay. 
25 in many large companies in Japan, the director's bonus is not paid when the company profit is 
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This numerator is large if the proportion of annual bonus to fixed pay is large. 
Although this proportion may suggest company's pay policy, it does not show the 
degree of association between pay and performance, which we are particularly 
interested in. The alternative sensitivity 2 tries to measure the degree of association 
between pay and performance by dividing this proportion by the level of 
performance. However, our pay-performance sensitivity that is defined above may 
reflect the association of pay and performance better than this alternative sensitivity 
2. 
Because of these weaknesses of alternative pay-performance sensitivities, 
this research will use our pay-performance sensitivity that shows the percentage 
change in pay when the performance changes by I %. It is true that our pay- 
performance sensitivity has a weakness, as it cannot be defined when firm profit is 
zero. However, this would not be a serious problem because our data do not include 
many cases where change in pay is zero. For example, the Japanese data that we use 
includes 420 profit figures as this data set includes 2 10 companies over a period of 
two years. Among these 420 cases, only one case shows zero change in profit26. 
Our pay-performance sensitivities have some advantages over those 
alternative sensitivity measures mentioned above. Firstly, our sensitivity will reflect 
the effect of 'change in performance' on 'change in pay'. As these changes are 
normalised as percentage, the effect of size on sensitivity may not be very large. As 
we calculate total pay-performance sensitivity in addition to annual bonus- 
performance sensitivity, the effect of bonus-total pay ratio on sensitivity is avoided. 
seriously low. 
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This sensitivity makes sense even if the performance or change in performance is 
negative because this sensitivity is a percentage change in pay when perfonnance 
improves by I %. In addition, we may be able to compare the sensitivity across 
companies, as it is standardised as the ratio. Lastly, as this sensitivity shows 
percentage change in pay when performance improves by I %, it may reflect the 
director's motivation better than other alternative sensitivities, which are examined 
above. Because of these reasons, a this research will calculate this pay-perfon-nance 
sensitivity for both Japan's data and the UK's data, and will examine the 
relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and company performance. 
" There are 194 cases where profit increases and 225 cases where profit decreases. 
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Chapter 8. The Effects of Pay Policy on Company 
Performance: A Comparison between the UK and 
Japan 
8-1. Introduction 
Following the research method explained in Chapter 7, this chapter reports 
the results of our analysis on the effect of company's pay policy on corporate 
performance. Our main hypothesis in this chapter is that companies with higher 
pay-performance sensitivities are more likely to achieve better performance. Prior 
to testing this hypothesis, this chapter looks into the basic characteristics of pay- 
performance sensitivity that are given in Chapter 7. Basic statistics and some 
histograms are employed to describe the basic nature of this pay-performance 
sensitivity. Then, the impacts of pay policies, such as pay-performance sensitivity 
and the change of sensitivity are examined using logistic regression and probit 
regression. 
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8-2. Basic Characteristics of Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
In this section, we examine the basic characteristics of pay-performance 
sensitivity. As defined in Chapter 7, this pay-performance sensitivity shows 
percentage change of executive pay when company performance improves by 1%. 
Tables (8-1) to (8-4) show basic statistics of pay-perfonnance sensitivities in the 
UK and Japan. Graphs (8-1) and (8-2) show the histograms of those pay- 
performance sensitivities in both countries. 
UK 
Tables (8-1) and (8-2)' show the basic statistics of pay-performance 
sensitivities in the UK'. Table (8-1) shows the mean, standard deviation and other 
statistics of pay-performance sensitivities in 1994 and 1995. We have four pay- 
performance sensitivities for two years, as we use two pay variables (total pay and 
annual incentive) and two performance variables (profit and earnings per share 
(EPS)). 
Table (8-1) shows firstly, that the mean of profit-total pay sensitivity is 
between 0 and I both in 1994 and 95. As our pay-performance sensitivity shows 
'the percentage change of executive compensation when performance improves by 
1%, a 1% increase in the profit before tax will lead to a 0.159% increase in 
Tables (8- 1) to (8-9) are at the end of this chapter. 
We excluded some observations whose values were equal to zero. Because of our definition of 
pay-performance sensitivity, it may be the case that our sensitivity is calculated as zero, even though 
the 'real' sensitivity is not zero. For example, if the performance is zero, our sensitivity is 
automatically calculated as zero. However, the number of those observations is small. 
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director's total pay in 1994, for example. Similarly, in 1995, total pay will increase 
by 0.197% when the firm's profit improves by I%. 
Secondly, the annual bonus-profit sensitivities are larger than total pay- 
profit sensitivities. On average, annual bonuses are more sensitive to the change in 
profit than total pay is. For example, average profit-annual incentive (Al) 
sensitivity in 1994 is 1.36, which shows that a 1% rise in profit leads to 1.36% rise 
in annual bonus. As total pay is usually composed of fixed pay and annual incentive, 
it also implies that the fixed pay is less sensitive to the change in performance than 
annual incentive is. These findings are consistent with our understanding that 
annual incentives are designed to link the director's incentive with company 
performance in many UK companies. 
Table (8-2) shows the basic statistics of our 'pay-performance change 
dummy'. As described in Chapter 7, this change dummy shows whether the 
company's pay-performance sensitivity intensified or not. The table shows the 
number of companies whose performance-pay sensitivity increased and also the 
number of those companies whose sensitivity decreased in 1995 in the UK. As we 
are able to calculate the pay-performance sensitivity for each company in 1994 and 
95, we are able to find out whether the pay-performance sensitivity in 1995 is 
greater than that in 1994. If the pay-performance sensitivity in 1995 is greater than 
or equal to that in 1994, we set the sensitivity change dummy to I- 
According to Table (8-2), many companies are trying to intensify their 
annual bonus-performance sensitivities and almost two thirds of companies 
intensified its annual bonus-performance sensitivity in 1995. For example, 653 
companies intensify their annual bonus-profit sensitivities while 383 companies 
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weakened the sensitivity. In contrast, the number of companies that intensify the 
total pay-performance sensitivities is smaller than the number of those that 
weakened the sensitivities. For example, 701 compardes out of 1374 weakened 
their profit-total pay sensitivities while 673 of them intensified theirs. 
One problem in Table (8-1) is that, the average value may be affected by a 
few extraordinary value observations. For example, in Table (8-1), the averages of 
'EPS-TP sensitivity in 1994', and 'EPS-Al sensitivity in 1995' are negative. These 
averages may be greatly affected by their negative extraordinary values, as the 
minimum of 'EPS-TP sensitivity' is -1250, and that of 'EPS-Al sensitivity' is -950. 
As these values are extremely small, the average figures without these 
extraordinary values may be different. Thus, this research will draw the histograms 
of pay-performance sensitivities. 
The histograms within Graph (8-1) are of pay-performance sensitivities in 
the UK in 1995. These graphs show the frequency distributions of these 
sensitivities. As pay-performance sensitivity is calculated for each company, the 
height of each bar shows the number of companies whose pay-performance 
sensitivities are within the interval. The horizontal axis of this graph is the value of 
pay-performance sensitivity and the vertical axis is the frequency in terms of 
proportion to the total. 
These histograms are shown to investigate the frequencies in each 
sensitivity interval. Our primary interests include the following questions: 
1) What is the proportion of sensitivity that is greater than zero and more than 1? 2) 
Which interval has the maximum number of sensitivities? Although almost all the 
observations are included in these histograms, some observations are excluded, 
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such as those whose sensitivities are extremely large or small', and those whose 
sensitivities are zero'. Most diagrams are drawn using the sample between -5 and 5. 
These graphs disclose some important points. Firstly, most of the 
sensitivities fall into the interval between 0 and 1. In other words, in most 
companies in te UK, the director's pay will increase by 0- 1% when the company 
performance improves by I%. For example, in Graph (8- 1) almost half of the 'total 
pay-profit sensitivity in 1995' falls into the interval between 0 and 1%. 
Secondly, it is noted that the frequency is largest in the interval 0 and 1/3 
for all the pay-performance sensitivities in 1994 and in 95'. This shows that in many 
companies in the UK, a I% increase in performance will lead to 0- 1/3 % increase in 
director's pay. 
Thirdly, there is a difference in the distribution of total pay sensitivities 
and those of annual bonus sensitivities. The dispersion of annual bonus sensitivities 
is greater than that of total pay sensitivities. The distribution of the total pay 
sensitivities is more centred than those of annual bonus sensitivities. In other words, 
annual bonuses seem to be more sensitive to the change of performance. Some of 
the bonus sensitivities are more than I while there are a few total pay sensitivities 
that are larger than 1. 
Fourthly, these graphs show that pay-performance is negative in some 
' Pay sensitivities that are more than 5 or less than -5 are excluded. It is possible to widen the scale 
of the graph, for example, to the interval between -30 and 30. However, we focus on this relatively 
small scale as there are few observations outside this interval and as the shape of the distribution is 
unchanged if we draw in a wider scale. 
'Observations, whose sensitivities equal to zero, are excluded. They may be set to zero because 
some of the variables in the formula are equal to zero. According to our definition of pay- 
performance sensitivity, sensitivity is calculated as zero if company profit equals zero, for example. 
In this case, we cannot obtain sensitivity, as sensitivity does not necessarily equal zero. 
' It should be noted that the observation of companies whose sensitivities are equal to zero are 
excluded, because of the definition of our pay-performance sensitivity. 
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companies, although this applies to only a few companies. Executive compensation 
may increase even though the performance worsened in these companies'. 
Although it is not easy to interpret this negative relationship between pay and 
performance, we have made some attempts. Firstly, there is a possibility that top 
pay depends on relative performance. For example, performance may be compared 
with those of other companies in the same industry. If, the decline in company 
performance is smaller than that of other companies, executives may be rewarded 
for their relatively 'improved' performance. Alternatively, there is a possibility that 
the company does not have a bonus scheme that is based on performance. If the 
director's pay increases gradually every year, and if the company performance 
declines, then our sensitivity is calculated as negative. 
Japan 
In attempting to investigate the basic characteristics of pay-performance 
sensitivity, similar tables and graphs have been compiled based on Japan's data'. 
Table (8-3) shows the basic statistics for pay-performance sensitivities in 
Japan between 1993 and 1995. Firstly, some sensitivities are less than 0. It should 
be noted that none of the wage sensitivities are between 0 and 1, while most ROC 
sensitivities fall within this interval. In general, the wage sensitivities are larger 
than other sensitivities, i. e. are larger than 1. These sensitivities show that a 
director's pay in Japan is more sensitive to a change in employees' wages than to 
other performances. Director's pay in Japan will increase by more than 1% when 
Or there is a possibility that executive pay decreases even though the performance improves. 
Profit before tax (PBT), return on capital (ROC), and wage are used as performance variables. 
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employees' wage increases by I %. In contrast, the top pay increase will be less than 
1% when ROC improves by 1%. 
Table (8-4) shows the basic statistics of pay-performance sensitivity 
change in Japan between 1994 and 1995. As given in Table (8-2), these sensitivity 
change dummies show whether the company intensifies its pay-performance 
sensitivity or not. In general, there is little sign that large Japanese firms are trying 
to strengthen or weaken their pay-performance sensitivities. For example, the 
number of companies that intensified the total pay-profit sensitivity is almost the 
same as the number of companies that weaken the sensitivities. Similarly, the 
numbers of companies that strengthened the pay-ROC sensitivities and pay-wage 
sensitivities, are almost the same, or smaller than the numbers of those that 
weakened the sensitivities. These tables suggest that large Japanese companies are 
not trying to strengthen the link between director's pay and company performance. 
It is of particular interest to compare Table (8-4) with Table (8-2) that 
shows a comparable table for UK companies. It has been shown that there is a 
substantial difference in the change in annual bonus sensitivities in both countries. 
In the UK for example, more than 60% of companies increase their annual bonus 
sensitivities while in Japan, only 127 companies out of 270 intensify their bonus- 
profit sensitivities in 1994 and 1995. It has been suggested that the companies in the 
UK are more interested in increasing the link between company performance and 
director's pay. 
Graph (8-2) shows the histograms of pay-perfon-nance sensitivity in Japan. 
As is the case for Graph (8-1), these histograms are drawn to investigate the 
frequency distribution of sensitivities. This research examines if the pay- 
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performance sensitivity is larger than 0, or is larger than I. Performance pay data 
include profit, return on capital (ROC) and wage'. The vertical axis shows the 
number of companies in terms of the proportion to the total and the horizontal axis 
shows the value of pay-performance sensitivity. As shown in Graph (8-1), some 
extraordinary value sensitivities are excluded'. 
Some points in Graph (8-2) will now be focused on. As in the UK, many 
sensitivity observations fall into the interval between 0 and 1. For example, the 
most frequent interval of total pay-profit sensitivity in 1995 are 0-1/3. In general, 
director's pay is not very sensitive to the change in performance as their pay 
increases by 0- 1/3 % when company performance improves by I%. 
It should be noted that the proportion of negative sensitivities is quite large 
in Japan. It is difficult to explain why there is a negative relationship between pay 
and perfonnance. 
Another point to raise with regards to this Graph (8-2) is that the pay-wage 
sensitivity is much larger than other performance sensitivities. For example, the 
histogram of pay-wage sensitivity is drawn between -50 and 50, rather than-5 and 
5. In other words, the director's compensation in Japan is very sensitive to the 
changein wage 
' As explained in Chapter 7, wage is included because employee's wage is considered to be one of 
the most important management objectives in large companies in Japan. 
' Sensitivities equals to 0 are excluded, in addition to those whose sensitivities are very large or 
small. 
Or director's pay decreases when company performance improves. 
This observation is consistent with our results in the empirical analysis in previous chapters. In 
Chapter 6, it is shown that there is a positive and significant relationship between profit and 
director's bonus. In contrast, we found a strong relationship between director's pay and employees' 
wage in Japan. 
-261- 
8-3. Regression Results: The Effect of Pay-Performance Sensitivity and 
Annual Incentive in the UK 
In this section, we report the results of our analysis on the effect of 
company's 'way to pay' on firm performance. Tables (8-5) and (8-6) show the 
results of the logistic regression. These equations are estimated using the data of 
listed companies in the UK, following the method described in Chapter 7. 
The sample size is 1415 covered over a time period of I year in 1995 . As 
this research analyses the relationship between pay policy and company 
performance, the performance improvement dummy is used as an dependent 
variable. This performance dummy is set to I if the company improves its 
performance, and otherwise set to 0. Independent variables include the annual 
incentive (Al) dummy", the new annual incentive dummy, 13 pay-performance 
sensitivity and the pay-performance sensitivity change dummy. 
Equations I to 3 in Tables (8-5) and (8-6) test the effect of an annual 
incentive on company performance. These equations compiled to analyse the 
following questions: 1) Are those companies with an annual incentive more likely 
to improve their performance compared to those without? 2) Did those companies 
that recently introduced annual incentive improve their performance? The results 
show that there is a positive correlation between annual incentive and company 
performance. All the coefficients for annual incentive in Tables (8-5) and (8-6) are 
" The annual incentive dummy is set to I if the company has an annual incentive, and is otherwise 
set to 0. 
" The new annual incentive dummy is set to I if the company introduced an annual incentive in 
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positive as expected, and they are statistically significant. For example, in Equation 
I in Table (8-5), the coefficient for annual incentive is statistically significant at the 
5% level. 
Although a positive relationship between annual bonus and profit 
improvement dummy is shown, some may argue that this relationship may be a 
'fake' as both variables are affected by the size of the company. It may be claimed 
that larger companies may have a more detailed pay scheme, such as annual 
incentive. However, our dependent variable is not the level of profit, but the dummy 
variable that shows whether the firm improved its performance. Therefore, our 
dependent variable is not affected by the size of the firm. In addition, according to 
our sample there is no obvious relationship between the size of the company and Al 
dummy". We can also exclude size effect by examining Table (8-6), as the 
dependent variable in Table (8-6) is change in earnings per share (EPS), which is 
less affected by size of the company. 
According to Table (8-6), the coefficients of annual incentive are positive 
and significant. For example, the coefficient in Equation I is statistically significant 
at the I% level, showing a positive relationship between annual incentive and 
earnings per share. Similarly, the coefficient in Equation 3 is also positive and 
significant at the 10% level. These coefficients suggest that the companies with an 
annual bonus scheme are more likely to improve their profit and EPS. As the annual 
incentive dummy is a variable that is either I or 0, this variable does not show the 
level of the compensation, but the way that it is paid. These results show the 
positive association between 'the way to pay' and the company performance. In 
1995, and is otherwise set to 0. 
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other words, the company with an annual incentive scheme is more likely to 
improve its profit and EPS than those without one. 
Equations 2 and 3 in Tables (8-5) and (8-6) show, as expected, that all the 
coefficients of a recently introduced AI are positive. However, 3 of them are not 
statistically significant. The coefficient in Equation 2 in Table (8-5) is significant at 
the 10% level. Thus, it is not clear if the introduction of a new annual incentive 
scheme may lead to higher performance. 
Equations 4-9 in Tables (8-5) and (8-6) show the results of an estimation 
that tests the effect of pay-performance sensitivity on company performance, using 
the same data. These equations are estimated to answer the following questions: 1) 
Are those companies with high performance-pay sensitivities more likely to 
improve their performance? 2) Are those companies that intensify the pay- 
performance sensitivities more likely to improve their performance? 
Equations 4 to 6 in Table (8-5) analyse the effect of 'profit-Al sensitivity' 
on profit growth, while Equations 7 to 9 in Table (8-5) analyse the effect of 
cprofit-total pay sensitivity' on change in profit. It has been shown that the 
coefficients of annual bonus sensitivities are not significant while the coefficients 
of total pay-profit sensitivity are positive and significant. 
Equations 4 to 6 in Table (8-5) show the effect of Profit-annual bonus 
sensitivity on company profit. The coefficients of Al sensitivities are not significant 
and also the coefficients for Al sensitivity changes are not significant. It has been 
suggested that those companies with high AI sensitivity are not more likely to 
improve their profit than those with low Al sensitivities. In addition, there is little 
" In our sample, the correlation between Al dummy and sales in 1995 is only 0.0785. 
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difference in the probability of improving profit between a company that recently 
introduced annual incentive and the company that did not. In other words, 'the 
profit-annual incentive sensitivity' has little effect on company profit. 
Equations 4 to 6 in Table (8-6) show similar results on earnings per share 
(EPS). These equations analyse the effect of 'EPS-AI sensitivity' on EPS. As given 
in Table (8-5), the coefficients for annual bonus sensitivities are not significant, 
suggesting that there is no relationship between Al sensitivities and EPS. Similarly, 
the coefficients for AI sensitivity change in Equations 5 and 6 are not significant. 
These results show that there is no relationship between annual bonus sensitivity 
and company performance. 
Why does this research not find any affect of annual pay sensitivity on 
company performance? Firstly, it may be because pay-performance does not affect 
company performance. If this is the case, then incentives do not matter for the 
CEOs in large UK companies. The other possibility is that our annual bonus 
sensitivities do not reflect real pay-performance sensitivities in these companies. 
As described in Chapter 7, a company may change the proportion of annual bonus 
to total compensation. If this is the case, we fail to obtain a relationship between 
sensitivity and performance improvement because our sensitivity variable is not 
appropriate. Thus, we will test the effect of total pay-performance sensitivity on 
company performance because total pay-performance sensitivity is not affected by 
the 'composition effect' that arises when a company tries to change the proportion 
of annual bonus to total pay. A company may increase the proportion of annual 
incentive to total compensation to motivate directors to work hard toward 
performance targets. However, our 'annual incentive-performance sensitivity 
fails 
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to analyse this effect. Thus, we will analyse the effect of 'total pay-perfonnance' 
sensitivity on performance using Equations 7-9 given in Tables (8-5) and (8-6). 
Equations 7 to 9 in Tables (8-5) and (8-6) analyse the effect of total pay- 
performance sensitivity on corporate performance. The equations in Table (8-5) 
show the effect of total pay-profit sensitivity on company profit, and those in Table 
(8-6) show the effect of total pay-EPS sensitivity on earnings per share. These 
equations are estimated using logistic regression like the other equations in these 
tables. It has been shown that there is a strong relationship between total pay-profit 
sensitivity and company performance, showing that the company with high 
4profit-total pay sensitivity' is much more likely to increase its performance. 
Equations 7 and 9 in Table (8-5) show that all the coefficients of 'total pay 
sensitivity' and those of 'total pay sensitivity change' are positive and significant at 
the I% level. For example, the coefficient, 0.5745 1, in Equation 7 in Table (8-5) is 
positive and significant and significant at the 1% level. These coefficients show a 
positive relationship between performance-pay sensitivity and increase in company 
profit. In other words, companies with high 'profit-total pay sensitivity' will be 
more likely to improve their profits compared to those with low sensitivities. 
Equations 8 and 9 in Table (8-5) show that coefficients for 'total pay sensitivity 
change' are positive and statistically significant at the I% level. In other words, the 
company that increases its 'pay-performance sensitivity' this year is more likely to 
increase its profit. 
Similarly, all the coefficients of the 'total pay sensitivities' and 'total pay 
sensitivity changes' in Equation 7 to 9 in Table (8-6) are positive and significant, 
showing a strong relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and company 
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performance. Equations 7 and 9 in Table (8-6) show that 'the total pay sensitivity' 
has a large explanatory power to the change in EPS. The coefficients are positive 
and significant at the 1% level. In other words, those companies with a larger 
'EPS-total pay sensitivity' are more likely to increase their EPS than those 
companies with low sensitivity. 
In addition, it is also suggested that those companies that intensify their 
pay-performance sensitivity are more likely to improve their EPS than other 
companies. The coefficients for 'total pay sensitivity change' in Equations 8 and 9 
are also positive and statistically significant at the I% level. These results show that 
there is a positive relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and company 
performance. These tables show that those companies with high pay-performance 
sensitivities are more likely to improve their performance. 
It should be noted that these results are obtained using only variables that 
show how directors are paid as all the independent variables show 'how directors 
are paid' and none of them -show 'how much they are paid'. The Al dummy, the 
new Al dummy", and the sensitivity change dummy are dummy variables that 
indicate the company's pay policy. Pay-performance sensitivity is the ratio of 
percentage between pay and performance". Our results suggest that in the UK 'way 
to pay' does affect the company performance. 
" As shown in chapter 7, the new Al dummy shows whether the company has introduced an annual 
bonus this year. 
" Although the amount of pay is used to calculate this sensitivity, it is reported as a percentage in 
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8-4. The Regression Results from Japan's Data 
In this section, we report the results of the regression that analyse the effect 
of company's pay policy on firm performance in Japan. Tables (8-7) to (8-9) show 
the results of these regressions. As our data are from the years 1993-95, these 
equations are estimated using the random-effects probit model". The independent 
variables are pay-performance sensitivity and sensitivity change dummy. The 
annual incentive (Al) dummy and the new Al dummy are not included because 
almost all of the large Japanese companies have annual incentives. We use three 
types of pay variables and three types of perfonnance variables. The pay variables 
are: total pay, pay and bonus, where total pay is the sum of pay and bonus. The 
performance variables are profit before tax, return on capital (roc) and employees' 
wages. As in the previous section, the sensitivity change dummy is set to I when the 
sensitivity in the year is larger than that in the previous year. Tables (8-7), (8-8) and 
(8-9) show the effect on profit, return on capital, and wage, respectively. It should 
be noted that the dependent variable is the future performance improvement 
dummy". 
Table (8-7) shows the effect of profit-compensation sensitivity on 
company profit. The dependent variable is future profit that shows whether the 
company improves its profit the following year. If the company profit increases or 
calculating the sensitivity. 
" XTPROBIT commands in STATA is used to estimate these equations. 
"This research assumes that the pay-performance sensitivity in the year (t) will affect the 
performance in the next year in Japan, as directors are informed of the sensitivity at the end of the 
year. In contrast, we assumed that the sensitivity (t) affects the performance of the same year in the 
UK. This is because directors are informed of sensitivity at the beginning of the year. 
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remains unchanged, then it is set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0. The independent 
variables are profit-TOTALPAY sensitivity change, profit-PAY sensitivity, profit- 
PAY sensitivity change, profit-BONUS sensitivity and profit-BONUS sensitivity 
change. Sensitivity variables show the magnitude of the link between profit and 
compensation, and the sensitivity change variables show whether the sensitivity has 
increased. If the pay-performance sensitivity of this year is larger than that of the 
previous year, then the sensitivity change variable is set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0. 
All the coefficients for these variables are expected to be positive, according to our 
hypotheses. 
Equations I to 7 in Table (8-7) show the result of these estimations". 
Contrary to our expectations, none of the coefficients are positive and significant. 
In other words, there is no positive relationship between pay-profit sensitivity and 
company profit. Some coefficients are positive, such as the coefficient for sbnpbtd 
(bonus-profit sensitivity change dummy), but these coefficients are not significant. 
Some coefficients are significant, but the sign of the coefficients is negative 
contrary to our theory, which predicts positive coefficients. These results suggest 
that the sensitivity does not effect company profit in Japan. 
Table (8-8) shows the effect of return on the capital (ROC)-compensation 
sensitivity on company's return on capital, showing no relationship between pay- 
performance sensitivity and company ROC. The independent variables are ROC 
sensitivity and its change. As given in Table (2-7), there is no positive and 
significant coefficient in Table (8-8). It has been suggested that the ROC is not 
affected by performance sensitivity. These results show that there is no difference 
The effect of total pay-profit sensitivity is not included because the XTPROBIT command in 
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in the probability of improving the ROC between the company with high sensitivity 
and the company with low sensitivity. 
Table (8-9) shows the results of the regressions on wage. These equations 
are estimated in order to test whether the 'compensation-wage sensitivity' affects 
wage. The results in this table are similar to the results in Tables (8-7) and (8-8), 
which show no relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and company 
performance. Only one coefficient in Equation 4 is positive and significant. 
However, considering that the coefficient of the same variable is not significant in 
Equation 6, this sensitivity may not be very effective. None of the other positive 
coefficients are significant. The results in this table show that pay-wage sensitivity 
does not affect employee's wage. 
The results in Tables (8-7) to (8-9) show that in Japan there is no 
relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and firm performance. Neither 
sensitivity nor sensitivity change affect the profit, return on capital, or wage. 
According to Tables (8-7) to (8-9), the probability that the company with high 
pay-performance sensitivity improves its performance is not significantly different 
from that for the company with low pay-performance sensitivity. Our results also 
enable us to re ect the hypothesis that those companies that increase their sensitivity i 
will achieve a higher performance. Thus, our hypothesis that pay-performance 
sensitivity affects the company performance, is not supported in Japan. 
STATA fails to obtain the results because the estimation result does not converge. 
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8-5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, firstly, the basic characteristics of the pay-perfonnance 
sensitivity are examined. As described in Chapter 7, pay-performance sensitivity is 
defined as the percentage change in executive compensation when the firm 
performance improves by I %. The basic statistics of these sensitivities and 
frequency distributions are examined. The main results can be summarised as 
follows. Firstly, in the UK, the number of companies that intensify annual bonus- 
performance sensitivity is larger than the number of companies that weakened the 
sensitivity. In contrast, in Japan, the number of companies that intensify the 
sensitivity is roughly equal to the number of companies that do not strengthen the 
link between pay and performance. Secondly, most pay-performance sensitivity is 
between 0 and I in both countries. In many histograms representing either country, 
frequencies of sensitivities are largest in the interval between 0 and 1/3. In other 
words, in either country in many companies, aI% increase in company 
performance will lead to a 0- 1/3 % increase in director's pay. Thirdly, in the UK the 
distribution of total pay sensitivities are more centred than those of annual incentive 
sensitivities. Fourthly, the proportion of negative sensitivity is large in Japan, 
showing that the link between pay and performance is weak. 
This research estimates performance regression to examine the 
relationship between pay policy and firm performance. The objective is to analyse 
whether the company's 'way to pay for executive' affects the company 
performance in both the UK and Japan. Our primary interest is to answer the 
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following questions: 1) Does the company with a higher pay-performance 
sensitivity perform better than those with a low sensitivity? 2) Can the performance 
of the companies that intensify performance-pay sensitivity outpace the 
performance of other companies? These questions are examined using the data 
from both the UK and Japan. This research also tries to answer the following 
questions: 3 Do companies with an annual incentive (AI) perform better than those 
without Al in the UK? 4) Can those companies that recently introduced an annual 
incentive program for executives improve their performance in the UK? Table (8- 
10) surnmarises these results. 
Table 8-10 Summary table of chapter 8 
The effect of pay system on firm performance in Japan and in the UK 
Japan UK 
Profit ROC Waae Profit EPS 
Annual Incentive (AI) 
. 
3142087** 
. 3539875*** 
(0.1380967) (0.1341149) 
New Al 0.2629953* 0.2180987 
(0.1507894) (0.1488575) 
Al sensitivity -0.0020683 -0.0263091 -0.0001467 0.0153522 0.013814 
(0.0007292)*** (0.0108491)** (0.0003518) (0.0208039) (0.0121101) 
Al sensitivity change 0.0303204 0.1010043 0.1539803 -0.18782 0.0350315 
(0.1684597) (0.1662911) (0.1783185) (0.1830827) (0.1740047) 
Total pay sensitivity -0.0008566 0.5727451 *** 0.7516764*** 
(0.0010103) (0.2998957) (0.1308436) 
Total pay sensitivity change -0.149547 -0.0443269 0.1351245 0.8237644*** 1.024789*** 
(0.1285413) (0.1270848) (0.1417282) (0.1402958) (0.1408631) 
Pay sensitivity -0.0019241 -0.0076261 -0.0001004 
(0.0013167) (0.0073508) (0.0008585) 
jPay sensitivity change -0.0624996 0.0369197 0.2548321 
(0.1353013) (0.1315936) (0.1517213)* 
It is noted that these coefficients are not obtained by same equations. 
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Our analysis on UK's data shows that there is a positive relationship 
between company's pay policy and firm performance. The main findings from the 
UK's data are as follows: The company with an annual bonus scheme is more likely 
to improve company profit and earnings per share. However, the relationship 
between the introduction of a new annual bonus and company performance is weak. 
The 'performance-TOTALPAY sensitivity' for executives has a positive and 
significant effect on both the profit and EPS, although the sensitivity of the annual 
bonus does not. Those companies with high 'total pay sensitivity' are more likely to 
improve their performance compared to those with low sensitivity. In addition, all 
the coefficients of 'change of total pay sensitivity' are positive and significant. In 
other words, those companies that intensify the total pay sensitivity are more likely 
to improve their firm performance. It should be noted that our independent 
variables do not show 'how much directors are paid', but show 'how they are paid'. 
Thus, our results suggest that in the UK the company's pay policy, or 'the way to 
pay' is an important factor for the company director's incentive. 
This research estimates a similar equation using Japan's data. The main 
findings from the Japanese data are as follows: Firstly, there is no relationship 
between the performance-pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these 
results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the 
performance-pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In 
addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay 
policy and performance. These results show that the performance-pay sensitivity 
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does not affect company performance in Japan's large companies, or the directors 
in those companies are not motivated by the change in performance-pay sensitivity. 
The most important contribution of this study is that it shows that there is a 
substantial difference in the effect of company's pay policy on firm performance in 
the UK and Japan". This research shows that the company's 'way to pay' for 
executives does indeed affect the company performance in the UK, suggesting 
incentive does matter. In contrast, there is no relationship between pay-performance 
sensitivity and firm perfonnance in Japan. 
Why then is there a difference in the effect of pay policies on performance 
between two countries? Although the answer to this question is not trivial, one 
reason may be due to the differences in corporate governance and in company's pay 
policies in these countries. 
As seen in chapters 2 and 5, shareholders have strong powers to control top 
managers, and their compensations in the UK. It is often the case that the 
remuneration committee in a large UK company is mainly composed of non- 
executive directors, who are relatively independent from CEOs. 
As described in Chapter 3, the UK companies seem to have a more 
detailed pay plan, which attempts to strengthen the link between pay and 
performance. 
As directors in the UK are informed of performance targets and reward for 
achieving these targets in advance, they may be motivated to pursue these 
performance targets. In contrast, most large Japanese companies do not have 
" It should be noted that there are big differences between Japan's data set and the UK's. Firstly, 'the 
highest paid directors' pay' is used in the UK while 'directors' average pay' is taken In Japan. 
Secondly, cross-sectional data are used in the UK's analysis while panel data are used in Japan's 
analysis. Thus, it may not be appropriate to compare the results of the two countries. 
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explicit performance based pay systems for directors. In other words, directors in 
the UK are more informed about their 'goals"' than those in Japan. As suggested by 
Marsden and French (1998), appropriate 'goal setting' may help people to improve 
their productivity. Our results suggest that the 'goal setting effect', in addition to the 
4 motivation effect'. helps managers to improve their performance. 
As directors in the UK seem to be more informed of the relationship 
between pay and performance than Japanese counterparts, they may be motivated 
to work hard toward these goals when the company intensifies pay-performance 
sensitivity. In other word, the directors in the UK may be able to respond to the 
change in pay policy, as they are well informed. In contrast, it takes time for the 
directors in Japan to respond to the change in company's pay policy, as they are less 
well informed. 
Although this research points to a positive relationship between pay policy 
and performance improvement in the UK", it is not obvious whether this means 
that company performance depends on the company's payment policy". Firstly, 
there is a possibility that directors in the UK may introduce a higher pay- 
performance sensitivity only when they can foresee a better performance in the 
coming year. As discussed in Chapter 7, if they know that the performance is to 
improve, they may try to intensify the pay-performance sensitivity to increase their 
compensations. However, there are two reasons why we believe this is not the case. 
These goals include profit and earnings per share (EPS). 
It should be also noted that we are analysing a certain kind of performance of large UK companies; 
EPS and profit. As we are analysing only short term performance, we cannot assess the relationship 
between pay schemes and the long term performance of the firm. 
" We assumed performance is observed one year after pay-performance sensitivity is observed. This 
assumption is based on our understanding of widely accepted practice in the UK 
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Firstly, if the CEO can foresee the change in performance, and can therefore change 
the pay-performance sensitivity, then we would observe a positive relationship 
between annual incentive and sensitivity, as it may be easier to change the 
performance-annual bonus sensitivity than to change performance-total pay 
sensitivity. Secondly, CEOs may not have enough power to determine the pay- 
performance sensitivity in some companies. In many companies in the UK, a 
remuneration committee is appointed to determine the executive compensation. 
Some companies argue that remuneration committees are comprised of non- 
executive directors. If this is the case, the CEO may not have enough power to 
control their pay-performance sensitivities. 
It may be also argued that firms performing well may have a more detailed 
pay plan, as these companies have enough resources to manage a complex pay plan. 
However, as we have seen, there is a no correlation between company size and 
whether or not a company has an annual incentive. In addition, it is not clear why 
companies that perform well prefer a performance related salary compared to other 
companies. However, this is of minor concern to us in this current research. 
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Graph 8-1 Distribution of pay-performance sensitivity in the UK in 1995 
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Graph 8-2 Distribution of pay-performance sensitivity in Japan in 1995 
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Table 8-1 Descriptive statistics: Pay-performance sensitivity in the UK 
Profit-pay sensitivity Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Profit-Al sensitivity in 94 322 1.360364 18.31556 -166.667 195.2055 
Profit-Al sensitivity in 95 504 1.96345 12.20552 -55.0495 163.7931 
Profit-TP sensitivity in 94 1108 0.158589 3.321202 -45.3875 25.24 
Profit-TP sensitivity in 95 1333 0.197297 11.53983 -384.9 123.2111 
EPS-pay sensitivity 
EPS-Al sensitivity in 94 310 0.877327 20.1442 -200 182.1086 
EPS-Al sensitivity in 95 494 -0.50553 44.234 -950 145.8333 
EPS-TP sensitivity in 94 1050 -0.95749 38.95515 -1250 41.4 
EPS-TP sensitivity in 95 1274 1 0.56127 , 
6.358237 
, -36.0182 1 
138.6651 
Al: Annual Incentive TP: Total Pay EPS: Earnings Per Share 
Table 8-2 Descriptive statistics: Pay-performance sensitivity change dummy in 
the UK 
0 1 Total 
Profit-TP sensitivity change 701 673 1374 
EPS-TP sensitivity change 725 708 1433 
Profit-Al sensitivity change 383 653 1036 
EPS-Al sensitivity change 382 655 1037 
0: Sensitivity decreased 
I: Sensitivity increased or unchanged 
Al: Annual Incentive TP: Total Pay 
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Table 8-3 Descriptive statistics: Pay-performance sensitivity in Japan 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total compensation-profit sensitivity 617 -16.7156 421.2385 -10445.8 535.9844 
Pay-profit sensitivity 552 0.647094 28.5179 -121.196 641.639 
Bonus-profit sensitivity 440 -1.95409 45.92577 -958.334 25.30907 
Total compensation-roc sensitivity 618 -0.77007 21.6317 -474.059 72.72469 
pay-roc sensitivity 552 0.298217 6.349604 -43.7205 77.04689 
bonus-roc sensitivity 441 0.457976 4.697933 -43.4917 48.56375 
Total pay-wage sensitivity 618 1.719848 50.9495 -335.311 712.9421 
Pay-wage sensitivity 552 2.320506 58.49597 -335.311 885.438 
Bonus-wage sensitivity 441 1.306309 111.4027 -1946.23 1106.724 
ROC: Return on Capital 
Table 8-4 Descriptive statistics: Pay-performance sensitivity change dummy in 
Japan 
0 1 Total 
Total compensation-profit sensitivity 204 205 409 
pay-profit sensitivity 179 185 364 
bonus-profit sensitivity 143 127 270 
total compensation-roc sensitivity 205 205 410 
pay-roc sensitivity 179 185 364 
bonus-roc sensitivity 143 126 269 
total compensation-wage 204 206 410 
pay-wage sensitivity 191 174 365 
bonus-wage sensitivity 136 , 
134 
. 
270, 
0: Sensitivity decreased 
I: Sensitivity increased or unchanged 
-280- 
ýc 
+-i 
00 
ýc 
CI) OD 
CM LO 
0 C, 4 cn 
C, 3 C) 00 
- 
C') r- * ' OD cýi le CY) C'2 C%J C* ) CO r- 
ý - cýi 00 <Z m Co ) - j; CIJ o C'4 cl 
"e: LU CD C) : 
LO Cli 00 
CD C, 3 LO 
LO OD CI) 
CD - 
le CO ce) M 1 Co le cn 0 ) 00 LO CO C%i r- C) r, - CD c5 m r- 
00 C, 2 le m 1 c"i '7 C-4 0 6 c(ý . 0 CD CD CD : 
00 C%i Co 
C") - LO C» C%i cz 
Lo Lr) Ci ci 
gt CO CD 0 rý r- . 7 c» Co cm c» 0 CY) 1 r-- Cq Cm C-4 (n ä uý - - 0) C) ö LU C) 
CI) CI) U') CM - C%i C» Co 00 c7) 
le LO CD Cm r- 
(C) Lr) ý C, 2 CD 
C» 00 * r- LO i 
U') 
CJ Izt 
xt, M 
CO 
(D 
(z 
CD C» CJ M OD 
U) OD e 
e 
CD ': t 
(0 - 1 OD (M c» 1 
N Co xý 0 6 Q) 
uj CD CD . (D > 
CI) cýJ 
OD (0 r- 
r- (C) Cm r- 
00 ' Co CD 
- 
r- 
CIA 
U ) 
CD - ö 
00 Co 
CD C') CM 
m ci - 
LO OD OD 
. zý 
LU 1 1 CD c%i 
c2 : 
CM (0 M 
LO CM (0 r- 
CI) C) 
U-) clý 
CD cli OD CO 
CD m 
C *4 CI) 1 
CD CD e 1 
LU cý C%i : 
U-) LO U') 
C%i CO CM : : 
C» 0 CD 
ý 
cli OD 
CO * LO C, 2 U-) CO cy; - 
CY) "7 
LO 
- OD 
OC) 
c, ) 00 
0-, CD C-) C., i - r- 
le CO 
CIJ r- 1 
cýJ 00 (n OD rý 
Lu 0 
cli LO cli C") : : 
r- Co 
ý 
CD 
C-) CO 
r- (0 
C» C) CD e r- 
C%i C%J LO M r- 1 Co 04 CJ U) 
6 N C) (L) (:: ý 
: 
LLJ 
c: > cýJ CD 
CO CD ý (0 C%J (: r- CD - 
ä 
00 ai u-) CY) CD OD - r- CD 00 r' cli ý- 00 e 0 C%j OD Q) CT ci LE 
0 
> > 
(D > 
-0 
> 
' 0 0 (1) E .; 75 c c E c > > 0 (1) :3 0 -b-i :e cn U) :Z C) C%j (n c 0 > 73 0 0-' g) 
ýý ii- > 
> -W «S- i cn r- - :e (0 m c 0 m 0 - - (0 
CL CL m i 9) - 0 4ý + C3 
m (n 3 - :3 
:3 C 
3. U) U) +i W 
c 
73 h 
(L) - 
C 4) 0 0 
0 o (Y) ('0 cy 
Lu , 
< 
, ,Z , ,< , .< . 
C) 
-Eý 
0 
- 
a- > 
ci) 
"p 
ci) 
CD 
lý +ý 
Cd 
C, 2 4-4 4- 
r, -s- * 
Q) u* 
CA ý:: * 
/I- 
00 
0) 
00 
ýc 
&M 
C14 00 00 
0 ý: r cy) LO cc) N 
* * Y * 0 - - U-) r 0 (D 
C ) 
Lc) LO 
m 
ý 
- ll: r ý:: 00 co r4 r- ý4 LO F- '0 cc) 'T C%j to m 00 "T m LO 04 to 1 U) & to U? Cyý C 4 0 
w 0 C) >- 
,:: r (D co 
--zr CY) m Cl) 00 C-4 
m C) 04 
00 
CD 03 CV) co 
' 00 
'T Lo I - C) 04 r, 
OD ": r *. r- 00 C14 CD 04 U) 0 0 (D 
LLI 6 
LO M 00 
RT LO C%j 
c CD - - io 
ci C'i 
00 r- - 
LO 
co 0 - (c) 
r- Zý; co CO 
r- 
00 1 LO 
UJ 
r- LO 
OD r- Cl) 01) 
0) r- r- 
C) C) 
1 CY) OD 0 ) L CD C) C? CV) O co C) Cýo 00 LO Cj -T 
! 0 
00 00 
co ý I CO U-) 
LLI 
LO (o r- LO 
01) C) (n 
* . Lo r- 
- * 
U ) 
- 
9 
C') `4 cli 
a ) 
C: ) C> m Cl) C) a) Cý) I*- C) r- Nl- LO r- M Lr) a) 
LLI 
194- LO r- LO 
- LO cv) 0) 00 r- 
cv) C) C) 
Cl) Cl? Nl- 
LO 00 Cý Nzr Cl) - C) 
C) 
Q) 
w 6 
a) a) C\j 
r- L. 0 r- 0) 
C14 00 r- m 
00 m q 
": r 
Lo 04 C-) LO 00 00 Lf) CC) 04 04 
04 ý: r A 
r- r- LO 
Cl) qr ICT CC) Oo " - ' C'J cv) i U ) 0 Lu 6 6 c cz 6 - 
00 C) LO 0) 
a) 00 r-- CV) LO C) - CO LO * co 00 
7 r- LO 00 0 m 06 N m - 6 CO 00 00 00 'cr 00 
C%j r- 
" U) 
i ai c uj 
C. 0 C-4 
r- cn 
r- co) 
'-1- 0 LO U-) C) Lo C%l 
' 00 r- U ) U') - 00 : ý: LO LO ;0 w 
LO Cýj (1) 
Lo 00 6 4) UJ c'? C5 
hD 
c 
co 
_r_ 
tko > 
-W 
> 
-4-1 _0 
-5 CNJ m 
> > L) 0 -0 > 
C: C: 
J j a) a) :3 (D 4- + cn (n 0 ci (n c L) > > -0 0 0ý 4) S . -P . Zj > > 4ý = I (j) c . F m m c m 0 
6 n n CL CL m 0 
-;, - m < c c 
D V 4) -Fu W w 3 1 Cf) cn c :3 C . 4-1 -0 bD cr C 4) - - 0 0 
0 (n co 
uj < z < 0 CL > 
4-A 
M 
M 
* 
0 r. u CD 
CD bü 
Gn 
C) z. « -4 cn 
. +-i Z-, 
u ; ýI, lý 
> 
1 
C14 
00 
p-, 
r-4 
+-i 
-ý-i 
C 
r. 
+-ä 
10 c; i 
tn 
+-i 
. ý2 
00 
ýc 
LO rl- m U-) m 
00 00 r- -I- ýo 
00 0 : C-4 00 00 00 J LO 
C) Cj C-4 C) U-) " m r- (=) co (=) C-4 to I Lo CD 
m 00 
0) C-) r- CD CD 0 
17 q - & 
LLJ 0 0 ci 
Cl) cv) 
00 (D 
(D LO 6 ý: r 0 4 00 C 
cli C14 
C) * , C-4 C-4 q co 
C) (7) C) 
Cli 
LO 
00 ro 8 LO 9 9 6 
LLJ 0 
I 
C) 
ý II 
(D CV) C) C) qll CD rl- 
C%j 0 5 C-4 
cv) 
C 
C) 
m 
q C'4 
C) C7) 
U) 
00 LO 
LO ýD CD 
17 17 
LLJ C) C) ý I I 
00 (. D m Tr m m CY) (D 
LO LO 6 co m rý r- * - Cl) OC) * 
r- - C) - C) C? U-) q m Cl) co C: ) r- ci C) 00 rý Ilzr 
C14 m LO 
r- 00 OD 
Cl) 0 
17 9 & 
ui C) 0 
Cl) LO 
C14 00 U. ) 
Cl) 
C) a) 
C: ) 0c) 
Cl) C) 
Cl) LO 0 C) & i 6 LIJ c 
(D Cl) C) co CY) C%j C"j (D Cl) C? C-) Cl? 
C: ) - C: ) C) 
(1) cli LO r- Cl) m 
'7 9 
LLJ CD C) 
00 LO a) 
LO Cl) m OD 
0 
C: ) I - 6 I: r CNJ LO m 00 co C) 
'7 Cý 
0 C) UJ I 
m 
- -0 -D -0 
C: :3 0 
OL 4a cl m cy 
-f-) ýt > -0 U) 
-0 cl m 
CL c 
CL > CL c -C 0 !E 7p CL c -0 c (n 0 cn 0) cn I C) I I C) - 
CD 
+-i 
u 
+-a 
vi Q) Q) (U 
r Z 
*Z cn 5 C) Q) Q) ;Z r--4 
ce 
Z Z 
CD 
mi 
- 
Z. 1 
cn 
r-4 
i--i 
n r. < < 9 +-4 . 1) > )--ý u u ý: ) ýD 
CD < 
, 
< 
+L 
4.4 
Z 
LZ 4, 4-4 
ce iZ 4.0 ; -, 44 $-( $-4 
4-1 
cn 
ce 
9 
u 
4ý 
-0 c2. cn rZ 
4-4 C. Z: -0 r_ * m cn v2 cn cn 
1 
(n 
00 
u 
0 
P4 
+-j 
10 
cd 
bl) 
u 
to 
0 
00 
ýc 
04 co 04 a) 
r- co C14 0 to 
r- Lf) C-4 i C'4 Ict co 00 ' 0 U-) CY) 
cli 
Cl) 00 C) C) 
CY) CY) 
cli 0 
to 
C) 
CD 0 C) 
CO - 00 Nr 
C) co 5 m 04 Lr CD LO 
04 
9 A 
- 6 C) m I r- 
R41- 
00 
(D LO 
C? 9 & 
LU C) C) 
U) r- a) ý; r Cl) (D C) Cl) C'i C) LO 
C) M 9 U) CD 14, 
cli 00 (D Cl) LO CD C) 
& 
LLJ c; ý I I ci Iý I I U') r- (0 LO lt: r cli (1) 0 04 (D 
00 LO C) 6 cn CD 00 00 
00 -; 1- 
g 9 - - - 7 cn C) M C) - 0 CY) m I Cl) Cl) 
cn 00 
04 
Cl) 
i C) C) c 
U') 00 04 
m C) U-) 
04 LO 
o 04 
9 00 q cn 
CD C) C) to 
I LO 1 C14 
Cl) OC) 
rý C) 
Cl) C) LO 
9 q & 
ui C) 0 
r- cc 00 1- 
cn I- C) co 
LO ý C') (: 
CD CY) * 
co (:: ) * 
, 04 CD co 
0 Cl) 0 04 
m 
U') C) 
04 
-7 q & 
W C) 
C) 
co C) 
Cl) c') CY) 
CD - 00 cj C) I: t cr) 
1 00 
C) 
r- co 
- C%i 00 
C) 
cr 
ci uj 
m 
-0 0 -D 0 C: :3 
L) L- I- m cr 
L) 0 
(n . 4-ý (1) 
L- c W 1 0 cl c -0 C: > C: 0 c 0 CL - 0 0 U) cn I MI I U)l 1 01 1 1 1 1 Z 
0 
(4-4 
* 
vi 
CU 
c2. 
.E 
0 
j, 
C) 
* 
m 
Z 
"IZ 
ci 
Q) 
rA CA 
.v - - 
ce 
0 
ce m 
M W r_ 421.1 zý 2., ný cý 
2ýb iý C) 
E 
ce 
cn .5 
-0 0 -a 0 
'1. ' 32 Z CD. Z'- 
CD 
_c r_ 
I 
'IT 
00 
C13 
4-1 
Cd 
r4 
00 
a) 
ýc 
NT - CJ 
a) C) LO Ilzr 6 U-) 0) 
0 (D * 
C) - * C) LO 
(:: i 
- 
Lr) 
00 C) 
LO 
00 0 
0 00 LO 0 LO 
0 0 & 6 i Lij c 
(1) C\j LO 
00 (D 
CY) 00 j C') 00 00 C 
ql" qCT * Lf) 0 * 
C\i * co * 
ci c) 
C) 
C14 
LO 
17 
LU 2 
cc a) cc 00 0 
(D Ce) - 
r-- co 00 
m co C-j Cl) 0 r- * 
LO C) co * 
- C-) 
b - 
U-) C: 
5 C%l m 
to C, 4 cli - LO Cl) 00 (M qct 194- CD C-i 
Cl) lq- C) 
'7 9 & 
0 C) LU 
lq: r C14 00 
to I- r- - 
LO (D (=i CD 00 
C) 
C) CD * 
0 LO 
d 
cv) 
b 
C. C) 
CD 
C) 00 
, I- 
C14 C) LO 
q 9 & 
0 C) Lli 
LO 
04 C14 
C) 
Lo 
cv) r- 
cc 
ci 04 
b IFT 
00 M 
C) 
0 LU 
ho ho 
bD _0 m -D cu +j c CID 
m bO ho 3. m :3 
bio m m W +j 
a 
3. 
w (1) (10 m 
OL C: c 
- :p c cl c C 0 -1- cn cn cn U) -- _cn 
(10 1 1 1 1 
E 
E 
"o - ý; 
"I: ý no 
t)L 
CL -0 
79 
rA 
tz 
Z 
2ý, 
rA 
CZ 
, ý. ' 
Z., 
< 1- Cli 
r- 
ýL) 
ce 
" 
U > 
7. "ý, ' 
zý 
< 
9--ý 
zý 
CD 
c2 
rA 
u 
< 
e 
< 
ýD 
Cd 
.- 
Z 
-6.1 
-4-1 * c2. -0 
I 
kn 
00 
9 
ca4 
Cd 
Cd 
Cd 
+-A 
0 
4--J 
r_: 
00 
ým 
C 
U 
01) CID 00 00 m 
cm C» Co m cm 
U') Co OD ö ci 
r, - - r- 
cm CD 00 
cm CD Lr) 
CD r- C) 0-) CD u-) 
u-) 1 - r- LO c*z cli 
C%i M 00 
- CD C» 
Co C) 
cr 
Lii ýc 
0 0 
r- 
Co CD - le 
le C%i 
CD Fi * 
CD CY) 
9 - LO (2) OD 
- 
CD c-) 
- 1 LO cm 
C, 3 Co 
CD le- 
OD CD Co 
C) 0 
6 
c: 5 ä LU C, 2 C, 4 U') CD 
0 Co r- r- 
Co r- ö CN C» m CM * 
LO 
00 m 
C, 
CI) Co 
Co OD 
CD 
LU 
u-) 00 e le 
C) (M Co (D 
cli 
U') 
u-) Co 
CD 
0 CJ - CI) 
01) Co r- c"i 
le le 0 u-) 
Co LO CD C) 01) CD 9 9 0 
- ci C D C: ) LU 1 1 
m 
W 13 m -C3 
73 tii) U cr 
ho m m 
m Co 3. r_ L r_ 
0 -; Z c a c -0 c 
cz 
-0 . - 
rA 
4- 
,* - U 4= 
tg . z;; -Cý -1: 1 bl) bj) 
cd (t 
cn 
+ý 
Ci 
4ý 
r- 
9) 
M Z 
-ci ý-. >. . ýý QZ 
CD 
-a t;. - Q) 
u r_ 
ýb tDü 
I 
IC 
00 
Chapter 9. Summary and Conclusion 
9.1. Summary of Our Findings 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the directors' incentives in large 
companies in Japan and the UK, with particular emphasis on the relationship between 
corporate governance, executive compensation and firm performance. The main 
questions analysed are: 1) What are the main determinants of directors pay in Japan and 
the UK? 2) Can we observe a positive link between pay methods to directors and firm 
performance? The main empirical results of the analyses of these questions and their 
implications are surnmarised in this section. 
9.1.1. The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan and in the UK 
In the first place, we estimated the determinants of directors' pay and their 
bonus in Japan to examine our hypotheses that follow the discussion in Chapters 2 and I 
Methodology and results of this research are described in Chapters 5 and 6 and details 
of our data sets are described in Chapter 4. 
This research examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
director's compensation. We can surnmarise the main results from Japan's data as 
-287- 
follows. As described in Chapter 5, the main hypothesis is that there is a positive 
relationship between director's pay and employees' average wage in Japan. These 
hypotheses are obtained by examining how directors and employees are paid. 
In large companies in Japan, employees are highly motivated to monitor top 
managers because they are implicitly investing their money in the firm through deferred 
compensation. In addition, shareholders hold very limited power to control the top 
managers. 
We estimated the determinants of directors' average pay and bonus, using 
micro ata of 210 large listed companies from 1995 to 1996. The main results of these 
estimations using Japan's data can be surnmarised as follows: 
1) In Japan there is a positive correlation between director's pay and 
employees' wage'. In addition, the director's bonus is also correlated to 
employees' wage'. 
2) In Japan there is no relationship between director's pay and shareholders' 
retum. 
3) In Japan directors' pay does not depend on profit while there is a positive 
relationship between profit and directors' bonuses. 
4) In Japan sales have a positive effect on directors' pay while numbers of 
employees has no effect. 
As described in chapter 4, employees' wage includes their bonus. 
The coefficient for employees' wage is not always significant when sales are included as an independent 
variable. As described in chapter 6, this may be because employees' wage is correlated with sales. 
Chapter 5 shows how sales affect employees' wage in large Japanese companies. 
-288- 
These results show that there is a positive link between director's salary and 
employees' wage in large companies in Japan. It is also suggested that directors' pay 
has no relationship with shareholders' return. 
This research finds no relationship between shareholders' return and directors' 
pay, suggesting that directors are not motivated to pursue shareholders' interest, because 
they will receive little reward for doing so. In contrast, we find a positive relationship 
between director's pay and employee's wage 3. This research also finds a strong 
relationship in Japan between profit and directors' bonus. 
Many previous studies have found a positive link between size of the company 
and executive pay. This research finds a positive relationship between sales and pay in 
Japan, and between sales and bonus but another size variable, number of employees, 
fails to explain either directors' pay or their bonus. This may be because both sales and 
director's salary are affected by firm performance, such as profit. 
Similarly, this research analyses the determinants of executive pay in the UK's 
large listed companies. The pay equation is estimated using around 1500 UK's listed 
company data from 1994-95. The methodology and results of these analyses are 
reported in Chapter 5 and 6. The details of our data set are described in Chapter 4. The 
main findings from the UK sample are as follows: 
1) In general, in the UK all perfonnance variables, including profit (both 
current and previous), stock market capitalisation, earnings per share (EPS) and 
' It is noted that employee's wage in our estimation includes their bonus. As employee's bonus depends 
on firm's profit (Freeman and Weitzman, 1987), the correlation between director's salary and employee's 
wage may indicate that both director's salary and employee's wage may depends on similar 
determinants. 
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sales, have a significant effect on the total pay and fixed pay of directors. 
2) Profit and EPS have a significant effect on the annual incentive for directors. 
These results suggest that directors in large companies in the UK have financial 
incentives to pursue the company's profit or stock market performance, as directors 
have the expectation of receiving higher pay when they achieve higher firm 
performance. 
In addition, we have tested whether there is a relationship between employees' 
wage and directors' salary in the UK. We constructed a smaller UK data set which 
would match the Japanese sample in terms of size. We estimated the determinants of top 
directors' pay, showing that there is no such relationship. 
In addition to the above estimations, we also analysed the determinants of the 
pay gap between directors and employees in large companies in Japan. The objective of 
this analysis is to examine the relationship between pay gap and 'promotion probability' 
of employees. It has been hypothesised that the pay gap is larger if employees are less 
likely to be promoted. If the pay gap between directors and employees is large, then 
employees are likely to work hard towards a promotion to directorship. However, if 
employees think that they have little possibility for promotion, they are more likely not 
to work hard unless the pay gap is very large. Thus, we hypothesise that there is a 
negative correlation between pay gap and probability of promotion. 
We have estimated the determinants of pay gap between directors and 
employees in large companies in Japan. Independent variables include promotion 
-290- 
probability, which is defined as the ratio of the number of directors to that of 
employees'. We analyse this relationship using the same data set as before, which 
covers 210 large listed companies in Japan between 1995 and 96. The methodology and 
results of this analysis is reported in Chapter 6. 
Our estimation shows that there is a negative correlation between pay gap and 
probability of promotion. In other words, pay gap will be larger in a company where 
employees see little probability of being promoted. This result suggests that the 
managerial pay systems in large Japanese companies have a rank order tournament 
structure, which is consistent with our discussion in Chapter 3 that 'rank order 
tournament' type pay structure is employed for managerial workers in large Japanese 
firms. 
9.1.2. The Effect of Executive Pay on Firm Performance in Japan and the UK 
In Chapter 7 and 8, we analyse in the UK and in Japan the effect of the 
company's 'ways to pay for the executive' on its performance. 
This research investigates whether the performance-pay sensitivity affects 
company performance, and whether the performance of those companies that intensify 
their performance-pay sensitivity can outpace the performance of other companies both 
in Japan and the UK. In addition, we also study in the UK whether those companies 
with an annual incentive scheme show an improved performance compared to those 
without Al, and whether those companies that recently introduced an annual incentive 
' As described in previous chapters, in Japan most directors are promoted from employees of the 
company. 
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program for their executive can improve their performance. 
One of the difficulties of this study is that it is not easy to observe each 
company9s perfonnance-pay sensitivity for each year. In this research, we examine 
some possible indices that may show pay-performance sensitivity. Pay-performance 
sensitivity is defined as the percentage change of the company performance divided by 
percent change of the compensation because this sensitivity index is one of the more 
effective measures of company's pay policy. 
We examine the basic characteristics of this pay-performance sensitivity, firstly 
to find out if our newly defined sensitivity variable can be used as an index for pay- 
performance sensitivity, and secondly, to analyse the difference in sensitivity between 
the two countries. We have found that many companies in the UK are trying to intensify 
their pay-performance sensitivity for their top directors. In particular, the number of 
companies that intensify their annual bonus-performance sensitivity is larger than those 
that do not. It is suggested that many companies are trying to strengthen the tie between 
pay and performance. 
In contrast, in Japan, our results suggest that not many companies are trying to 
strengthen the link between pay and performance. The number of the companies that 
both strengthen and weaken their sensitivity is almost the same. In some companies in 
Japan, the pay-performance sensitivity is negative, showing that some companies 
increase directors' pay even when their perfonnance is declining, or vice versa. Our 
results also show in both countries that in many companies, the pay-performance 
sensitivities are around 0- 1/3, suggesting that aI% increase in firm performance will 
lead to a 0- 1/3 percent increase in directors' pay. 
Logistic regression is estimated using data for more than 1000 UK listed 
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companies in 1994-95, in an attempt to analyse if the company's way to pay affects firm 
performance. This data set is the same as the one we use in previous chapters. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that shows whether the company improved its 
performance. Independent variables include pay-performance sensitivity and dummy 
variables that show if the company has some pay packages such as an annual incentive 
scheme. 
The main findings from the UK's data can be surnmarised as follows. The 
company with annual bonus is more likely to improve its company profit and its 
earnings per share (EPS). The 'performance-TOTALPAY sensitivity' for executives has 
a positive and significant effect on both profit and EPS, though the 'sensitivity of annual 
bonus' does not. In other words, companies with high 'total pay-performance 
sensitivity' are more likely to a achieve better performance. These results show that in 
the UK the company's pay policy, or 'the way to pay' is a very important factor 
affecting motivation of the company director's . 
This research estimates a similar equation using Japan's data, using the same 
data set as in previous chapters that contains 210 companies. Our results suggest that a 
company's pay policy has no effect on firm performance in Japan. Our main findings 
are as follows. There is no relationship between the performance-pay sensitivity and 
company performance. Our results do not support the hypothesis that those companies 
that intensified performance-pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their 
performance compared to those that did not. These results show that the performance- 
pay sensitivity does not affect company performance in Japan's large companies, or the 
directors in those companies are not motivated by the change in performance-pay 
sensitivity. 
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There are some differences in the analysis of data from Japan and that from the 
UK. Firstly, the data for 'the highest paid directors' pay' are used in the UK while in 
Japan the data are 'directors' average pay'. Secondly, cross-sectional data are used in 
the UK's analysis while panel data are used in Japan's. Therefore, it is inappropriate to 
compare the two results directly. 
9.2. Implications of the Theory of Corporate Governance and Executive 
Compensation 
In this section, we will discuss the implications of our results on the literature 
of the theory of corporate governance and executive compensation. 
9.2.1. Contributions: The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan and 
the UK 
One of the most important results of our research is that it has provided the first 
systematic evidence that there is a positive relationship between employee's wage and 
director's salary. 
Xu (1993) in his research attempts to find a similar correlation, though to no 
avail. One of the main reasons why his results are different from this research is the 
difference in the characteristics of data sets. As described in Chapter 4, we examine 
various types of directors' salary data in Japan. Director's salary data based on income 
tax may be overestimated because of the inclusion of income from other sources, not 
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related to their employment. In addition, a sample selection bias will arise because one 
can only obtain the president's income data above a certain income threshold. Thus, we 
used the directors' salary that is based on the company's annual report, rather than 
income tax. 
According to our results, in Japan there is a significant and positive 
relationship between directors' compensation and employee's wage. Employees' wages 
have explanatory power for both directors' pay and their bonus. 
Since there is a positive relationship between director's compensation and 
employees' wage, it is suggested that both directors and employees are paid in similar 
ways in large Japanese companies. It is also suggested that both directors and 
employees have a similar incentive system, reflecting that both of them have a strong 
stake in the company through firm specific human capital. 
In contrast, this research does not find any relationship between shareholders' 
return and directors' compensation in Japan. Thus, directors are considered to have little 
financial incentive to pursue shareholders' interest, because they will receive little 
reward for doing so. The results in this research are consistent with the argument that 
directors' in Japan's larger companies pay little attention to shareholders' interest. In 
other words, our results may provide empirical support for why large companies in 
Japan seem to ignore the shareholder's interest. 
One of the most important implications of our results is that this research 
shows a positive relationship in Japan between director's salary and employee's wage,. 
suggesting that both director's salary and employee's wage are paid in similar way, as 
discussed in chapter 5. In other words, director's salary and employee's wage have a 
similar incentive structure. In addition, our estimations on pay gap between directors 
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and employees indicate that director's salary may affect employee's motivation. These 
results indicate that both director's salary and employee's wage can be analysed from 
the same viewpoint. 
As described in Chapter 2, British managers face more pressure from 
shareholders and the financial market, while their counterparts in Japan are constrained 
by the employment relationship rather than by the financial market and shareholders. 
However, few studies exist that examine whether this difference in corporate 
governance affect the determinants of executive compensation. This research is the first 
study that suggests that both directors and employees are paid in a similar way. 
Some previous studies try to investigate if directors in large Japanese firms 
have financial incentives to work toward shareholder's wealth (Kato, 1997, Kato and 
Rockel, 1992a, Kaplan, 1994, Xu, 1992,, 1993,1996,1997). They examine whether there 
is a positive relationship between director's salary and shareholder's return. The 
majority of the studies argue that there is a positive relationship (Kaplan, 2994, Xu, 
1992), however, this research shows that there is no relationship between director's 
salary and shareholder's interest using the new data set. 
So why is our result different from those of previous research? One reason may 
be that our data set is taken in the recession period. It is often the case that director's 
salary increases over time whether or not their performance improves. On the other 
hand, it may be the case that stock prices of most large companies increase in a boom 
period. If these are the case, then one may observe a positive relationship between stock 
price and director's salary, which may not necessarily reflect the company's pay policý, 
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toward directors as the conditions in the stock market greatly affect this. 
As our data set is taken from the recession period, many companies' stock 
prices may not improve. However, the principal-agent theory suggests a positive 
relationship even in a recession period. As described above, this research does not 
observe any positive relationship between shareholder's return and director's salary, 
contrary to previous studies (Kaplan, 1994). Thus, it is suggested that previous research 
may observe a positive relationship that is not based on the company's pay policy, as 
both shareholder's return and director's salary may increase in a boom period, i. e. the 
result has been distorted by the condition of the stock market at the time. 
As described in Chapter 5, our employee's wage includes their bonus. It is 
often argued that employee's bonus reflects the firm's performance, particularly its 
profit (Freeman and Weitzman, 1987). Chapter 6 also shows a positive correlation 
between director's salary and firm Profit. Therefore, the positive relationship between 
directors' salary and employee's wage may show that both director's salary and 
employee's wage are effected by the same factor, suggesting both directors and 
employees have a similar incentive system. Both directors and employees are paid in 
similar ways in large Japanese firms because both of them can be seen as implicit 
investors in the company, as discussed in chapter 5. 
Secondly, this is the first time research that compares the determinants of 
directors' compensation in Japan and UK has been carried out. Some previous studies 
compare the determinants of top directors' pay in the US and in Japan, giving very 
different results. Kaplan (1994), and Kato and Rockel (1992) compare the determinants 
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of top pay in the US and in Japan. Kaplan suggests that directors' pay in Japan and the 
US can be explained by similar factors, showing that in both countries, top directors' 
compensation depends on firm performance. In contrast, Kato and Rockel argue that 
there is a difference in the determinants of executive compensation in both countries, 
showing that shareholders' return has little explanatory power for top director's pay in 
Japan. 
This research shows that there is a difference in the determinants of top 
directors' compensation in Japan and the UK. In Japan, there is a positive correlation 
between directors' compensation and employees' wage while shareholders' return 
cannot explain executive compensation. In contrast, in the UK, there is a positive 
relationship between top directors' pay and stock market value of the company. 
Although the determinants of directors' compensation are generally different, 
there are some similarities. In both countries, the coefficients for profit are positive and 
significant. This suggests that directors in both countries may be motivated to pay 
attention to the profit of the company. In addition, the coefficients for the sales are 
positive and significant in both countries. 
As described in Chapter 2, there is a difference in corporate governance style 
between in the UK and Japan. Shareholders and financial markets have considerable 
power over top directors in the UK, while in Japan employees have an incentive to 
monitor top managers as they acquire firm specific skills. Our analysis on the 
comparison of the determinants of executive compensation in both countries suggests 
that the difference in corporate governance does affect the director's salary and their 
incentives. 
Thirdly, this research provides an analysis that is based on new data sets in 
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both countries. For example, our data set includes around 1500 listed companies in the 
UK, which is larger than most studies that estimate the determinants of executive pay in 
the UK. As shown in Chapter 3, most previous studies employ data sets that contain 
anything between 30 to 300 companies as a sample. Studies by Conyon and Leech 
(1994), and Gregg Machin and Szymanski, (1993) use data sets whose sample size is 
around 300. 
The other advantage of our data set is that it shows the details of directors' pay 
in the UK. For example, our data show the amount of fixed pay and annual incentive for 
each director so it enables us to analyse the determinants of top director's fixed pay and 
those of annual bonus, separately. This is important because fixed pay and annual bonus 
may depend on different set of factors, as mentioned by McKnight (1997). 
In addition, as our data for Japan are based on 1995-96 data, our results provide 
evidence based on recent data sets. This is considered to be important as almost all the 
studies of the determinants of executive compensation use data from the 1980's. For 
example, Kato and Rockel (1992a) use data from 1985 and Kaplan (1994) uses data 
from 1981-1984. As this research uses data from 1995-96, our results will provide 
evidence based on recent data. 
Lastly, our analysis on pay gap between directors and employees shows a 
negative correlation between pay gap and probability of promotion. It is suggested that 
large companies in Japan use a 'rank order tournament type' incentive system. 
As described in Chapter 3, one of the main characteristics of the employment 
structure of large Japanese firms is that new employees are allocated to the bottom rank 
of the employment hierarchy and that they are supposed to be promoted to a higher rank 
through competition with their colleagues. Our results are consistent with this view, as 
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in a rank order toumament, employees are supposed to compete with their colleagues to 
be promoted to higher position within the company. 
9.2.2. Contributions: The Effect of Pay Policy on Firm Performance in Japan and 
the UK 
This research also analyses the effect of pay policy on firm's performance. The 
major contribution of these results can be surnmarised as follows. Firstly, to our 
knowledge, this is the first research of its kind that analyses the effect of directors' pay 
systems on firm's performance in Japan and the UK. Only a few studies exist that 
attempt to analyse the effect of the company's way to pay on firm performance (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990b, 1990c, Abowd, 1990). Their results suggest that those companies 
with higher pay-performance sensitivity are more likely to achieve a higher firm 
performance. Although the methodology used in their research are differs from that 
used in this research, our results are consistent with theirs. Our estimation in the UK 
shows that there is a positive relationship between company's pay policy and firm's 
performance. For example, those companies with an annual bonus scheme are more 
likely to achieve an improved performance than those without. In addition, the company 
that intensifies the pay-performance sensitivity is more likely to improve its 
performance. 
Secondly, this research shows that there is a significant difference between 
Japan and the UK in the effect of pay policy on company's performance. Our results 
show that the company's 'way to pay' their executive is an important incentive for them. 
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and thus, in the UK, it affects the company's performance in the UK whilst in Japan the 
pay-performance sensitivity does not seem to affect the company's performance. One 
reason for this difference may be the 'goal setting' effect of the director's pay scheme. 
In many UK companies, directors are informed of their performance target after which 
they can concentrate on them. In contrast, most large companies in Japan do not have an 
explicit executive compensation program that shows performance targets. 
Thirdly, this research newly defines pay-performance sensitivity. The 
advantage of our sensitivity index is that we can observe the change of pay-performance 
sensitivity as we are able to calculate this pay-performance sensitivity for both each 
year and each company. Jensen and Murphy (1990b, 1990c) calculate pay-perfonnance 
sensitivity for each company, however, one cannot observe the change in their pay- 
performance sensitivity as their sensitivity can be calculated over that length of time. 
Therefore, our measure of pay-performance sensitivity makes it possible for us to 
analyse the effect of 'change of sensitivity' on firm's performance. 
In addition, our results give another example of results that test the 
effectiveness of performance related pay. Although some studies analyse the effect of 
performance related pay on performance (Marsden and Richardson, 1994, Marsden and 
French, 1998), little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of performance related 
pay for top directors. Our results also indicate the effectiveness of perfonnance related 
pay for top directors, as a positive relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and 
firm perfonnance is observed in the UK. 
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9.3. Policy Implications 
In this section, the policy implication of our study will be discussed. Corporate 
governance has been a ma or public debate recently both in Japan and the UK. One of j 
the major concerns is that many monitoring devices for managers may not be effective 
enough. In other words, top managers may face little pressure from stakeholders, such 
as shareholders of the company. Some scholars argue that the majority of monitoring 
devices for managers is not effective because of the moral hazard problem. As described 
in Chapter 2, Stiglitz (1985), and Hart (1995) suggest that even hostile take-over and 
monitoring by large shareholders may not be effective'. In response to these debates, 
some recommendations are presented regarding corporate governance and top director's 
pay in the UK. In Japan, some companies are trying to strengthen the tie between firm's 
performance and executive pay, though few changes have been made regarding the 
regulation on corporate governance. 
As described in the previous section, our estimations of the determinants of 
executive pay in Japan suggest that directors in large Japanese firms may not have 
enough financial incentive to pursue the shareholder's return. In other words, directors 
may not be punished by shareholders even if they fail to follow shareholder's interest. 
Although it is not necessarily straightforward as to whether stockholders are 'owners' of 
' They point out that take over may not be effective as the current management team may have more 
information than the external investors. In other words, external investors may try to buy the company 
because they do not have enough information on the company. In addition, large shareholders may 
collude with the current management team. 
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the company, they are nevertheless investing large amounts of money in the company. 
Thus, it may be important for shareholders to be able to monitor the top management so 
that managers are motivated in pursuing shareholder's wealth. As suggested in much of 
the research, executive compensation is an important device to motivate directors. In the 
UK, listed companies are recommended to disclose the details of executive 
compensation. However, there is no such regulation or recommendation in Japan. As 
described in Chapter 4, most companies do not disclose the amount of executive 
compensation for each director. Thus, this research suggests that all the listed 
companies are better off disclosing the detail of executive compensation for top 
directors in listed companies in Japan. This will make executive pay in Japan more 
accountable for shareholders. Similarly, as is the case in the UK, the detail of top pay 
should be disclosed whereby particular emphasis should be laid on the disclosure of 
stock options. 
9.4. Possible Limits of This Study 
This research has highlighted some points that could be improved for future 
research. Firstly, it is not straightforward to interpret our statistical results as evidence 
that large companies in Japan behave like employees own them. 
As we find no relationship between shareholders' return and directors' pay in 
Japan, the directors in large companies probably have incentive to pursue shareholders 
return. However, a positive relationship between directors' pay and employees' wage 
does not necessarily show that directors' pay depends on employees' wage. 
As 
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described above, a positive relationship between director's salary and employees' wage 
indicates that both directors and employees have a pay structure based on similar 
incentives. 
This research does not clearly define who the employee in Japan's large 
companies is. In their annual report, every listed company discloses the number of 
employees working for them. It is often the case that this number does not only include 
the core employees, such as senior managers or full-time workers, but also part-time 
workers and seasonal workers. Many scholars argue that large companies in Japan are 
managed for the sake of 'core employees' (Komiya, 1988). Usually, only full-time 
workers are considered to be the 'core employees' of the company. Thus, if we use 'the 
average wage of core employees', rather than 'the average wage of total employees', 
then we would be able to obtain more accurate estimates, although this kind of data are 
not easy to come by'. 
9.5. Future Project 
In this section, we will discuss some possible future research projects that may 
extend this research. Particular emphasis is laid on the interaction between employees' 
wage and directors' pay in Japan, and stock options in both countries. Research on the 
development of the corporate governance style of large Japanese companies is also 
mentioned. 
' As each company has a different composition of workforce in terms of their age, gender, tenure, etc, 
their average wage may reflect the difference in the composition of the work force rather than the 
difference in the level of wage. Although we cannot avoid this problem completely, we try to control this 
effect using dummy variables and difference of variables. 
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Our analysis on the detenninants of executive pay in Japan shows that there is 
a positive relationship between director's pay and employees' wage. As described in the 
previous chapters, we do not include employees' wage as an endogenous variable 
explicitly in our estimation'. However, as mentioned in the previous section, there is a 
possibility that in Japan employee's wage also reflects the change in performance in 
large companies. This point is considered to be important as many studies suggest that 
employees' annual bonus reflects change in firm's performance (Freeman and 
Weitzman, 1987). Typically, bonus shares are 20-30% of employee's annual income. 
Thus, it may be worth analysing the interaction between employee's wage and 
directors' pay. In other words, we may analyse the simultaneous determination of 
director's pay and employee's wage. 
In future research, the determinants of both employee's wage and director's 
salary will be estimated as the endogenous variable. One of the main questions is 
whether in large Japanese companies the employees are paid like the directors. If 
employee's wage reflects a fluctuation of the firm's performance, employees are 
considered to take some risk of the company. 
There are some advantages in this project. Firstly, we can analyse director's 
pay as a part of the pay structure that covers the whole company. It may be important to 
examine the incentive systems of the companies as a whole, because the director's 
salary is considered to be an incentive device for other employees to work hard. 
Employees in large Japanese companies are motivated to work hard to be promoted to 
higher positions within the company, such as directors. Our empirical analysis in 
' Japan's employee's wage variable may be affected by firm's profit as employee's wage includes their 
bonus. 
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Chapter 6 supports this view, as pay gap between directors and employees is larger in a 
company where employees face less chance of promotion. In addition, we will be able 
to analyse the similarity and differences between director's pay and employee's wage. 
This may be of interest because the distinction between directors and employees may be 
smaller in large companies in Japan compared to that in other countries. 
In our analysis in Chapter 5 and 6, we do not analyse the determinants of 
employees' wage explicitly. In addition, we do not assume that there is a difference in 
the employees' commitment to the company, and that the difference in the commitment 
may effect the relationship between directors' pay and employees' wage. However, it is 
possible to assume that employees have a greater power in governing the company in 
some companies compared to others. 
For example, it may be the case that employees have more power if the 
company is strong on essential human capital, or if employees take more risks than 
other stakeholders do. In other words, it may be worth measuring the employee's 
4commitment' to the company, and relate this commitment to the company with other 
variables, such as the degree of correlation between director's pay and employee's wage. 
Our hypothesis predicts that the relationship between director's pay and employee's 
wage is larger in a company where employees have a strong commitment to the 
company'. 
This employee's commitment may be seen as 'risk taking' by the employees, 
and their implicit investment in the company in terms of deferred compensation, or their 
firm specific skill that is essential to the company. 
' In this hypothesis, the dependent variable is the correlation between a director's pay and an employee's 
wage. 
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In this project, firstly, we will assess the 'employee's commitment to the 
company' index. For example, it may be possible to estimate how employee's wage is 
affected by firm's performance by estimating the wage function. In addition, we will 
estimate the correlation between director's pay and employee's wage. Then, we will test 
the hypothesis that correlation between director's pay and employee's wage is larger if 
employee's wage depends on firm's performance'. 
In addition to the above project, which attempts to extend the research on the 
effect of corporate governance on top executive pay, we will analyse the effect of stock 
option on director's incentive in both countries. In Chapter 7 and 8, we analyse the 
effect of director's pay on firm performance. However, we do not mention the effect of 
stock option on director's incentive to firm performance, although stock option is 
widely used in large UK companies. Although stock option has not been used in large 
Japanese companies because of legal problems, some companies are introducing a stock 
option in order to motivate directors to pursue stock market performance of the 
company. So, two main questions arise: 1) Does stock option really motivate directors 
to focus on shareholders' interests? 2) Do those companies with a larger stock option 
package perform better than others do? We will examine these questions separately in 
both countries. 
Firstly, we will examine the first question in Japan. It may be too early to 
examine the effect of stock option on firm's performance in Japan, as the stock option 
scheme has only just began. Thus, we will focus on the effect of the stock option on 
9 Alternatively, we may be able to use the level of employee's pre-retirement bonus as a indicator of 
deferred compensation. An employee may have strong 'commitment' if he receives a large pre-retirement 
bonus, because he has invested his assets in the company implicitly. 
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director's motivation". The questions we are interested in are as follows: 1) Do 
directors really understand the objective of the stock option and its performance target? 
2) Do they think that the stock option is effective enough to motivate them? A 
questionnaire survey and interview will be the main method to analyse these questions. 
Similarly, we will examine the same questions in the UK. In addition, we will 
analyse the effect of stock options on firm's performance as stock option is widely used 
in large UK companies. Then, the main questions to be analysed will be as follows: 1) 
Do those companies with stock options perform better than those without? 2) Do those 
companies with a larger stock option package perform better than others do? 3) Is there 
any condition where stock options work more effectively? These questions will be 
analysed using quantitative data. As there are various types of stock options, we will 
analyse the advantages and disadvantages of each type of stock options. 
'0 It may be important to analyse the relationship between the effects of stock options and the types of 
directors. Stock options may motivate some directors who will respond to this kind of incentive scheme, 
though other types of directors may not be encouraged. 
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